«2016 / Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield 199 ARTICLE Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield Gil Avriel* * Legal ...»
See Boaz Ganor, The Hybrid Terrorist Organization and Incitement, THE CHANGING FORMS OF
INCITEMENT TO TERROR AND VIOLENCE: THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (2012).
(“A hybrid terrorist organization is one that stands on two or, in many cases, three legs. The first leg is that of the classic terrorist organization: a military or paramilitary organization that engages in terrorism. The hybrid terrorist organization extends a second leg, that of a political organization.
A hybrid terrorist organization’s political branch may merely represent its ideology, or it may compete in legitimate, free, and democratic campaigns and elections. Further, the hybrid terrorist organization has extended a leg into the realm of legitimate, usually state-sponsored services, through branch organizations that provide welfare services to a potential or actual constituency.
Once these terrorists have won considerable power through legitimate political processes, they begin incrementally taking over the political establishment. And once they have taken over the political establishment, they can subordinate the resources of the state for their own.”). See also
JONATHAN KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS AND THEDYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL (2003).
See Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava and Eric C. Martin, Terrorism as Formal Organization, Network, and Social Movement, 24.1 J. OF MGMT. INQUIRY 47 (2015); Martha Crenshaw, Mapping Terrorist Organizations, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (2010). 210 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 7 From a linguistic perspective, Civilitary Theory describes the activities of territorial terrorist groups by using three stages or civilitary models. The terms “stage” or “model,” in the context of this Article, are used as paradigms, or ideal types,40 to broadly illustrate the evolutionary trends of some terrorist groups. Due to the dynamic and fluid nature of these models, it is somewhat hard to classify each group within a single model. Some terrorist groups could theoretically match more than one ideal type, and could therefore potentially move back and forth within the flexible analytical framework.
Lastly, the Theory differentiates between regular terrorist groups and those that evolved by gaining territory and governing civilians. It coins a new term, “territorial terrorist groups,” to illustrate this phenomenon. During the course of developing this Theory and its associated new terms, thought was given as to whether the term “terrorist” ought to be included in the term “territorial terrorist group” or if there was room to explore and critically discuss the use of the word in this context. Civilitary Theory includes the word “terrorist” as part of its new terminology because it assumes that both regular terrorist groups and new “territorial terrorist groups” engage in what most member states and international organizations collectively refer to (or at least generally recognize) as acts associated with terrorism41 or terrorist activities.42 Further exploration of the term “terrorist,” despite its potential usefulness, would divert the focus from the core elements of Civilitary Theory set forth in this Article.
Civilitary Theory has three models, or stages:
In Civilitary Model I, terrorist groups acquire land and gain effective control over the local population. The groups evolve and become territorial terrorist groups. This Article explores six territorial terrorist groups: the Islamic “According to [Max] Weber’s definition, ‘an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view’ according to which ‘concrete individual phenomena.
.. are arranged into a unified analytical construct’; in its purely fictional nature, it is a methodological ‘utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.’ Keenly aware of its fictional nature, the ideal type never seeks to claim its validity in terms of a reproduction of or a correspondence with reality. Its validity can be ascertained only in terms of adequacy....” Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/#IdeTyp (internal citations omitted).
See Boaz Ganor, Workshop on the Definition of Terrorism, a Fundamental Counter-Terrorism Measure: ICT 13th International Conference, World Summit on Counter-Terrorism (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.ict.org.il/Article/717/The-Definition-of-Terrorism-A-Fundamental-CounterTerrorism-Measure; Eva Herschinger. A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism 25.2 J. OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 183 (2013); en Saul, Definition of “Terrorism” in the UN Security Council: 1985– B 2004. 4.1 CHINESE J. OF INT’L LAW 141 (2005).
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, State Dep’t Country Rpt. on Terrorism, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information (2014), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239416.htm; 2015 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, THE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE (2015), http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gtifinding.
2016 / Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield 211 State in Iraq and Syria; Boko Haram in northern Nigeria; the Houthis in Yemen;
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula; Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The territorial dimension of terrorism has become so extensive that the traditional expression “terrorist safe haven” is outdated. It does not capture the magnitude of the phenomenon. Instead, the 21st century has witnessed the creation of de facto “terroristates” in various parts of the world.
In Civilitary Model II, territorial terrorist groups conduct a triple terrorist strategy: they terrorize the lives of civilians inside their territory; inflict horror on civilians in nearby states; or facilitate terrorist attacks around the world. All of the six territorial terrorist groups we explore in this Article undertake some, if not most, of these activities.
In response to the activities of these territorial terrorist groups, some states and coalitions have adjusted their own national security strategy. They use surgical airstrikes, in accordance with their inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, to degrade the terrorists’ capabilities. Airstrikes have thus been carried out against ISIL, first by a United States-led coalition, and later by Russian fighter jets.43 A Saudi-led coalition of Arab states has also organized airstrikes against the Houthi rebels.44 Both Nigerian and Chadian fighter jets have targeted Boko Haram in Nigeria,45 and Israel has also used airpower against terrorists from Hamas and Hezbollah.46 Egypt, for its part, is using airpower against Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula.47 In Civilitary Model III, territorial terrorist groups respond to these surgical airstrikes by developing adaptive strategies to ensure their survival.48 This strategic approach results in the decision to acquire rockets and ballistic missiles and to embed them in residential areas to shield those assets from surgical attacks.
