«Published by the Center for African Studies, University of Florida ISSN: 2152-2448 African Studies Quarterly E Staff Elizabeth Beaver Lin Cassidy ...»
49. Kenya Human Rights Commission, Quarterly Repression Report, October- December
1995. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission and Kenya Human Rights Commission, Quarterly Repression Report, July-September 1996. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1996.
50. See generally, United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Kenya, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1993/6, 1993.
51. See, United States, Kenya: Human Rights Report, 1995. Nairobi: Embassy of the United States of America, 1995.
52. Article 19, Kenya: Post-Election Political Violence. London: Article 19, p. 1, December 1998 and generally, Article 19, Deadly Marionettes: State Sponsored Violence in Africa.
London: Article 19, October 1997.
53. Kenya Human Rights Report, Kayas Re-Visited, A Post-Election Balance Sheet, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi, 1998: pp 40.
54. Amnesty International Kenya Annual Report for 1997, (Amnesty International, 1998).
55. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997).
57. "IPPG Recommendations and the Aftermath" Daily Nation, Nairobi, (16 January 1998).
See also note 62.
58. Ibid. See also Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, Amnesty International, September 1997).
59. Amnesty International, Kenya: Political Violence Spirals, (Amnesty international, 10 June 1998).
60. US State Department. Report on KENYA Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, State Department, February 2000).
African Studies Quarterly | Volume 5, Issue 1 | Winter 2001 http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1a1.pdf Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel arap Moi, 1978-2001 | 17
62. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997).
65. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997).
66. Amnesty International, Kenya, Political Violence Spirals, (Amnesty International, 10 June 1998).
69. US State Department Kenya Report for Human Rights for 1999, Washington D.C, US State Department, February 2000).
70. US Department of State, Kenya Report on Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, State Department, February 2000).
71. US State Department Kenya Report for Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, US State Department February 2000). See also Kenya Human Rights Report, Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi 1998
Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article:
Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae 2001. "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap
Moi 1978-2001. African Studies Quarterly 5(1): 1. [online] URL:
The State and Development in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Botswana and Mauritius with Angola, Malawi and Zambia
Introduction African countries inherited economies that are backward, skewed and underdeveloped as a result of Western colonial rule. Since independence, African states have embarked on the transformation of inherited economic structures with varying degrees of success. The debate about the role of the state in development in Africa reached its peak in the 1970s. Following independence in the 1960s, state involvement in the economy was welcomed, partly due to the lack of indigenous private entrepreneurs and partly due to economic distortions created by colonialism. However, the dismal performance of African economies resulting in the "economic crisis" in the 1970s, necessitated a reappraisal of the role of the state in the economy in the 1980s.
The predominant view now, especially by neo-liberals, including international financial institutions (IFIs), is that the state in Africa and other developing countries should reduce its role in economic development.1 Leftwich and White, taking the opposite view, argue that state intervention is necessary for development to take place because development requires not less state, as the World Bank contends, but better state action, and this is most likely from a developmental state.2 The question, therefore, is: what kind of state intervention is conducive to the promotion of development? This paper examines and compares the role of the state in development in Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia in order to understand why states like Mauritius and Botswana are successful developmental states and other states like Angola, Malawi and Zambia are non-developmental, and hindrances to development. Sandbrook, makes the argument that Africa needs active, developmental states capable of complementing and directing market forces.3 In contrast to the neo-liberals, Leftwich 4 argues that the single most important factor for the generation and sustenance of development is a developmental state, with six features including a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy, a weak and subordinated civil society, effective management of non-state economic interests, and repression, legitimacy, and performance. Thus, a developmental state has the capability for sustained economic growth (i.e.
high gross domestic product (GDP)), and development (i.e. welfare services to the mass of the population), qualities that Mauritius and Botswana have.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES:
Mauritius: Real Successful Development?
