«BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL 32-4005 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 30 OCTOBER 2001 Civil Engineer PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND ATTACK ACTIONS NOTICE: ...»
A5.1.2. Individuals must consume enough water to maintain hydration standards. Commanders and supervisors should stress water consumption, because dehydration can become a serious health and performance degradation factor long before personnel become thirsty.
A5.2. Analysis Factors. Consider the following factors in MOPP analysis and update as factors change.
A5.2.1. Mission. The importance and time sensitivity of a task will dictate the degree of risk appropriate to accomplish it.
A5.2.2. Threat. Information concerning the type and degree of a CB attack threat is obtained from intelligence sources and knowing how CB agents are used. In rear areas, where most Air Force bases are located, persistent agents are more likely to be used to disrupt operations.
A5.2.3. Weather. Existing and expected weather conditions can influence the threat and type of CB attack. Also, the body cannot dissipate heat easily when temperature and humidity levels are high.
The GCE makes this even harder since air movement through the garment is not adequate to evaporate enough perspiration to naturally cool the body. As body heat levels rise, the length of time personnel can sustain a given work rate decreases, and the risk of heat exhaustion and heat stroke rises.
A5.2.4. Warning. Estimate the amount of warning expected before an attack. Consider available intelligence, whether CB agents have been used in the theater, location of enemy forces, available delivery systems, and the type and deployment of detection, identification, and warning systems.
A5.2.5. Training. Well-trained personnel in good physical condition usually tolerate work and heat stress better and respond faster, more effectively, and with fewer casualties than those who are not.
Hands-on experience wearing the GCE further enhances efficiency, since personnel learn how to pace themselves and work within restrictions imposed by the GCE. Personnel in both poor physical condition and little hands-on experience will be less productive than the task time multipliers given in Attachment 8.
A5.2.6. Work Rate. The harder personnel work, the faster they tire and accumulate body heat. Rest periods, which increase the time it takes to do a job, are needed to reduce body heat levels. Rest periods must include sufficient time under environmental conditions that promote cooling, such as shade and air movement. Little effective cooling will occur with a closed OG in air temperatures in the 90°F and above range. Heat-stressed personnel can't adequately assess their own condition--they may require close supervisory direction.
72 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 A5.2.7. Time to Accomplish Mission. Personnel in MOPPs 1 and 2 will need little additional time to do a specific task. However, at higher MOPPs, tasks will take more time because of degradation caused by protective equipment.
A5.2.8. Type and Amount of Agent. The type and amount of agent in conjunction with the locations and weather conditions will reflect the how long the personnel will remain in an Alarm Black condition. Personnel conducting post-attack reconnaissance will verify the results and relay all information to their unit control centers (UCC). The “Persist 2” chemical persistency program is the preferred program for NBC Cell personnel to use when preparing detailed chemical persistency calculations.
See AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technician’s Manual for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense for information concerning Persist 2.
A5.3. EXAMPLE A.
A5.3.1. A tactical air reconnaissance base is in the rear area, far from enemy territory. Hostilities are imminent, and intelligence reports increased activity at enemy chemical munitions storage areas. In addition to other measures, the command alerting system directs MOPP 0. Base war planning assumes the base could be attacked with chemical agents and most likely with persistent agents. It also assumes some advance warning of an attack since the aircraft and missiles capable of delivering chemical munitions would be detected on air defense radar. Base personnel are fully trained in chemical warfare defense and are in normal physical condition. Reaction: MOPP 0 is implemented according to directed alert measures.
A5.3.2. Sometime later, hostilities begin. Intelligence reports enemy chemical agent use in the theater, but there is no enemy air or SCUD activity near the base. Reaction: The commander determines there is no immediate threat to the base and remains in All Clear and MOPP 0.
