«BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL 32-4005 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 30 OCTOBER 2001 Civil Engineer PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND ATTACK ACTIONS NOTICE: ...»
1.10. Transportation. Incorporate into unit checklists transportation requirements necessary to sustain CCA/TFA operations, either on or off base.
1.11. Individual. Know the location of their protective shelter and understand shelter processing procedures.
1.12. Shelter Requirements.
1.12.1. Air Force units are allowed to use War Reserve Materiel (WRM) to support shelter operations during major accidents, peacetime natural disasters, and other civil emergency relief operations.
WRM is authorized to support our National Military Strategy to fight to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). Accordingly, peacetime use of WRM must be approved only after considering the impact on that strategy, and the ability and timeliness of reconstituting the WRM. WRM assets are to be the last option. Prior to any peacetime use approval, requesting organizations will make every practical effort to satisfy the requirement using alternative means of support. AFI 25-101, War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Program Guidance and Procedures, provides more information on the WRM program.
8 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 1.12.2. There are two types of personnel shelters: emergency operations shelters, where personnel perform essential functions; and rest and relief shelters, where personnel obtain rest and relief between work shifts.
126.96.36.199. Rest and relief shelterees normally should not use emergency operations shelter space unless they work in the emergency operations shelter.
188.8.131.52. Shelter space in medical facilities normally should not be used by the base populace for rest and relief purposes.
1.12.3. Staffing consists of shelter supervisors, CCA supervisors, and assistants.
184.108.40.206. Minimum team size for emergency operations and rest and relief shelters used only for nuclear fallout is one shelter supervisor and one exposure control monitor per shift.
220.127.116.11. Minimum team size, for emergency operations and rest and relief shelters used for CB protection is one shelter supervisor and one CCA supervisor per shift.
18.104.22.168. The number of attendants required for CCA processing depends on the skill of the base populace in regards to processing, the protective ensemble they are wearing (BDO versus J-FIRE for example), and the required flow rate into the TFA. See Attachment 2 for duties.
22.214.171.124. Minimum team size for emergency operations and rest and relief shelters used for natural disaster or major accident relief is one shelter supervisor and one assistant per shift.
1.12.4. For nuclear fallout protection, planning factors should include:
126.96.36.199. Providing one shelter space for each person based on the projected peak on-base population of military and emergency essential civilians.
188.8.131.52. Using Federal Emergency Management Agency supplies and equipment, if available.
1.12.5. In overseas areas, the threat to the installation determines CB protection requirements. CB protection should be provided by using available collective protection systems or establishing open air
CCAs and TFAs. Units should:
184.108.40.206. Provide one space per two personnel assigned to a rest and relief shelter.
220.127.116.11. Ensure positive overpressure of filtered air is provided in collective protection facilities to keep CB agents out of the TFA.
18.104.22.168. Ensure outward airflow through the airlocks and CCA is provided to minimize hazards.
22.214.171.124. Consider the use and location of open air CCAs and TFAs.
1.12.6. Conventional protection should be provided for emergency operations and rest and relief shelters.
126.96.36.199. Many facilities that provide nuclear fallout and biological and chemical protection also protect against conventional munitions.
188.8.131.52. Expedient hardening, berming, or revetting can provide additional conventional protection.
184.108.40.206. Bunkers and revetments provide expedient protection for personnel working outside when an attack occurs. They can be used on an as-required basis; however, do not assign them as shelter spaces.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 9 1.12.7. Natural disaster shelters should be selected based on their structural and personnel housing capabilities in relation to the type of disaster(s) likely to occur in the area.
1.12.8. Attachment 2 and Attachment 3 contain additional guidance on shelter preparation, operation and radiological exposure control.
10 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001
2.1. General Information.
2.1.1. CCAs are essential to sustained operations in a chemical environment. They limit the spread of contamination into a TFA so personnel can work or obtain rest and relief without wearing individual protective equipment (IPE). They also provide a controlled environment to safely remove contaminated IPE.