Mauritius has one of the most successful economies in Africa. In general, Mauritius has modeled its development on the East Asian countries in terms of export-led growth based on manufacturing complemented by generous tax incentives.5 Between 1990 and 1994, its GDP grew by a yearly average of 5.3 percent compared to 0.9 percent for sub-Saharan Africa.6 In spite of being a small island, with a population of 1.3 million people of diverse racial and ethnic origins, Mauritius has enjoyed a high GDP per capita of $13,172 and a low unemployment rate of five percent.7 Successful development is unique in view of the fact that the three dominant parties - the Labour Party (LP), Movement Militant Mauricien (MMM), and Movement Socialist Militant (MSM) - are socialist in ideological orientation. The three parties have alternated power since 1970, exist in a functioning multi-party democracy, and have allowed for a free market economy.8 Mauritius's economic success is attributed to three important factors. Since the 1970s, the government has implemented policies that have provided a conducive environment to the private sector to be the propeller of the economy. Of special importance has been the government's successful implementation of five successive stand-by arrangements and two structural adjustment programmes between 1980 and 1986, which put in place the preconditions for sustainable export-led growth. These measures were part of the process of liberalizing the economy, especially trade and the exchange rate, gave sufficient incentives to foreign private investors, and coincided with the global economic recovery of 1983. Together, the measures boosted output and therefore exports, and by 1990 the economy attained full employment, reaching a goal that has had top priority since independence in 1968.9 The restructuring targeted all sectors of the economy. In the agricultural sector, the government's reform programs included a reduction of export taxes on transfers of agricultural land and abolition of restrictions on sugarmill closures. In industry, the government eliminated restrictions on imports and reduced tariffs and promoted foreign private investment in the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) by providing fiscal and financial incentives. In 1983, the government established the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA) to undertake investment missions and export promotions to boost the number of foreign investors and amount exported, respectively.10 With regard to tourism, the government resorted to aggressive advertising, improvement of hotel capacity, and improvement of air access policy.11 In addition, the devaluation of the Mauritian rupee created a realistic exchange rate that helped to make exports internationally competitive. Traditionally, the government supplemented the rupee as part of its wage policy to ensure the competitiveness of Mauritian exports. Similarly, the adoption of a real rate of interest helped increase gross domestic savings that were used for development programs and reduced the need for foreign borrowing and the debt service burden, which fell from 20 to 6.8 percent in the 1980s.12 Another source of economic success is the high demand, ready market, and favorable terms of trade for Mauritian exports in developed countries. Mauritian exports have benefited greatly
from the sugar protocol under the Lome Convention with the European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Community (EC). Under this law, Mauritius sells 80 percent of its sugar exports to the EC at a price three times higher than the world market price. The government has prudently utilized the revenue earned from sugar exports for diversification into manufacturing, especially by the EPZ. Like sugar, apparel exports have received special treatment because they are not subjected to import duties and quota restrictions for entering the EC market. There are no quota restrictions in the US market because Mauritian exports have not exceeded the requirement of one percent of US production. The Lome Convention has significantly contributed to the growth in exports of manufactured goods in Mauritius because the EC buys 70 percent while the US absorbs 30 percent of its manufactured goods.13 Finally, availability of cheap labor has fitted neatly into the government's labor intensive export-oriented strategy of development. The unemployed, which includes a large pool of women, have been absorbed into the EPZ and has greatly contributed to the growth of employment opportunities. For example, it accounted for 70 percent of the 21,000 jobs created in the economy in 1987 and helped increase income.14 Social progress has been the most remarkable achievement of investment export revenue from sugar and manufactured goods as well as domestic savings. Through the national development plans, the government has been able to provide social services to most of the population. Of even greater significance is the provision of education, health facilities, housing and improved life expectancy. Primary school enrollment is 90 percent of children and secondary school enrollment rose from 26 percent in the 1960s to 45 percent in the late 1980s.15 Also, there has been improvement in life expectancy from 61 years in the mid-1960s, to 68 years in 1987, to 71 years in 1994. The infant mortality rate decreased from 67 per thousand to 24 per thousand in the same period. Similarly, the adult literacy rate stood at 82 percent in 1994. These contribute to the decline in income inequality in Mauritus.16
Botswana: Successful Development?
Botswana has one of the world's best rates of economic growth, surpassing that of Mauritius, Korea and other Asian tigers - the newly industrializing countries (NICs). During the 1980s it had the fastest economic growth rate in the world, with an average of 10 percent, despite six years of drought that affected the cattle industry.17 It has a very low debt of $0.7 billion, with debt servicing accounting for four percent of exports and enormous foreign reserves. Botswana has a relatively small population but large resource base with a per capita income of $ 5,367.18 The current economic prosperity of Botswana contrasts sharply with the situation at independence, when the state was viewed by most analysts as a very poor country dependent on foreign grants to finance its budget.19 The transformation of Botswana from a poor agricultural country to a buoyant thriving economy makes it a developmental state.
The government has been able to transform and sustain high levels of growth because of its mineral resources, especially diamonds, which became the base of the economy in the late 1960s. Mining revenues account for 50 percent of the GDP, surpassing the beef industry. 20 With the revenue from diamond exports, the state invested in other mineral industries including African Studies Quarterly | Volume 5, Issue 1 | Winter 2001 http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1a2.pdf 22 | Hwedi copper and soda ash. It also diversified into manufacturing, particularly vehicles like Hyundai (which collapsed in 1999), textile and soap industries, and tourism.
More impressive is the investment of diamond revenues in social and infrastructural services with rapid expansion of education, health facilities, housing and roads in both rural and urban areas. Ninety percent of the children are enrolled in primary school, and primary health care is available to 80 percent of the rural population who are within 15 kilometers radius of a health clinic.21 Similarly, households with access to potable water increased from 56 to 83 percent between 1981 and 1994. Poverty has declined considerably. The numbers of the national population who are poor and very poor declined from 59 to 47 percent between 1985/86 and 1993/94, and the numbers of poor and very poor households declined from 49 to 38 percent during the same period.22 Moreover, the creation of state institutions, for example, for water and housing, has facilitated the delivery of services. Additionally, increases in government revenues from diamond exports has facilitated job creation, with the government becoming the largest employer in the country.