A5.3.3. Air defense reports enemy aircraft approaching the base’s operational area, but it’s too early to predict targets. Weather conditions are seasonal and forecast to remain so with temperatures ranging between 68°F and 82°F and humidity between 60 and 70 percent, at this time winds are blowing towards 360° at 6kts. When the air defense warning was declared, the temperature was 76°F and rising with 66 percent humidity. Reaction: The commander feels the base personnel can rapidly assume higher MOPPs and, considering the airborne threat, directs Alarm Yellow and MOPP 1. Anticipating heat degradation, the no fatigues and ventilation options are authorized. Even though the no fatigues option will increase risk during CCA processing, the commander feels the option is worth the risk.
This option will allow longer working times if agents are employed that prevent using the ventilation option. The commander authorizes the mask-only option only for personnel in collective protection systems.
A5.3.4. A few minutes later, the enemy aircraft enter the base operational area and are within 12 minutes flying time from the base. Reaction: The commander directs MOPP 2 and continues the previously authorized options.
A5.3.5. Soon, radar operators report the enemy aircraft are on a direct heading for the base. Attack seems likely within four minutes. Reaction: The commander directs Alarm Red and MOPP 4. The ventilation option is automatically revoked.
A5.3.6. Enemy aircraft attack the base, then depart the area. Reports to the SRC indicate the runway, taxiways, and aircraft shelters were heavily hit with conventional munitions. Some of the aircraft dropped bombs exploded with a muted sound several hundred feet above the ground. Automatic AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 73 detectors have alarmed, M8 paper indicates G-type liquid nerve agents, and several casualties have nerve agent symptoms. Reaction: The commander directs Alarm Black and continues in MOPP 4.
The ventilation option continues to be withheld until the situation clarifies.
A5.3.7. Chemical monitoring confirms only GB-type nerve agent was used. Weather conditions have changed little. Base recovery and sortie generation is a high priority. Enemy air activity continues in the theater, but not in the base’s operational area. Based on a temperature of 20C and 6KT winds the NBC Cell personnel calculated the persistency of the agent to be 1.75 hours. The Chief of Maintenance requests MOPP 3 for a small group of electronics specialists who cannot perform an indoor repair wearing gloves. Reaction: The commander approves MOPP 3 for the Chief of Maintenance.
MOPP 4 is continued for everyone else. The no fatigues option continues in effect. Nerve agent GD is absorbed by the skin with cumulative effects. However, the ventilation option is authorized with the reservation it only be used when heat stress prevents essential task completion and then only for the time necessary to obtain heat relief.
A5.3.8. After two hours monitoring showed that the chemical warfare agents have dispersed naturally. Selective unmasking directed by the commander results in no symptoms. There is no immediate threat of another attack. Reaction: The commander directs All Clear and MOPP 0 for personnel outdoors.
A5.4. EXAMPLE B.
A5.4.1. A mobile communications unit without collective protection systems is operating near the forward line of troops. Hostilities are likely, and intelligence reports increased activity at enemy chemical munitions storage areas. Among other measures, the command alerting system directs MOPP 0. Reaction: The commander assumes the unit could be attacked with chemical agents and most likely with nonpersistent agents since it is in the expected line of enemy advance. Little or no advance warning of an attack is expected because the unit is within artillery and rocket range. MOPP 0 is directed.
A5.4.2. Later, hostilities are imminent. Intelligence predicts an initial enemy thrust through the unit’s area and feels chemical agents will be used. Daily high temperatures are 48°F and drop to 36°F at night. The forecast calls for calm winds and a constant neutral or inversion temperature gradient. The command alerting system recommends Alarm Yellow. Reaction: Considering the intelligence estimate and because the weather conditions favor a chemical agent attack, the unit commander directs Alarm Yellow and MOPP 2. The ventilation option is also authorized. The no fatigues option is not used. Since the expected threat is nonpersistent agents, the period of degraded operations will be relatively short and the ventilation option may be possible during the period contamination is present.
A5.4.3. Hostilities soon begin, and the unit is hit with an intense barrage of rocket fire. The rockets burst upon impact with low flash and muffled explosions. Reaction: The commander directs Alarm Red and MOPP 4 within seconds of the barrage's beginning. The ventilation option was automatically revoked.