2.1.2. The hostile use of chemical agents in liquid form either neat (unthickened), thickened, or solid (dusty) form against our base populace will almost certainly force the creation of a CCA, regardless of the agent or external factors involved. One or both of the following situations will likely occur after the attack.
220.127.116.11. If an air base is attacked with chemical agents in liquid or solid form, it is possible that the agent’s persistency will be greater than the people’s ability to “ride it out”. Consequently, the work force will require some degree of rest and relief in order to sustain mission operations. This rest and relief will primarily be obtained by processing people through a CCA into a TFA.
18.104.22.168. In most cases, a small percentage of the base population is likely to have their chemical protective overgarment (OG) contaminated with agents in liquid form at the time of the attack.
Still others will contaminate their OG during post-attack operations. For these individuals, the contaminated OG presents an immediate contact hazard which can be negated to a large degree through the use of the M291 or M295 decontamination kit, as long as the kit is utilized within 15 minutes of contamination. These contaminated OG’s must be removed as soon as possible but absolutely within 24 hours. This suit replacement will take place at the CCA/TFA complex.
2.1.3. CCAs can be part of a shelter or they can be established in an open air environment. For the most part, CCA/TFA processing will take place in the open air as opposed to inside NBC filtered facilities. Even inside collective protection facilities, the majority of CCA processing steps will occur in an unfiltered environment and many of the same steps (suit aeration for example) will still apply.
2.1.4. The ultimate goal is to balance mission continuation with force survivability in order to maximize mission effectiveness. Towards this end, the concept of risk assessment (what risk a commander is willing to take in relation to the importance of the mission) is an integral part of the equation.
2.1.5. If not properly set up and operated, many people will be exposed to chemical contamination during the CCA processing operation. In fact, the likelihood of casualties occurring during processing
will be directly dependent on:
22.214.171.124. The amount and type of agent used.
126.96.36.199. Personnel processing that are untrained in CCA operations, resulting in a contact transfer of the agent.
2.2. Operational Concepts:
2.2.1. Plan CCAs for assigned collective protection systems and for open air operations.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 11 2.2.2. Designate and train monitors in CCA management and train personnel in CCA use.
2.2.3. Develop procedures and checklists for assistants and signs for processing personnel.
2.2.4. Obtain supplies and equipment for stocking and resupply.
2.2.5. Develop procedures and designate areas for OG aeration, rubber IPE decontamination, weapons decontamination and storage, and trash disposal (discarded contaminated equipment, and waste generated by shelters and CCA operations).
188.8.131.52. Place shelter and CCA supplies and equipment susceptible to contamination under covers. Process supplies and equipment for shelter resupply through the CCA. Replace these covers as necessary based on serviceability, perceived agent penetration capabilities, etc.
184.108.40.206. After a chemical attack it may not be necessary to process the entire base populace. This decision will be determined by the agent’s expected persistency time. See A2.12. for determining CCA processing line configurations.
220.127.116.11. Decontaminate IPE as soon as practical (approximately 15 minutes) after contamination occurs.
18.104.22.168. To the longest extent possible and with the authorization of the installation commander, try to delay processing personnel exposed to liquid/solid agents to allow decontamination by weathering. A one to two hour delay can reduce contamination levels significantly, thereby reducing the risk of agent transfer.
22.214.171.124. Bag and remove liquid/solid contaminated IPE and waste from the CCA as soon as possible to reduce vapor levels. Also bag and remove trash from shelters. Mark the bags as contaminated waste, OG, human waste, trash, etc. If possible use egressing personnel to take the bags to the designated disposal areas or to the decontamination area.
2.3.1. Agent Delivery Systems. The primary threat to air bases in regards to chemical-delivery vehicles is bulk-filled missiles. Because of the greater area coverage associated with airburst as opposed to impact fusing, it is assumed the missile will function as designed with airburst fusing. A probable scenario will involve from one to five missiles per base per attack. In most cases, a single missile footprint (optimal functioning) will cover approximately one million square meters - 500 meters wide by two kilometers in length. The contact hazard, with resulting vapor concentrations, will vary within the footprint - with the heaviest concentrations (expectantly, 5 grams per square meter) accounting for less than 10 percent of the total area.
