FREE ELECTRONIC LIBRARY - Dissertations, online materials

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 12 | 13 || 15 | 16 |   ...   | 57 |

«THE RHODESIAN CRISIS IN BRITISH AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1964-1965 by CARL PETER WATTS A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham For the ...»

-- [ Page 14 ] --

a fundamental Anglo-American concern. 221 Second, the FO and the CRO diverged on the objectives of British policy, and the most efficacious means of achieving those objectives.

FO officials felt that the CRO had given little consideration to the pressures that the British Government was likely to face as a result of the international reaction to a UDI, particularly in the United Nations, where responsibility for defending British policy and interests rested with the FO, not the CRO. In May 1965, Derrick March, an official in the

FO West and Central Africa Department wrote:

–  –  –

question. It is one of the great faults of the Sub-Committee on Rhodesia that although many papers have been prepared on detailed aspects of a unilateral declaration of independence nothing has been written about the reactions of Afro-Asian Governments, the OAU and the United Nations, and the effect on our international position if [Her Majesty’s Government]

–  –  –

March argued that if economic warfare broke out between Rhodesia and Zambia, and the UN passed a resolution in Chapter VII terms, the British Government would have to demonstrate that it was willing to support African and UN forces to overthrow the rebel government. 223 March observed that if this situation was reached, the British See below, Ch. 6, for an extensive discussion of the problems that this caused in Anglo-American relations.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Minute by Derrick March, 24 May 1965.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is concerned with ‘Action with respect to threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’, i.e. situations that constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. This provides for Member States not actively concerned with a dispute to Government would have to consider the use of British troops to end the rebellion which would, in any case, be very much cheaper than the threat posed by economic sanctions to the whole Sterling area envisaged by the Board of Trade. March argued that the British Government should not allow a minority of 217,000 Europeans, of whom 75 per cent

–  –  –

suggested that the Rhodesian Government would not contemplate a UDI if the British Government demonstrated sufficient resolve, but acknowledged that the situation might deteriorate ‘if the Rhodesian Government proceeds on the assumption that troops would never be used in any circumstances.’ 224 There was not much sympathy in the FO towards suggestions that force might have to be used. 225 However, senior officials certainly emphasised the need satisfy, so far as possible, public opinion in Britain, in Africa, and in the United Nations, without running Britain into bankruptcy in the process. 226 The FO therefore favoured measures with presentational value that could be implemented at little economic cost to Britain, such as take action against the state responsible for the existence of a dispute. The Foreign Office was concerned that the CRO did not understand the difficulties that the British Government was likely to face as a result.

See TNA: PRO, FO 371/181879, passim.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Minute by Derrick March, 24 May 1965. Emphasis in the original.

One official suggested that ‘no responsible government could willingly initiate the use of force for the solution of a political problem in the present situation in Africa. The experience of the Congo is surely too recent to be forgotten, and no one can foresee how, when released from the bottle, the genie of force could be put back. The one thing that does seem certain is that if force were employed against Rhodesia one of the principal and most immediate sufferers would be Zambia.’ TNA: PRO, FO 371/181879, C. M.

MacLehose to Oliver Wright, 28 September 1965.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181877, Minute by Sir Roger Allen, 10 June 1965; and Minute by R. J. M. Wilson, 14 June 1965.

the exclusion of Rhodesia from Her Majesty’s Dominions. The CRO, on the other hand, believed that stringent economic measures would work if given sufficient time and there was therefore no need to consider exclusion. In July 1965, Arthur Bottomley wrote to the Prime Minister: ‘Such a Bill will not be required until some time after any unilateral declaration of independence, and only then if we have decided, in the light of developments, to accept the success of the declaration, which we hope will not happen.’ 227 FO officials were unhappy with Bottomley’s proposal that no further action should be taken, and Martin Le Quesne therefore prepared a draft minute of opposition for consideration by the Foreign Secretary. Meanwhile the Prime Minister took advice from Sir Burke Trend and the FO was advised that Wilson concurred with Bottomley’s

proposal. Michael Stewart then wrote to the Prime Minister:

–  –  –

period during which we hope that the various forms of economic and political pressure open to us will serve to bring public opinion in Rhodesia

