«BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL 32-4005 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 30 OCTOBER 2001 Civil Engineer PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND ATTACK ACTIONS NOTICE: ...»
2.5. Site Components. Each CCA must have an entrance, Contact Hazard Area (CHA), Vapor Hazard Area (VHA), and an airlock/transition point between the VHA and Toxic Free Area (TFA). The CCA/ TFA complex is composed of the following sub-elements, each connected in some way and can only be successfully accomplished through cohesive, integrated operations. See Figure 2.3. and Figure 2.4. for an example layout of the CCA site components 2.5.1. Transportation drop-off point. In relation to the prevailing winds, the drop-off point should be located on the downwind side of the CCA (approximately 30-meters). At this point, establish a wind device, ie, wind sock, to monitor CCA wind direction. It is in this area that the first active efforts are taken for individuals to reduce both the contact and vapor hazards. As personnel leave the transportation drop-off point, they should be directed (either by sign or attendant) to the contamination control area.
2.5.2. CCA Entrance. The entrance to the CCA includes the following areas: Arrival and Initial Decontamination Area, Weapons Clearing, Wash & Holding Area, and the External Equipment Removal Area.
Use this area to:
184.108.40.206. Perform initial decontamination of yourself and your buddy prior to entering the Contact Hazard Area. See Table A2.9. for CCA processing procedures.
220.127.116.11. Inform the processees of the sequence of events they will experience and any emergency response procedures.
18.104.22.168. Provide a covered area for rest and shade while waiting to process.
22.214.171.124. Allow for turn in of weapons and the removal of external equipment worn other than the overgarment. i.e. Helmet, Vest (aircrew), Web Gear, Mask Carrier, Flak Vest, and Cold/Wet Weather Gear. Most of this equipment cannot be decontaminated to safe levels due to material composition. Equipment will be marked with individual’s rank, name, and duty position for reissue to the same individual.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 15 2.5.3. Contact Hazard Area (CHA). CCA processing stations in which the individual removes their OG. The goals of the CHA are contamination reduction in regards to processing personnel and the containment of all contact hazards i.e., agents in liquid or solid form, within the CHA.
2.5.4. OG Aeration Area. Units must perform a risk assessment before establishing an OG aeration area. This area may not be necessary if the chemical threat is low, the unit is sufficiently stocked with suits, and the resupply line functions. In this case, previously-used suits could be sent directly to the contaminated waste disposal area. However, if the threat of multiple chemical attacks is probable, suits are in short supply, or there isn’t a realistic resupply capability, then an aeration area is critical to mission sustainment. Personnel should consider the following items when selecting a site.
126.96.36.199. Accessibility of site in relation to the CHA: Locate the aeration area as close to the CHA as feasible. However, you must ensure the aeration area is downwind from the CHA/VHA transition point. Also, ensure the aeration area is far enough from the TFA and mask removal point that it doesn’t present a threat to unprotected personnel. The aeration area’s self-generated vapor hazard must be constantly monitored because this collection of contaminated suits in a single area will create an artificial “hot spot”.
188.8.131.52. Access to the suits for egress.
184.108.40.206. Terrain. In order to optimize the effects of weathering, the suits should be exposed to high temperatures, sunlight, and high winds. However, the suits should be provided some overhead cover in order to prevent inadvertent recontamination.
220.127.116.11. Security. Security for this area will come from available resources.
2.5.5. Contaminated Waste Disposal Area. Consider the following suggestions.
18.104.22.168. Method of containment or disposal. The three primary ways of handling the problem would be open storage, burying, and/or burning.
22.214.171.124. Location(s). It’s probable that at least two sites will be required, one within the main base area and one located somewhere in conjunction with the CCA function. Site selection should be based on prevailing winds for the season and be located downwind of all personnel housing and rest and relief locations, even in regards to the main base area.
126.96.36.199. Marking and personal protection requirements.
188.8.131.52. Monitoring. If sufficient equipment exists, place automatic vapor alarms around, or just downwind of, the area. NBC reconnaissance personnel should also periodically monitor just outside the area with hand-held vapor detection devices such as the chemical agent monitor (CAM) or the M256.