12 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001
Figure 2.1. Standard Threat Profile.
126.96.36.199. In the event an air base is within approximately 100 kilometers of the enemy’s border, it is possible a few aircraft could penetrate air defenses during the first couple days of the conflict and deliver bulk-filled chemical bombs or conduct limited line-spray operations.
188.8.131.52. It is also possible for small teams of ground forces or to use chemical mortars, land mines, or rockets for harassment activities against air bases. Sprays may even be a threat by special operations forces (SOFs).
2.3.2. Primary Threat Agents. The primary chemical agents likely to be used against an air base are Distilled Mustard (HD), Sarin (GB), and Soman (GD). Depending on the adversary, Lewisite (L), Cyclosarin (GF), and VX might be utilized. Theoretically, all of these agents can be delivered in neat,
thickened, or dusty form. Assumptions are made that:
184.108.40.206. The enemy may deliver a combination of agents during a single attack, i.e., a single attack containing both GD and VX.
220.127.116.11. The expected ground contamination levels would be no more than 5 g/m2.
18.104.22.168. The maximum total exposure from any single attack would be no more than 4500 mg-min/m3.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 13
Figure 2.2. Chemical Volume/Vapor Concentration
22.214.171.124. In the event biological agents are utilized, either toxins or pathogens, the basic organization and processing principles outlined in this manual will still apply although some additional difficulties exist in the areas of detection and decontamination.
126.96.36.199. Individuals will deploy or be equipped with chemical/biological protective equipment in accordance with AFI 32-4001.
188.8.131.52. The CCA/TFA function directly supports sustainment of mission operations so long as a CB hazard exists. However, leadership must carefully consider the necessity of extended CCA/ TFA operations because the people in a CCA/TFA are more vulnerable, (security, less splinter protection, etc.) than at their normal duty location on base. Additionally, span of control becomes strained by the physical separation of personnel from their normal communication modes.
2.4. Sequence of Events. In regards to the establishment of a CCA/TFA, the basic sequence of events
following a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack on an air base would be:
2.4.1. NBC reconnaissance teams, SMTs, other specialized teams, and base populace initiate NBC monitoring.
2.4.2. NBC Control Center personnel analyze results and advise commander of hazards (type and duration).
2.4.3. NBC reconnaissance teams check pre-selected CCA/TFA sites (on and/or off-base) for contamination and attempt to find “clean” areas. The first-choice will always be to remain on base.
2.4.4. Once the decision has been made to activate the CCA(s), support materials are brought from their protected positions (cover and splinter protection) to the selected site(s).
2.4.5. Under Civil Engineer Readiness/Life Support supervision, augmenters establish the CCA/ TFA(s). Both aircrew and ground crew personnel processing lines should be established. Additionally, ensemble aeration areas and contaminated waster disposal areas must be established. Medical patient decon stations will likely be established in the same general area.
14 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 2.4.6. The CCA/TFA operations plan is executed (personnel rotation to and from the complex, transportation, logistics, personnel accountability, security, etc.).
2.4.7. Transportation from contaminated pick up locations to the CCA drop off points are established, routed, and coordinated.
2.4.8. Logistics personnel initiate resupply actions for the CCA/TFAs.
2.4.9. Personnel accountability systems are activated, and site security measures are taken to protect the site personnel and resources.
2.4.10. TFA “enhancements” (eating facilities, work center operations, etc.) are initiated IAW commander directives.
2.4.11. The CCA/TFA remains operational for the duration of the hazard or until it can no longer be sustained operationally or logistically.
2.4.12. Relocation plans are initiated. Personnel and equipment are processed for relocation and when complete, the CCA/TFA is closed.