The term used here to describe the buildup of missile arsenals by territorial terrorist groups is “terroballistic” or “terrorocketing capabilities.” In addition, the term used to describe the assimilation of terrorist infrastructures into civilian See Russian Warplanes Bomb ISIS Targets, Activists Say, CBS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-airstrikes-syria-reported-third-day-possibly-hits-isistargets/.
Kareem Fahim, The Saudi-Led Coalition’s Airstrikes in Yemen, and the Civilian Toll, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/world/middleeast/the-saudi-ledcoalitions-airstrikes-in-yemen-and-the-civilian-toll.html?_r=0.
Chad Fighter Jets Just Bombed a Nigerian Town Targeting Boko Haram, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-chadian-aircraft-bomb-nigerian-town-in-antiboko-haram-raid-2015-1#ixzz3RgS6Oq79.
Israel Responds to Gaza Rocket Fire With Airstrike Against Launcher, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 24, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/israel-responds-gaza-rocket-fire-airstrikearticle-1.2268976.
Egyptian Airstrikes Kill 25 Daesh-linked Militants in Sinai, ALBAWADA NEWS (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.albawaba.com/news/egyptian-airstrikes-kill-25-daesh-linked-militants-sinai-653326.
See Eitan Azani, The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study, STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 36 (2013).
212 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 7 neighborhoods is “ascivilation” (a portmanteau of the words “assimilation” and “civilian”). The two territorial terrorist groups that have reached the stage of Civilitary Model III are Hezbollah and Hamas. The following paragraphs explore these stages in more detail.
A. Civilitary Model I: Territorial Acquisition
In Civilitary Model I, terrorist groups acquire territory and govern the lives of civilians, thus becoming territorial terrorist groups. Recently, political leaders have stated that they are using military force against ISIL to ensure that there will not be a “safe haven” for the terrorists to carry out their crimes.49 The term “terrorist safe haven” traditionally includes “ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”50 In November 2015, the UN unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2249 which calls upon member states "to take all necessary measures... to eradicate the safe haven they [ISIL] have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria," 51 a statement which also requires linguistic clarification.
Civilitary Theory questions the relevance of the term “safe haven." First, while it accounts mostly for the territorial dimensions of terrorist sanctuary, the term in practice captures neither the magnitude nor the severity of the phenomenon. The statistics are striking: ISIL controls land in both Syria and Iraq equivalent in size to Ireland or Indiana.52 As it continues to expand,53 some have See Remarks of President Barack H. Obama at the United Nations General Assembly, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/ remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly (“There is no room for accommodating an apocalyptic cult like ISIL, and the United States makes no apologies for using our military, as part of a broad coalition, to go after them. We do so with a determination to ensure that there will never be a safe haven for terrorists who carry out these crimes.”).
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, State Dep’t Country Rpt. on Terrorism, supra at 42. See also Cristiana C.
Brafman Kittner, The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism, 19.3 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 307 (2007); Ken Menkhaus, Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens,
23.2 J. OF CONFLICT STUDIES 7 (2006).
U.N. Security Resolution 2249 (November 20, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2249(2015). See Dapo Akande, Marko Milanovic, The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council’s ISIS Resolution, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (EJIL) (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-the-securitycouncils-isis-resolution/, cf. Marko Milanovic, How the Ambiguity of Resolution 2249 Does Its Work, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (EJIL) (December. 3, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/how-the-ambiguity-of-resolution-2249-does-its-work/.
Graham Allison, Panel Discussion at the Harvard Kennedy School International Law Forum:
Instability in the Middle East (Nov. 17, 2014), http://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/instabilitymiddle-east.
See How Much of Iraq Does ISIS Control? INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DATA SITE, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/isis/analysis.html.
2016 / Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield 213 compared its actual territory to all of Jordan54 or even Great Britain.55 Over the past year of airstrikes by the United States and its allies, along with ground offensives by local forces, ISIL has lost territory in some areas but gained it in others.56 ISIL currently administers the lives of civilians in Mosul.57 This is Iraq's second-largest city, equivalent in size to Philadelphia.58 ISIL also gained control over Fallujah59 and many other cities.60 In Africa, Boko Haram has also evolved61 and now controls land in northeast Nigeria equivalent to the size of Belgium62 or West Virginia, and governs the lives of more than 1.7 million people.63 Hamas does not control a large piece of land, but it fully governs the lives of nearly 1.8 million people in Gaza.64 In Lebanon, Hezbollah maintains a puppet government and controls, de George Packer, The Common Enemy, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2014/08/25/the-common-enemy.
Raf Sanchez, Islamic State Controls Area the Size of Britain, US Warns, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept.
3, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11073593/Islamic-Statecontrols-area-the-size-of-Britain-US-warns.html.
Kathy Gilsnan, How ISIS Territory Has Changed Since the U.S. Bombing Campaign Began, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isisterritory-map-us-campaign/404776 (“ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of the populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could,” but its “area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.” The fight against ISIS is “tactically stalemated” with “no dramatic gains on either side.”). See Lisa Ferdinando, Dempsey: Future of ISIL Increasingly Dim, U.S.
Dep’t of Defense (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/616656/ dempsey-future-of-isil-increasingly-dim.
See Max Boot, ISIS: More Than Just a Terrorist Organization, THE HOOVER INST. (Feb. 2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/isis-more-just-terrorist-organization; The Islamic State: Can It Govern? THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/ 2014/08/islamic-state.