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Generally (and among other things), the Post-Katrina Act looked at issues that affected householders impacted by a disaster event. Essentially, the Act addressed issues that relates to the evacuation of vulnerable populations and established measures to prevent the types and levels of fraud, waste and abuse identified during Katrina. It also addressed rental allowances, direct housing assistance and rental rehabilitation. Additionally, it addressed assistance for events classified as catastrophic disasters where householders could receive two times the amount of financial support available to non-catastrophic disasters with the possible inclusion of mortgage or rental assistance.
Locating the Military in Disaster Response The United States disaster response system places local, tribal and state response organizations at the foundation of the national disaster management system. This structure is reinforced through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 and the National Response Framework which require local and state leaders to exhaust their resources before
The involvement of the military in disaster responses are essentially through two routes – under the directives of the state governor or under the directives of the President. The Department of Defence (DoD) roles in domestic disasters and support to civil authorities is determined through a number of disparate pieces of legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DoD documents.
The Posse Comitatus Act: The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was enacted in 1878 (to complement the Insurrection Act of 1807) with the intent of placing substantial limitations on the federal government’s use of the military following the Reconstruction period. It is essentially the foremost statute that governs DoD’s domestic response role and limits and prohibits the use of Title 10 forces from performing certain functions when employed in domestic operations. In this regard it explicitly prohibits under pain of punishment the wilful employment of the Army and Air Force, (except as authorized under the constitution and/or an Act of Congress) in the enforcement of civil laws within the continental United States.
Initially, the Act addressed the prohibition of the Army from Posse Comitatus activities but this was extended to the Air Force in 1956 and in 1981 restriction was placed on the domestic use of the Navy and Marines. The restriction of the PCA does not apply to National Guard personnel when under the authority of a state governor or to military operations.
Following the 2005 Katrina disaster, Congress was urged by the President in 2006 to consider the revision of federal laws that placed prohibition on the domestic use of the armed forces so that they can be employed in the aftermath of a natural disaster to restore public order and enforce laws. This resulted in the passing of H.R. 5122, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (NDAA) which essentially changed the dynamics of
significant discretionary powers in the hands of the President to employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service where in his individual judgement the guaranteed rights, privileges, immunity and protection under the constitution are threatened.
However, this change although somewhat bold and revolutionary was short lived as it was repealed in its entirety in 2008.
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 5 and 8. Presidential Directives, also called Presidential Decision Directives or PDD are effectively executive orders issued by the President. PDDs essentially articulate policies and carry the full force and effect of law and as such must be given full and serious consideration when reviewing the authority for federal undertakings. In this regard, together with the applicable Federal statutes, Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 5 and 8 and the National Response Framework (NRF) which established DoD’s domestic disaster response role must be so considered.
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, whose purpose is “To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system,” (HSPD 5, Sec. 1. p1) directs the Secretary of Defense to provide military support to civil authorities in domestic incidents “as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law” (HSPD5, Sec 9. p3).
HSPD-8, National Preparedness, while described as a companion to HSPD-5, holds little in terms of activity for the DoD and merely directs the DoD to support the Secretary of Homeland Security through the provision of information on “the organizations and functions within the Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide support to civil authorities
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8. In the wake of several natural and anthropogenic events (such as the 9/11 terrorist attack, Hurricane Katrina and Rita, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and H1N1 Influenza) which caused significant environmental, physical and physiological damage to the United States, and stands as a threat to the future safety and security of its citizens, several approaches were taken to strengthen the resilience of the U.S through what was described as “systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters” (p.1).
To achieve this objective the federal government issued Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, on April 8, 2011, which rescinds and replaces Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, except for paragraph 44 of HSPD-8. Additionally, PPD-8 was designed to function in conjunction with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. PPD-8 did not depart from the all hazard community based approach to disaster planning; in fact it further strengthened the concept by requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to, “coordinate a comprehensive campaign to build and sustain national preparedness, including public outreach and community-based and private-sector programs to enhance national resilience” (p.4), and also by the inclusion of such events as WMD and cyber-attack along with catastrophic natural or manmade disasters.
Military support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). The strategies of the DoD surrounding the delivery of support to civil authorities can be found essentially in three principal DoD directives. These are Department of Defence Directives DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, DoDD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) and (DoDD)
Department of Defence Directive (DoDD) 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) outlines the policy and responsibilities that governs the extent and level of support provided by DoD to civil authorities in response to major domestic disasters and emergencies and the authority for such support: such support however cannot include activities of a law enforcement nature.
Provisions are also made for imminently serious situations that require immediate response to save lives. In such situations the directive authorizes local military commanders and responsible officials of other relevant DoD sectors to take appropriate action on a request from the appropriate and responsible civil authorities.