–  –  –

however, that we must, at any rate in our planning, admit the possibility that these measures will not succeed in their object and that we shall at some stage be faced with the necessity of taking the serious step of declaring that Rhodesia is no longer one of Her Majesty’s Dominions. 228 Stewart accepted that the problems involved were complex, but argued that these would not become any easier to resolve after a UDI had taken place. He suggested that Africans TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Bottomley to Wilson, 12 July 1965.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Stewart to Wilson, 20 July 1965.

would want the British Government to take action quickly and it would be embarrassing if the Government eventually decided to take the step and then had to wait for an official study to be prepared. Stewart therefore recommended that the problem should be considered immediately in order to identify and define the issues involved. 229 Bottomley responded: ‘The Bill would legally end the Rhodesian rebellion by admitting its success. It would terminate all responsibility of Britain for Rhodesia and make her a foreign country. It would put the world on notice that we washed our hands of the Rhodesian problem.’ With regard to the point raised by Stewart concerning the likely reaction of Africans, Bottomley contended: ‘I take the opposite view and believe that Africans would criticise us strongly and accuse us of connivance if we passed the ultimate legislation with indecent haste.’ Bottomley averred that it was not difficult to identify and define the issues with which the legislation would be concerned: some sixty Acts of Parliament applying to Rhodesia would have to be examined. Further, the experience of South Africa leaving the Commonwealth had indicated what issues would be involved if Rhodesia were to be excluded. Bottomley therefore concluded that he did not wish to amend his original recommendation to which the Prime Minister had agreed. 230 Le Quesne remained unhappy and discussed the matter further with officials in the CRO. 231 Although they were agreed that there would be a period after UDI during which the British Government would try to bring Rhodesia back to legality, they differed on the time scale involved. The CRO believed that this period might be as long as five years, Ibid.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Bottomley to Wilson, 27 July 1965.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Minute by Le Quesne, 13 August 1965.

which the FO thought quite unrealistic; Le Quesne suggested six months was more likely.

He refuted Bottomley’s view that Rhodesia’s expulsion from the Commonwealth was likely to be interpreted as evidence of collusion between the British and Rhodesian Governments. On the contrary, if the British Government failed to act quickly then Britain would be accused of acquiescence and collusion. Le Quesne commented: ‘It is true that it would also constitute an admission of our inability forcibly to impose our will on Rhodesia. But this is a fact which we at any rate accept and which, in the circumstances envisaged, will in any case have become apparent to all.’ 232 Le Quesne observed that as the Prime Minister had already endorsed Bottomley’s proposal, there was no point in challenging the accepted view. However, he suggested that a draft minute should be prepared for the Foreign Secretary in order to make the Prime Minister aware of the difference of view between the FO and CRO. The minute was sent on 31 August 1965, and recommended that the issue should be given further consideration in the official Rhodesia sub-committee. 233 In September the DOPC began to lean towards the Foreign Office position and encouraged a meeting between FO and CRO officials to revise the Government’s contingency plans. 234 When the meeting took place, CRO officials continued to profess their belief that if the British Government expelled Rhodesia from the Commonwealth it would be seen as connivance and would lead to the disintegration of the Commonwealth. 235 They did agree, however, that it was unrealistic Ibid.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Stewart to Wilson, 31 August 1965.

TNA: PRO, CAB 148/18, Minutes of OPD (65) 40th Meeting, Item 4, 22 September 1965. The Committee invited the FO and CRO to arrange for OPD (65) 132 Annex II to be amended to reflect the possibility that further measures to those proposed by the CRO might be necessary in the context of the likely response at the UN.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181878, Minute by Le Quesne, 1 October 1965.

to think in terms of the British Government holding its position at the UN for up to five years, but CRO officials apparently told their FO colleagues that Bottomley refused to admit the possibility that the British Government’s contingency measures would fail. 236 This was at variance with the views of the FO, and the difference of opinion was never resolved. Shortly before UDI, Le Quesne wrote to his counterpart in the CRO, Derrick Watson: ‘I am sorry to keep reverting to this point, but we would be extremely grateful if you could let us have a reasoned statement of the grounds on which we believe that the measures which we propose to take against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI will be successful.’ 237 The absence of such a ‘reasoned statement’ can only be explained by the fact that there were no reasonable grounds on which to base the assumption that British objectives could be achieved by the measures that the Government proposed to take in the event of a UDI. This makes an even bigger nonsense of Wilson’s remark at Lagos in January 1966 that ‘the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.’ 238 Conclusion In his biography of Wilson Philip Ziegler observed that if the Labour Government’s foreign policy problems are considered in isolation it risks ‘misrepresenting the atmosphere in which such problems were considered and decisions made’, because Wilson had to grapple with so many interrelated problems simultaneously. ‘To give the Rhodesian negotiations the calm and concentrated attention which they deserved against Ibid.