2.5.6. Vapor Hazard Area (VHA). The VHA provides the last chance for the CCA staff to verify processing personnel are free of any type of contamination before the individual(s) transition to the TFA.
In the case of open-air processing there should be at least a 15-meter buffer zone between the end of the CHA and the monitoring station. At the end of the VHA, attendants should verify the chemical vapor concentrations are at safe levels before they let people remove their mask. A decision to remove mask will be based on the recommended safe levels provided in Attachment 2. Consequently, the two-stage approach of clothing removal and monitoring is executed throughout this area.
184.108.40.206. Personnel must remove all clothing that could be “off gassing” in the VHA prior to entering the TFA. Personnel should not be allowed to automatically transition straight into the TFA 16 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 with their underwear if the people were using the no Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) option since that layer of protection would be missing. Consequently, each installation must develop a workable concept of operations for clothing replacement.
220.127.116.11. If the threat dictates, personnel should be monitored with the CAM for “dusty” contamination within the VHA. The attendants sense of sight and use of M8/M9 paper are not effective, especially in the case of dusty mustard (DHD).
18.104.22.168. In order to provide the highest degree of protection for personnel, VHA attendants must routinely monitor the air at the mask removal point.
2.5.7. Mission Critical Equipment (MCE) Refurbishment Area. The purpose of the refurbishment area is to decontaminate MCE and return it to the warfighter as quickly as possible. This area includes refurbishment of groundcrew, firefighter and EOD equipment. Refer to Table A2.13. for MCE refurbishment procedures. To prevent bottlenecks during this process, this function should have dedicated personnel when the CCA is fully operational. Regardless of whether it is a single activity or several line-by-line activities, the people will require large supplies of plastic bags, M8 paper, M291/M295 decontamination kits, sponges and bleach. The refurbishment area should be located outside the CCA processing lines. See Figure 2.3. for an example of the Refurbishment Area location and Figure A2.1.
for the Refurbishment Station layout. The refurbishment duties are split between the Contact Hazard Area and the Vapor Hazard Area. Ensure adequate space, dedicated personnel, and supplies are available for this tasking.
22.214.171.124. People in the TFA will remain vulnerable to any new chemical attack, radical wind shift, etc. until their mask is returned.
126.96.36.199. Untrained personnel may inadvertently be the cause of casualties. Extreme attention to detail is required in regards to contamination identification, mask decontamination if appropriate, cleaning of the mask, filter replacement, etc. The eyes are the most vulnerable part of the body and the slightest mistake on the part of the mask refurbishment team may well result in vision problems down the line, with the corresponding immediate loss of productivity.
2.5.8. Transition Buffer Zone Between CCA and TFA. This is the area where personnel remove their mask prior to entering the TFA.
2.5.9. Toxic Free Area to include accountability and logistics resupply point(s).
2.5.10. Egress Portion of CCA.
2.5.11. Supply Transition Point.
2.6. Site Selection. The most important step in selecting a suitable location for the installation CCA/TFA complex(s) sterns from a comprehensive vulnerability assessment. See Figure 2.5. for an example of where to establish the CCA in relation to the chemical deposition. The next consideration is knowing how large of an area will be needed. There are two main directions an installation may take.
2.6.1. Off-base. The decision to site CCA/TFA complex off the installation (probably at pre-selected sites located at least 10 km from the air base) should work if the following “ideal” parameters are present.
188.8.131.52. Installation is located at least 15 km away from populated areas and the proposed route(s) to the CCA/TFA complex are not intersected by potential civilian evacuation routes.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 17 184.108.40.206. Off-site locations are readily available which provide adequate space, multiple access routes, sufficient water and utility support, communications (primarily back to the main installation’s command and control and warning and notification networks), and a degree of personnel protection (from elements and hostile attack).
220.127.116.11. Civilian populations are not located downwind within 15 km of the CCA complex, to include the aeration area and contaminated waste disposal area.
