«I. Introduction The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) held the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference, entitled ...»
Next, Kocherlakota commented on two challenges for policy in the near future. First, he posed the challenge for central banks of devising an eﬀective way to communicate with the market about their exit policies. He explained that it was not business as usual in the sense that there could be no return to the Taylor rule for a while, even if the output gap and the inﬂation gap were resolved. Second, he referred to the observation that the natural interest rate would continue to remain low for some years compared to historical standards. He pointed out that keeping interest rates low might be associated with ﬁnancial instability. In relation to these comments, Kazuo Momma (Bank of Japan) asked whether central banks were succeeding appropriately in sharing uncertainty involved in the economic outlook with the market. He emphasized that care should be taken in setting an achievable target on the real side of economy, such as the natural interest rate and the natural unemployment rate, because nobody knew exactly what these rates were and this made central banks’ communication more complicated.
Plosser agreed that it was important to understand that there were measurement errors in economic variables, and stressed that it was important to implement robust policy rules against measurement errors and to achieve transparency in communication.
Yörüko˘ lu commented that central banks did not share a quantitative standard model g which enabled them to assess how the stock and ﬂow of QE aﬀected prices.
Regarding exchange rate and foreign reserves policies, Jordan referred to Goodfriend’s keynote speech that pointed out an aspect of the carry trade in monetary policy and stated that the SNB could temporarily face capital losses, due to foreign exchange rate ﬂuctuations, but that the SNB should be able to compensate potential losses in the long run through seigniorage. Nakaso mentioned the fact that Japan was more or less in a situation similar to Switzerland in the sense that it had large foreign reserves. On top of this, he supposed that the SNB was now one of the QE-sians, and that its exit strategy was no less diﬃcult than that of other central banks given the relative size of its balance sheet. Braun asked about potential scenarios in which Switzerland faced the “queasiness” of QE-sians, for instance, would a sharp depreciation of the Euro make the Swiss National Bank queasy? Jordan replied that the SNB diﬀered greatly from the QE-sians as the SNB implemented a minimum exchange rate policy and did not have any quantitative target for the size of its balance sheet.
Regarding Rajan’s concerns about the international spillovers of prolonged accommodative monetary policy in advanced countries, Goodfriend suspected that the United States, the euro area, and Japan were not subject to such a sub-optimal situation as Rajan had pointed out, because they still had inﬂation below the target level. Plosser 17 suggested that being transparent and operating in a predictable way amounted to international coordination of a sort, because doing so helped other countries to cope with policies. Hamada argued that monetary policy coordination between major countries is not necessary under the genuine ﬂoat perhaps except for such an adjustment case as Plosser had pointed out. Ito stated that, for major central banks, domestic considerations justiﬁed their QE policy. He objected to the view that these countries were in a currency war, noting that even usual interest rate policy as well as QE policy caused international spillovers and that there was often a misconception that QE functioned only through exchange rates.
In response to these comments, Rajan argued that whether each country was in a sub-optimal situation due to the international spillovers would depend on the extent to which central banks’ policies could take care of ﬁnancial risk as well as the level of domestic inﬂation. He also mentioned that in Japan structural policies (the “third arrow” of “Abenomics”) were important for positive feedback on general prices rather than import prices, although QQE might contribute to a rise in inﬂationary expectations in the short run. Végh argued that attention must be paid to international cooperation not only among advanced countries but also between advanced countries and emerging countries. He illustrated that tapering by the Fed might cause capital outﬂows from emerging countries and hence the depreciation of their currencies, forcing them to raise interest rates while their GDPs were falling. Nakaso commented that we might need to improve collectively devised international mechanisms for facilitating adjustments when the direction of capital ﬂows changed quite abruptly. In this regard, he mentioned that the central bank community had already stepped into the area of supranational policy measures, including central bank swap lines to cope with the global liquidity shortage of U.S. dollars.
References Adrian, Tobias, and Nellie Liang, “Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability,” paper presented at the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era,” in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014.
Federico, Pablo, Carlos A. Vegh, and Guillermo Vuletin, “Reserve Requirement Policy over the Business Cycle,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2014-E-6, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2014.
Gertler, Mark, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, “Banking, Liquidity and Bank Runs in an Inﬁnite Horizon Economy,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2014-E-7, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2014.
Goodfriend, Marvin, “Monetary Policy as a Carry Trade,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 32, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2014, pp. 29–44 (this issue).
Ikeda, Daisuke, and Takushi Kurozumi, “Post-Crisis Slow Recovery and Monetary Policy,” paper presented at the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era,” in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014.
Ito, Takatoshi, “We Are All QE-sians Now,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2014-E-5, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2014.
Kuroda, Haruhiko, “Opening Remarks,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 32, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2014, pp. 25–28 (this issue).
Lipton, David, “From Deﬂation to Reﬂation? Japan’s New Monetary Policy Framework, Effectiveness, and Broad Lessons,” speech at the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era,” in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014 (available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/052814.htm).
Plosser, Charles I., “Inﬂuencing Expectations in the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” remarks at the 2014 Bank of Japan-Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Conference: Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era, in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014 (available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2014/05-28-14-boj.cfm).
Rajan, Raghuram G., “Concerns about Competitive Monetary Easing,” remarks in the Policy Panel Discussion at the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era,” organized by the Institute of Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014 (available at http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id= 896).
Tucker, Paul, “Underpinning the Legitimacy of Independent Central Banks,” remarks at the 2014 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era,” in Tokyo on May 28–29, 2014.
Wednesday, May 28, 2014 Morning Opening Session Chairperson: Tomoo Yoshida, Bank of Japan Opening Remarks: Haruhiko Kuroda, Bank of Japan Keynote Speech: Marvin Goodfriend, Carnegie Mellon University
Thursday, May 29, 2014 Morning Session 3: Banking, Liquidity and Bank Runs in an Inﬁnite Horizon Economy Chairperson: Esther L. George, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Paper Presenter: Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Princeton University Discussant: R. Anton Braun, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Session 5: Post-Crisis Slow Recovery and Monetary Policy Chairperson: Jun Il Kim, Bank of Korea Paper Presenter: Takushi Kurozumi, Bank of Japan Discussant: Mark A. Wynne, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2014