TNA: PRO, FO 371/181880, Le Quesne to Watson, 21 October 1965.

Quoted in Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 377.

such a tempestuous background was beyond the powers of any except the superhuman.’ 239 It is right to acknowledge the multiple difficulties that Wilson faced from his very first moments in office, and indeed Wilson drew attention to these in his memoirs. 240 However, it is important not to overstate the problems that were not of Wilson’s making to the extent that they obscure the difficulties that he created for himself. During the 1964 general election Wilson need not have entered into an explicit commitment to bring about African majority rule in Rhodesia, especially as this was not even an issue in that election. 241 This commitment was at variance with his Party’s cautious approach to the Rhodesian problem in 1964, and it complicated the dialogue with the Rhodesian Government once Labour was in power. The Labour Government’s initial response to the possibility of a UDI was robust and effective, but the deterrent effect of Labour’s early posture wore off over the next few months because the Rhodesian Government was able to determine how it could circumvent the likely economic consequences of a UDI. The fact that the Labour Government was able to lock the Rhodesian Government into four rounds of substantive negotiations during 1965, and to stave off a UDI for so many months, was an achievement in itself. However, it made little sense to expend so much effort seeking a negotiated solution; it would have been more realistic to try to maintain the status quo. As Ben Pimlott has commented: ‘The most puzzling aspect is that the Rhodesian Government bothered to declare UDI at all. It puzzled Wilson at the time. At best illegal independence was bound to be risky and lonely, at worst disastrous. A rational course would have been to retain the stable limbo Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 218.

Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 2-3.

D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1965), p. 121.

Cited in Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p. 29.

of minority rule under the technical suzerainty of the British Crown.’ 242 This might have been achieved if the British Government had been prepared to engage the key concern of the Rhodesian Government – economic uncertainty – through a massive programme of aid and technical assistance. Instead, the British Government created economic uncertainty of its own with its preparations to implement economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI. The contingency planning operation suffered from multiple weaknesses – a complicated decision structure, ministerial procrastination, and bureaucratic conflict – which adversely affected the preparations to deal with a UDI. To return to the point raised by Ziegler, it was all but impossible for Wilson and the Labour Government to grapple effectively with the Rhodesian Crisis when there were so many other problems to deal with at home and abroad. Yet there were alternative policies to which the Government might have given greater consideration, especially the use of force, which is discussed in the next chapter.

Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 372.

–  –  –

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 12 | 13 || 15 | 16 |   ...   | 57 |

Similar works:

«KOMENTARZE HISTORYCZNE MARKIEWICZ BIAŁYSTOK MARCIN MARKIEWICZ, OBEP IPN BIAŁYSTOK ARKIEWICZ, TAJGA I TOPIELISKA W świadomości mieszkańców dawnych Kresów Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej okres okupacji „pierwszego Sowieta” – lata 1939–1941 – kojarzony jest głównie z masowymi wywózkami obywateli polskich w głąb Związku Radzieckiego. Ta szczególna forma zbiorowej odpowiedzialności stosowana na zajętych przez Związek Radziecki terenach odcisnęła swoje piętno na...»

«Graduate Journal of Visual and Material Culture Issue 5 I 2012 Double Exposure: Multiplexing of Signals and Time in the Photography of Thomas Struth Dana Liljegren Abstract: As contemporary viewers of artworks both new and historical, how do we experience and perceive time in relation to art? How do we perceive art in relation to time? The works of photographer Thomas Struth, particularly his photographs of art and visitors in museums, add a new dimension to the discourse surrounding these...»