18.104.22.168. There is an exceptionally limited or nonexistent ground threat, to include harassment activities from state-directed terrorists or sympathizers.
22.214.171.124. The installation possesses sufficient resources to execute the plan.
2.6.2. On-base. Finding and utilizing clean areas within the installation’s perimeter as the location
for CCA/TFA operations is preferable when:
126.96.36.199. The air base is near heavily populated civilian areas or near a potential civilian evacuation route. The resulting traffic jams caused by massive amounts of people, some of whom will be overtaken by the agent effects with disastrous driving effects, will probably result in making off-base CCA/TFA complexes unreachable.
188.8.131.52. A disruptive ground threat exists.
184.108.40.206. The population is resource constrained in regards to transportation. Communications limitations are also a factor.
220.127.116.11. The installation is large enough to possess areas outside of the “target rich environment” associated with the industrial and main housing areas.
18 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001
Figure 2.3. Example of a Site Components Layout.
18.104.22.168. The installation possesses a reliable detection network. The potential risk to personnel, as a result of changing weather conditions, certain terrain features, etc. is increased if the installation can’t field an effective detection system. For example, installation may have relatively clean areas above the chemical cloud. Vapor interaction with air currents is aided by the fact the threat agents are heavier than air by factors ranging from 4.8 to 9.2. This generally means the agents tend to follow the low-lying areas of the ground. If an installation has uncontaminated hill tops, ridges, or multi-storied buildings, it’s possible the concentrations of agent at these levels (verified through the use of detectors) are such that rest and relief may be obtained by “going up”.
2.6.3. A combined approach of site selection may be the best methodology. The prioritization for site selection should be: on-base (ground-level arrangement), on-base (vertical arrangement - space permitting), and off-base.
2.6.4. The requirement for space is a factor associated with selecting the site for a CCA/TFA complex. This factor depends on several variables. As a point of departure, consider a site of 500-meters square.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 19 Figure 2.4.
Example of a Contamination Control Area Layout.
22.214.171.124. Each of the CCA/TFA complex sub components has an accompanying space requirement: CCA entrance, CCA processing lines, mask refurbishment area, the ground crew ensemble (GCE) aeration and contaminated waste disposal area, buffer or transition area, egress areas, supply transition point, and the TFA.
126.96.36.199.1. CCA entrance. A single entrance area can be used for multiple processing lines.
However, the size of the entrance area will depend on the number of personnel the installation is expecting to process at any given time. This number will drive the size of the transportation point (one bus at a time or multiple), the size of the contamination control area, and the size of the “holding” area where people can rest while awaiting their turn to process.
188.8.131.52.2. The CCA processing lines will take a large amount of space in order to optimize processing and force protection ideals. Spread the lines out (distance between processing stations) as far as reasonably possible. If space permits stations should be spaced approximately 18 meters apart and areas within each station should be 9 meters apart.
Establish the lines in an angular and staggered fashion as opposed to a straight-line concept.
The angle of the line should be a 20-degree angular configuration. Using this method, the concentration of "trailingî vapor hazards washing over people downwind of each processing station will be significantly reduced. See Figure 2.4. for the example of a CCA Layout.
184.108.40.206.3. Lay out processing lines with plenty of space for the mask refurbishment area located in the CHA. The mask refurbishment work stations will require sufficient space for working, a disposal area for detection and decon kits/hoods/eyelens outserts, etc., a stock of spare parts, and a holding area for masks waiting to be checked.
220.127.116.11.4. The GCE aeration area and the contaminated waste disposal area. The aeration area has the potential to be as large or larger than the processing lines themselves. If a base population of 2000 use its full complements of OGs because of successive attacks, there would potentially be 6000 suits weathering at the same time. Therefore, an area of approximately 200-meters square is recommended. This area should be separated from the CCA lines and the TFA by approximately 50 meters.
18.104.22.168.5. Once monitored personnel remove their mask and proceed to the TFA. The further the better, but at least 25 meters is recommended from the end of the VHA to the TFA. See Figure 2.4.
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