«Chapter Four AN INFORMATION-BASED REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS* Major Norman C. Davis, USMC The world is on the cusp of an epochal shift from an ...»
14While the French and British calculated the speed of a combined-arms unit by that of its slowest element, the Germans measured it by that of the fastest—the tank—and insisted that their Panzer divisions move as rapidly as possible. Lt. Col. Douglas A.
MacGregor, USA, “Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War,” Parameters, Winter 1992–93, p. 36.
15Van Creveld, Technology and War, pp. 235–236.
16Jeffrey R. Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield—Removing the ‘Fog of War’: A Framework for Understanding an MTR of the Information Age” (Arlington, VA: SRS Technologies, June 1993), p. 23. Unpublished manuscript; cited with permission of the author.
17See, for example, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Morrow Press, 1980).
18Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming,” pp. 3–4.
19General James A. Van Fleet, USA, quoted in Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: MacMillan Press, 1973), p. 91.
20William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 68– 69.
21Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, “Always in Readiness for the Defense of the Fatherland,” Voyenizdat, 1982.
22Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, DC: 1993), p. 237.
An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs 97 23Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Military and the New ‘Technological Operation’ in the Gulf,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 1991, p. 17.
24Ibid., p. 15.
25In fact, some have speculated that those capable of producing such weapons will dominate warfare to a degree not seen since Western Europeans conquered and colonized most of the known world. Hammes, “The Evolution of War,” p. 35.
26Lt. Col. Edward Mann, USAF, “One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?” Military Review, September 1993, p. 37. Emphasis in original.
27Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau, USA, “In the Wake of Revolution, Continuity and Change: A Soviet General Staff View of Future Theater War,” Military Review, December 1991, p.
28“From Plato to NATO, the history of command in war essentially consists of an endless quest for certainty....” Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Press, 1985), p. 264.
29Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield,” pp. 1–2.
30Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming,” p. 7.
31Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 19.
32Ibid., pp. 13–14. The Bosnian Serbs appear to be following such a strategy.
33Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), pp.
34FitzGerald, “The Soviet Military,” p. 38.
35Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 38.
36“The old-style Soviet central planning with huge stocks of unwanted merchandise was the ultimate example of this paradigm.” Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield” p. 26.
37Ibid., p. 19.
38Ibid., p. 19.
39“Armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their former successes than by the skill of their opponents.” J.F.C. Fuller, “The Tactics of Penetration,” The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, November 1914, p. 389. Quoted in Maj.
Anthony M. Coroalles, USA, “The Master Weapon: The Tactical Thought of J.F.C.
Fuller Applied to Future War,” Military Review, January 1991.
40The Marine Corps’ development of amphibious doctrine and techniques in the interwar years, despite the example of Gallipoli during World War I, is one such example.
41See Bruce Gudmundsson, “The Multiple Launch Rocket System: On Time and Under Budget,” Kennedy School Case Program C16-87-773.0, Harvard University, 1987, for an excellent example of this phenomenon.
42Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” International Security, Summer 1988, p. 136.
43J.F.C. Fuller, “A Study of Mobility in the American Civil War,” Army Quarterly, January 1935, p. 271. Quoted in Coroalles, “The Master Weapon.” 44The Romans, for example, made exactly this sort of decision when they chose to rely primarily on highly disciplined infantry forces instead of uncontrollable masses of cavalry. A millennium later, the hugely successful Mongols designed their cavalry 98 In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age formations specifically to facilitate control in battle. Maj. Ralph Peters, USA, “The Movable Fortress: Warfare in the 21st Century,” Military Review, June 1993, p. 66.
45Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield,” pp. 33–34.
46“In Desert Storm, the effective employment of precision systems such as the FGBU-27 combination required correspondingly precise target information, whereas the areas in which the strategic portion of the air campaign was least effective were precisely those in which fundamental gaps in Coalition understanding of entire target systems existed.” Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, p. 248.
47Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield,” pp. 40–41.
48As both the U.S.S. Stark and Vincennes incidents demonstrated, in the age of “information overload” the slowest component in the tactical chain of command is often the human making the decision of whether or not to shoot.
49“In a sense, General Norman Schwarzkopf’s brilliance in Desert Storm was in knowing when to be quiet.” Captain John W. Bodnar, USNR, “The Military Technical Revolution: From Hardware to Information,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1993, p.
50Officers in the basement of the Pentagon helped pick targets and plan attacks; staffs at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia managed CENTAF’s spare parts accounts; Space Command provided warning of missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia; and meteorologists processed weather information for use within the theater. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, p. 248.
51Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 36.
52“Most adversaries that the United States and its allies face in the realms of lowintensity conflict—international terrorists, guerrilla insurgents, drug cartels, ethnic factions, etc.—are all organized like networks (although their leadership may be quite hierarchical). Perhaps a reason that military (and police) institutions keep having difficulty engaging in low-intensity conflicts is because they are not meant to be fought by institutions.” Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming,” pp. 17 and 23.
53Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield,” pp. 34–35.
54To cite just a few examples, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft now use the same Air Tasking Order; data collected by Air Force surveillance aircraft guides the movement of Army formations; long-range Army missiles strike deep targets while Air Force aircraft engage enemy vehicles in contact with friendly forces; and national sensors alert anti-tactical ballistic missile forces of missile launches. Martin C. Lybicki and CDR James A. Hazlett, USN, “Do We Need an Information Corps?” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, p. 89.
55“While games can be nice while they last, in our age too there is a real danger that they will be upset by barbarians who, refusing to abide by the rules, pick up the playing-board and use it to smash the opponent’s head.” Van Creveld, Technology and