A5.4.4. The barrage lifts after five minutes. There is little damage from blast and shrapnel. Reaction:
The unit commander, suspecting a chemical agent attack, directs Alarm Black, and continues MOPP
4. The ventilation option continues to be withheld until the situation clarifies. Chemical monitors begin testing for agents.
74 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 A5.4.5. A few people reported smelling almonds as they put on their masks at the beginning of the attack. A few casualties of the attack died without apparent wounds. The chemical monitors report a negative on all tests. The commander directs selective unmasking. Reaction: Based on type of attack, symptoms, and the almond odor, the commander assumes the unit was attacked with hydrogen cyanide which almost immediately dissipated to subdetection levels. Still subject to attack, Alarm Yellow and MOPP 2 with the ventilation option is directed.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 75
A6.1. Personnel should relieve themselves before departing a TFA into a contaminated environment.
Work and heat stress will automatically minimize urine formation. Therefore, do not limit the intake of liquids to minimize urine formation. NOTE: Personnel should try to avoid relieving themselves in a contaminated environment if at all possible. Blister agent vapors can harm exposed skin.
A6.2. Personnel can relieve themselves in a contaminated environment using the procedures below.
Avoid contaminating exposed skin and clothing worn under the OG. If absolutely necessary, personnel can relieve themselves inside the OG and change it as soon as possible.
A6.2.1. Step 1. Select a toilet or other suitable area. NOTE: Personnel may use toilets located in a facility protected from liquid agent contamination. Squat above, rather than sit on, the toilet fixture to help avoid contamination transfer. Use a "cathole" (for depositing and burying body wastes) only if a toilet is not available.
A6.2.2. Step 2. Decontaminate your gloves with a decontamination kit.
A6.2.3. Step 3. Unsnap back snaps (CPO has no snaps, only the retention cord) and pull up your OG jacket by the bottom, folding it back on itself once, enough to open your OG pants.
A6.2.4. Step 4. Decontaminate your gloves again, if necessary.
A6.2.5. Step 5. Unsnap and unzip your OG pants, and carefully peel them down as far as necessary.
A6.2.6. Step 6. Carefully remove your rubber gloves and inserts and set them nearby. Do not touch contaminated objects with your unprotected hands.
A6.2.7. Step 7. Open and lower your underclothing, as necessary, and relieve yourself.
A6.2.8. Step 8. Pull up your underclothing.
A6.2.9. Step 9. Put your gloves and inserts back on without touching the outside of the gloves, which may be contaminated.
A6.2.10. Step 10. Pull up your OG pants and refasten them.
A6.2.11. Step 11. Pull your OG jacket down and refasten it.
A6.2.12. Step 12. Fill and pack down the cathole, if used.
76 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001
A7.1. Introduction. Commanders should not consider cold conditions a deterrent to CW agent use.
Agent physical properties are affected by temperature, but the effectiveness is not always degraded when used at very low temperatures. They can create an appreciable vapor and aerosol hazard.
A7.1.1. Operations in the cold present health and survival challenges. It is critical to be able to recognize the threats, implement preventive measures, recognize the symptoms of cold injury and take corrective actions. Proper training before deploying into cold-weather regions is more important for prevention of cold injuries than repeatedly being exposed to cold temperatures. Humans do not acclimatize to cold weather nearly as well as they can acclimatize to hot weather, although repeated cold exposure does produce what is referred to as habituation. With habituation to repeated cold exposure, humans adjust mentally and emotionally.
A7.1.2. While cold makes military tasks more difficult, it does not make them impossible. Viewing cold as a challenge to be overcome is the key to the positive attitude required to successfully complete the mission.
A7.2. Behavior of Chemical Agents. The major threat from the employment of chemical warfare weapons in cold regions is the delayed action. Some nerve and blister agents are almost inactive, especially in terms of presenting a vapor hazard, at 32oF. The danger is created when nerve and blister agents are carried into heated shelters on clothing, footgear, or other equipment. The warmth of the shelter will reactivate these agents creating a chemical vapor and/or a liquid hazard in the enclosed area.