«Louisiana Architecture: 1945-1965 Post-War Subdivisions and the Ranch House HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Post-WWII Population Growth and U.S. Housing Shortage: Without a doubt no American industry was harder hit by the Great Depression and the Second World War than housing. Over this protracted sixteen year period, annual housing starts fell to less than 10% of what they had been during the boom days of the “Roaring Twenties.” Numerous architectural practices and construction firms simply “went...»

«Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2012), Pp. 50-69 From Colonial Port to Post-Revolution: Urban Planning for 21st Century Havana Laura Peñaranda Currie Harvard Extension School, Cambridge, MA penarandacurrie@gmail.com Abstract Coffee table books are filled with them: the clichés of Havana as frozen in time, scented with nostalgia for a bygone era. At first sight, the city's unique combination of urban design and architectural styles suggest a tension between...»

«FoMRHI Comm. 2013 John Downing Gansars, Catlines, Pistoys and Lyons – Those Silken Lute Strings? O, had the monster seen those lily hands Tremble, like aspen-leaves, upon a lute, And make the silken strings delight to kiss them, Titus Andronicus, Act II Scene IV 44-46 There are no surviving examples of lute mid range and bass strings from the 16th and 17th C so it is not known exactly how they were made or from what material. Modern historical string makers have assumed that they were made...»


«ACROSS THE GREAT WATER: RELIGION AND DIASPORA IN THE BLACK ATLANTIC By JOHN WILLIAM CATRON A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008 1 2008 John William Catron 2 To the two people who inspired me and kept the faith: my mother, Patricia, and my wife, Tracey. 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No one writes a doctoral dissertation by themselves, and I am no exception....»

«Throw Away Your Wristwatch Pennsic 40 Edition THL Maximilian der Zauberer scheltem@yahoo.com ADVANCED I II XII III XI IV X V IX VI N VIII VII N VIII VII Time e fo War Timfor War r 1 Sundials have been used by every culture throughout history. For many people a sundial wasn’t even necessary. You got up when the sun came up, ate lunch when the sun was directly overhead, and went to bed when the sun went down. It mattered little to you, living near London, that dawn to dusk in the summer took...»

«Ranch Houses Are Not All the Same David Bricker Architectural Historian California Department of Transportation San Bernardino, California Introduction With nearly constant rumbling and clattering sounds of construction, much of American suburbia was transformed during the bustling postwar period. Vast acres of land were subdivided for a multitude of new housing tracts. Their varied patterns of streets, yards, and detached single-family houses rapidly changed the appearance of the semi-rural...»

«Rhinoceros Background Pack Contents About the production 2 Synopsis of the play 3 About the writer: Eugene Ionesco 5 Ionesco and Berenger 6 Ionesco on theatre 7 About the play: Writing the play 8 Ionesco on Rhinoceros 9 Historical background 10 Rehearsal diary 11 A writer’s view 15 Interviews: Dominic Cooke 16 Benedict Cumberbatch 18 Zawe Ashton 20 Classroom activities: Writing activities 22 Design challenge 24 Movement exercises 25 Useful links 27 © Royal Court Theatre, 2007 About the...»

«SUSAN BLAKE CURRICULUM VITAE 1033 E. Third St., Sycamore Hall 026, Bloomington, IN 47405 blakes@indiana.edu 217-419-6860 AOS: epistemology; philosophy of perception; Chinese philosophy. AOC: philosophy of language; philosophy of mind; history of analytic philosophy. Education Indiana University, Philosophy PhD program, 2006—present. Dissertation: Mental Content and Epistemic Foundations. Director: Gary Ebbs; Committee members: Fred Schmitt, Mark Kaplan, and Adam Leite. Minor: Chinese (with a...»

«Curriculum Vitae Ange-Marie Hancock, PhD Department of Political Science, VKC 327 University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089 angemariehancock@gmail.com Education: Doctor of Philosophy (2000) University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Political Science) Master of Arts (1997) University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Political Science) Bachelor of Arts (1991) New York University (Politics) Academic Employment History: University of Southern California (2008 present) Associate...»

<<  HOME   |    CONTACTS
2016 www.dissertation.xlibx.info - Dissertations, online materials

Materials of this site are available for review, all rights belong to their respective owners.
If you do not agree with the fact that your material is placed on this site, please, email us, we will within 1-2 business days delete him.