«BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL 32-4005 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 30 OCTOBER 2001 Civil Engineer PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND ATTACK ACTIONS NOTICE: ...»
Figure 2.5. CCA Site Selection
184.108.40.206.6. There is also a requirement for the installation to operate egress-processing lines.
Adequate space must be provided for sufficient egress lines to allow personnel to process out of the TFA, keeping with shift change requirements. CCAs should accommodate simultaneous ingress and egress and inhibit cross-contamination of egressing personnel. In a worst case scenario, many lines may be necessary because people would have to utilize previously used OGs, combat boots, and clothing. In this scenario, space would also have to exist to store these previously-used items along the egress processing line(s). There is also a space requirement for storage space for individual equipment items such as web belts, canteens, first aid kits, helmets, M9 paper, etc.
220.127.116.11.7. Supply Transition Point. The size of this area will depend on the wing’s CCA implementation philosophy and the degree of contamination control utilized prior to the attack.
18.104.22.168.8. TFA. The size of the TFA is the largest variable of all. An area of 200-meters square is recommended. The main housing portion of the TFA should be separated from the CCA processing lines by the maximum distance available. A separation of at least 100-meters is recommended. A chemical vapor detection network should exist between the TFA and the CCA.
22.214.171.124. Other factors that should be considered during the site selection process are site security, communications, slope of the terrain, and the presence of other natural features.
2.6.5. CCA/TFA Patient Decontamination Site: Optimal requirements for a decontamination facility
22 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 126.96.36.199. Co-location with the supported Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) (not closer than 75 meters downwind or crosswind, and situated so arriving vehicles/casualties can reach it without approaching the MTF).
188.8.131.52. Access to water (free of NBC contaminants but not necessarily potable).
184.108.40.206. Hook-up to electricity/electric generator for water pump operation and lighting.
220.127.116.11. Approximately 60 meters controlled perimeter, and ground/floor gradient sufficient to facilitate drainage of contaminated water away from the decontamination facility and MTF.
18.104.22.168. Protection of equipment from temperature extremes, rain, and pilferage is required.
2.7. CCA Resources. Instructional signs, decontaminants, containers, and other equipment and supplies used in a CCA vary according to the design, processing rates, and availability or preference. General
2.7.1. Decontaminants. Liquid solution (5% chlorine solution) is preferred for most areas within the CCA. Normal household bleach is made at the 5% chlorine level. Do not use a 5% chlorine solution to decontaminate skin. Chlorine must be reduced to 0.5% for skin decontamination and must not be placed in open wounds. Standard decontamination kits (M291and M295) will also be used as appropriate for the task. The liquid chlorine mixture is placed in shuffle boxes for footwear decontamination and in troughs for glove decontamination steps. The amount needed for sustainment is based upon a number of variables, such as the type of protective ensemble the individual is wearing, number of personnel processing and flowrate. The CCA attendants will ensure the shuffle boxes and hand troughs are initially filled and checked periodically for refilling as necessary. For planning purposes;
the initial CCA start-up quantity using the groundcrew version CAPS is 73 gallons of bleach at 5% concentration and 46 gallons of water. See Figure 2.4. for CCA layout. The consumption rate to support 400 personnel is calculated at approximately 60 gallons of bleach (5% percent concentration) for BDO processing and 144 gallons for CPO processing; an average of 12 gallon of water was used for both processes. Consider contacting Civil Engineering Utilities personnel to create the 5% solutions required in order to reduce contract costs and airlift/storage requirements. Caution: shuffle pits become extremely slippery when filled with chlorine bleach. Look for solutions to the problem in advance such as laying terry cloth towels in the bottom of the pit to increase friction between overboots and the shuffle pit.
2.7.2. Containers. Use containers to collect contaminated waste and IPE doffed in the CCA. Provide containers at each station. Use plastic bag liners for containers holding contaminated IPE. Liners are recommended for all containers to help remove and store or dispose of their contents. Sealing plastic bags containing contaminated IPE will significantly reduce vapor levels. The amount of containers and plastic bags needed depends on the CCA design (available space) and the processing rate.