The employment of DoD’s resources will only be authorized where state and local resources are overwhelmed, but must be offered on a reimbursable basis. However, the requirement for reimbursement does not necessarily prevent or stop the provision of support from the DoD.
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). Department of Defence Directive (DoDD) 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS) addresses the employment of DoDs resources when in support of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances inclusive of terrorist activities. All request to the Secretary of Defense for assistance under this directive must be routed via the Attorney General; most importantly, the primacy of civilian authority is maintained at all times during military support to law enforcement operations.
DoDD 3025.12 reinforces the authority of the President in the employment of the military
Defence Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Department of Defence Directive (DoDD) 3025.18, Defence Support of Civil Authorities 2010 “provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA when requested by civil authorities or by qualifying entities and approved by the appropriate DoD official, or as directed by the President, within the United States” (p.1) and provides appropriate support during domestic emergencies and/ or civil disturbances and domestic consequence management.
Changing paradigm: The search for new missions The changing nature of the global threat environment after the Cold War presented some challenges to military doctrine, force levels, and missions that had, for all intents and purposes, successfully sustained Cold War mission and strategies. The United States could hardly ignore this situation, considering the lessons learned from the Viet Nam war that third world insurgency wars cannot be won by superior technology only. As such a rethink of the traditional military mission to accommodate non-military threats for which the post-Cold War military was illprepared had to be accommodated. The new security agenda after the Cold War saw the proliferation of a myriad of non-military missions such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, disaster management and humanitarian intervention for which Cold War strategies were not adequate. This shift away from training for war to conflict prevention was indeed a paradigm shift.
The end of the Cold War effectively removed the threat of a comparative modern military force poised to strike the USA. It was no longer necessary for the USA to have the same level of forces and global military presence. The U.S. national security strategy of containment had effectively ended. As a direct impact of this threat reduction, a number of frontline units were to
this as an ideal opportunity to define new roles and missions for the military and although strategies ranging from a "new world order" to "enlargement" and "assertive multilateralism," were presented, a strategy to capture the imagination of the US people remained somewhat elusive.
Subsequent to the terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC on September 11th, 2001, the US Government considered the possibility of expanding the role of the military in
empowering the military in domestic operations as it had legal implications for the Posse Comitatus Act. However, in July 2002, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security approved the proposal by President Bush to create a new department to take responsibility for the defense of the American homeland. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), hitherto a standalone organization with direct communication path to the President was subsumed within this new and powerful Department of Homeland Security.
In 2005 Louisiana and Texas were struck by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, respectively, causing significant damage to the built and natural environment and mental and physical trauma and loss of lives 3. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in particular saw a breakdown in law and order, an upsurge in gang violence, widespread looting and other related crimes. The response by the state agencies responsible for disaster was seen by many as inadequate, ineffective and inept. In contrast the response of the military with its centralized command structures, heavy lift capacity and trained manpower was seen as the only redeeming factor in a sea of crisis; saving many lives, providing relief for many and responding to the upsurge in crime. This response by the military saw a burgeoning of public goodwill and a call by many, Approximately 1,464 persons lost their lives and damages were estimated at $25B source CBC/AP August 30, 2005.
MILITARY DISASTER ROLE VS BATTLE READINESS 28including the President of the United States for a review of the role of the military in domestic operations with a view to their expansion.
Military Preparedness for War – Battle Readiness Military Readiness. Military readiness is described as one of the most important elements of military capability, with approximately one third of the defense budget being expended in its attainment (George 1999, p2). The US Military Dictionary on Answers.Com 4 defines readiness as the “ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy” which is conditional on the fusion of two critical factors – unit readiness and joint readiness. For troops to meet the nation’s security objectives they must have the requisite force structure, the necessary and modern equipment, timely and efficient maintenance and logistics support and qualified, competent and highly motivated personnel (1995 Annual Defence Report) 5. Army units that are under trained or inappropriately trained are quite likely to experience high causalities and accidents in theatre (Murtha and Obey, 2006) and more than likely, will be unable to achieve mission objectives. The failure to achieve mission objectives is assessed within the context of readiness degradation which is a function of improper or inadequate training, chronic equipment failure, funding constraints and personnel shortages and administrative mismanagement (Murtha and Obey 2006). Organizations such as the military, organized around a core function (a fighting tradition) that operates outside of that core function, may suffer a degradation of their fighting spirit. Where that organization is required to significantly increase its commitment to ancillary duties, there will also be a requirement to
support and maintain those activities which may result in the diversion of focus and resources from their central mission of combat training and war fighting (Dunlop, 1992).