2.7.3. Mask Servicing. Spare hoods, mask parts, sponges, brushes, decontaminants, and water are needed to prepare mission masks for reuse. Amounts depend on the CCA processing rate.
2.8. CCA Duties and Staffing. The local commander should determine the personnel needed for each shift since it depends on the CCA size, design, and processing rate. Dedicated CCA monitors may not be feasible for temporary shelters due to the small number of personnel sheltered. The shelter or CCA supervisor designates untrained CCA assistants from the shelterees as required. Unit commanders should desAFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 23 ignate personnel as "organizational trainers" to receive CCA management training. CCA training is
categorized under the SMT course. CCA duties include:
2.8.1. CCA Supervisor. The CCA supervisor is a designated, trained person responsible for CCA management. At least one per shift is needed for CCA supervision. One per shift for both the CHA and VHA may be needed when the CCA design (including number of lines) precludes supervising all areas or when the processing rate exceeds an effective span of control.
2.8.2. CCA Assistants. CCA assistants are shelterees selected to help operate the CCA as an additional duty when not performing mission essential duties. They perform assigned CCA support tasks for the CCA supervisor. At fixed sites locations the attendants can be identified through the installation READY program and deployed forces.
22.214.171.124. CCA Entrance. Provide an assistant in the holding area who can answer questions concerning the CCA/TFA, collect classified material and direct people to the appropriate processing line, thereby minimizing bottlenecks. Also provide an individual for weapons clearing/storage operations.
126.96.36.199.1. Four people to operate and handle suit transport to and from the aeration area.
188.8.131.52.2. One person to control the contaminated waste disposal area (equipment operator preferably).
184.108.40.206.3. One person per processing line for hood roll.
220.127.116.11.4. One person per two or three processing lines to assist personnel as necessary prior to their reaching the VHA.
18.104.22.168. CHA Staffing. Minimum staffing, per shift, should be:
NOTE: The minimum staffing requirements listed below are based upon the complete setup of the CCA layout in Figure 2.4. Manning may fluctuate based upon the setup.
22.214.171.124.1. Four people to operate and handle suit transport to and from the aeration area.
126.96.36.199.2. One person to transport contaminated waste to the disposal area. (equipment operator preferably).
188.8.131.52.3. One person per processing line at the Mask Wipe and Hood Removal Area.
184.108.40.206.4. One person per two or three processing lines to assist personnel as necessary prior to their reaching the VHA.
220.127.116.11. VHA Staffing. Minimum staffing, per shift, should be:
18.104.22.168.1. Two to three personnel are necessary to monitor personnel at the BDU removal point for potential contamination. These personnel could also be utilized to monitor the air at the mask removal point.
22.214.171.124.2. Two people to operate and handle clothing transport to and from the aeration area.
126.96.36.199.3. Four personnel are necessary for mask refurbishment operations. See A2.8. for MCE refurbishment procedures.
2.9. Miscellaneous Support Issues.
24 AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 2.9.1. Transportation. In practical terms, we do not have the ability to thoroughly decontaminate vehicles to the point they could roll into the TFA. There is no need to attempt decontamination of the vehicles in regard to troop transport to and from the pick-up/drop-off points throughout the installation.
2.9.2. Logistics supply. There will be a need to establish a supply transition point. This supply transition point may be adjacent but must stay downwind of the CHA/VHA transition lines associated with personnel processing. Nothing can be allowed through the supply transition area until it has been thoroughly monitored and declared to be free of all contamination, to include low-level vapors. This effort will require staffing by personnel trained in basic contamination control techniques and advanced use of chemical detection instruments such as the CAM.
2.9.3. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I). C3I must be closely linked in order for the operation to be a success.
188.8.131.52. Reliable, redundant communications must exist internal to the CCA itself, between the CCA and the TFA, and internal to the TFA. Further, a dedicated communications link must exist between the CCA/TFA complex and the main portion of the installation.
184.108.40.206. Early warning concerning potential hazards to the personnel in the TFA and to the people processing into or out of the CCA is of the utmost importance.
AFMAN32-4005 30 OCTOBER 2001 25
3.1. General Information.
3.1.1. AFVA 32-4012, Mission-Oriented Protective Postures, depicts the various MOPP levels. See A4.1. for MOPP level configurations.
3.1.2. MOPP only applies if there is a threat of CB agent use. Attachment 4 contains guidance on MOPP levels and variations. Attachment 5 contains MOPP Analysis and MOPP Analysis examples.
3.1.3. People may need to relieve themselves while in a chemical-biological contaminated environment while wearing the groundcrew ensemble. See Attachment 6 for procedural guidance.
3.1.4. See Attachment 7 for chemical-biological warfare defense (CBWD) cold weather operations.
3.1.5. Water hydration is critical for personnel wearing the OG. Personnel usually have a tendency to drink to satisfy thirst rather than physical needs, consequently the concept of “forced” hydration, drinking more than to satisfy thirst, may need to be implemented. See Attachment 9 for guidance on water consumption at various temperatures.
3.1.6. While in MOPP 3 and 4, the time needed to complete tasks will increase. Attachment 9 contains guidance to determine estimated work completion rates.
3.2. Installation Commander. The installation commander should:
3.2.1. Direct MOPP levels and variations, based on mission, local situation (SRC input), intelligence data, and higher headquarters requirements.
3.2.2. Commanders must adopt a risk assessment philosophy when balancing force survivability and mission continuation requirements.
3.3. Unit Commander. The unit commander should:
3.3.1. Implement procedures to control heat build-up through work and rest cycles and maintaining hydration standards. Attachment 9 contains additional guidance on work and rest cycles and estimated rest times.
3.3.2. If available, consider using the multi-man intermittent cooling systems to alleviate heat build-up during physically demanding operations and in hot climates. T.O. 35EA4-7-6-1, Multi-Man Intermittent Cooling System, contains additional guidance.
3.4. Medical Services. Should advise the installation commander on hydration standards and work and rest cycles for personnel in MOPP 3 and 4 according to Attachment 8 and Attachment 9.
3.5. Survival Recovery Center (SRC) Staff. SRC representatives should assist the installation commander and subordinate commanders with MOPP analysis by providing functional knowledge, expertise, and advice.
4.1. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) Requirements. AFI 32-4001, Chapter 3 contains guidance for protective equipment worn during chemical, biological, and conventional attack.
4.2. Detection and Identification Planning Factors.
4.2.1. Chemical and Biological. The installation commander should:
220.127.116.11. Plan to deploy and integrate automatic detection, identification, and warning systems with individual detection and identification equipment. Ensure maximum coverage of critical areas with automatic systems and rely on manual systems to expand or back-up the coverage.
18.104.22.168. Using the data provided by the fielded detectors and with the help of the SRC staff, determine the status of the airfield. The actual presence or absence of contamination should be confirmed by multiple detection systems or kits. The following indicators should help to determine
the presence or absence of contamination:
22.214.171.124.1. Agent symptoms in people and wildlife. Some chemical agents may not manifest themselves until several hours after an attack. Some biological agents may not manifest themselves until several days or weeks after an attack.
126.96.36.199.2. Tactics and weapon systems used in the attack.
188.8.131.52.3. Presence of suspicious clouds, vapors, powders, or liquids.
184.108.40.206.4. Intelligence data supporting the likely or actual use of CB agents in theater.
220.127.116.11.5. Reports from personnel, teams, and automatic systems.
18.104.22.168. Use NBC reconnaissance teams, damage assessment and response teams (DARTs), contamination control teams (CCTs), and SMTs to verify initial positive indications, identify agents, and survey unmonitored areas as required.
4.2.2. Nuclear. Rapid detection of fallout arrival and measurement of radiation intensity are needed to continue mission operations, warn personnel, tailor protective measures to the situation, and for reporting. SMTs can provide much of the information. NBC reconnaissance teams, DARTs, and CCTs may be available for collecting information on previously unmonitored areas that obtain operational significance.