«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
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REPORT OF THE
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE
FOR THE BATTLEFIELD
APR I 0 1995'
I MMON STATMM
D Approved tot public rele;am Distribution Unlimited
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGYWASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140 19This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.
This document is UNCLASSIFIED.
Security review completed 28 November 1994 by OATSD (Public Affairs) Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review.
(Reference # 94-"-4704)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON. D.C 20301-3140 DI NDV 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION &TECHNOLOGY) SUBJECT: Report of Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield which was chaired by Dr. Craig I. Fields and General James P. McCarthy. This study was chartered to develop recommendations on implementing an information architecture to enhance the combat effectiveness of theater and joint task force commanders.
The Task Force's key findings and recommendations are summarized in the report's executive summary. While the Services and agencies are making good progress in developing programs to improve battlefield information interoperability, continued systemic improvement is needed to ensure a flexible joint information structure is achieved. A broader warfighter involvement in the development of joint requirements for battle
Memorandum for Chairman, Defense Science Board Final report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Ferce on
Information Architecture for the Battlefield udy Task Force on Attached is the final report of the Defense Science Board Sui Information Architecture for the Battlefield. This DSB Task Foico as charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture th.-.- would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for assimilation. The Task Force addressed all aspects :f the Terms of Reference except for the assessment of current and future DoD and Service programs. The Task Force had neither sufficient time nor access to all detailed plans necessary to perform this assessment.
The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for the battlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive anci defensive; the business practices of the DoD in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems.
This report emphasizes the importance of the warfighter as the principal customer for battlefield information systems. In today's complex world, the warfighter requires flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted to accomplish different missions. Further, the Task Force is quite concerned that DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare. However, the Task Force also found that the information systems of potential adversaries are also quite vulnerable.
The Task Force believes that management structure changes can provide an effective approach to integration of disparate systems. The group reinforces that notion that DoD can greatly enhance the effectiveness of limited DoD resources by leveraging available commercial products and technology.
We would like to thank the Task Force members and the Government advisors for their hard work on this report. In addition, we commend the support of DSB secretariat. The quality of this report is a direct result of their contributions.
EXECLUTIVE SUM MARY
1.1 Terms of Reference
1.2 What We Heard
1.3 Task Force View
2.0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONM ENT
2.1 M ilitary Operations Continuum
3.0 INFORM ATION IN WARFARE
3.1 What the Tactical Commander Requires
3.2 W arfighter Requires Expanded Information Capabilities
3.3 Empower the CINC to Fashion His Own Information Processing and Delivery System........ 9
3.4 CINC's Warfighting Architecture-Enables Battlefield Dominance
3.5 The Future
3.6 A Logical Time-Phased Approach to Provide Real Time Information to the Warfighter....... 13
3.7 Create Battlefield Information Task Force: An Instrument of Change
3.8 Explore Direct Broadcast System
3.9 Provide Robust Wideband Comm unications
3.10 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support
3.11 Virt-,al Conflict Every Day
3.12 Readiness Impact
4.0 INFORM ATION W ARFARE
4.1 Information W arfare-The Next Revolutionary Technology
4.3 Global Information Infrastructure Supports Military Operations
4.4 Security Commission Report-February 1994
4.5 Information W arfare
4.6 Offensive Operations
4.7 Conduct Net Assessment
4.8 Increase Defensive Information Warfare Emphasis
4.9 Red Team to Evaluate Information Warfare Readiness and Vulnerabilities
4.10 Joint DoD Strategy Cell for Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare
4.11 M ajor Policy Issues
5.0 BUSINESS PRACTICES
5.1 Strengthening our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management Processes.............. 37
5.2 Structure Concept for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure M anagement
5.3 Rapid Commercial Information Technology Evolution Must be Infused into DoD Systems
5.4 Reform Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management
6.0 R&D FOR INFORM ATION DOM INANCE
6.1 Enhanced Reconfigurability
6.2 Information and Information Systems Protection
6.3 Recom mendations
7.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Key Findings and Observations
7.2 The Key Recommendations
Table of Contents(Cont.)
Overview This Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for assimilation. The Task Force was instructed to focus on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations.
The global security environment provided the background for understanding the information needs of warfighting commanders in scenarios likely to occur in the coming decade. Based upon this environment, the Task Force assessed four aspects of information
architecture for the battlefield:
"* the use of information in warfare;
"* the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive;
"* the business practices of the Department of Defense (DoD) in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and "* the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems.
This report provides detailed analysis and supporting rationale for ti e findings and
recommendations of the Task Force, which are summarized as follows:
The warfighter must be an informed customer, with an integral role in the " determination of the operational output (specification of requirements), acquisition, and implementation of information systems;
Warfighters require flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly "* adapted and/or altered to accomplish different missions;
DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare, but so are "* those of potential adversaries; and, The DoD can greatly leverage limited DoD resources by exploiting available "* commercial practices and technology plus "buying into" commercial practices.
" Recognize Information in Warfare as a critical element of warfighting success by:
- establishing a Battlefield Information Task Force to define the Warfighter information systems needs and future vision;
- combining and expanding DoD capabilities for exercises, games, simulations and models;
- giving the Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) better staff support by strengthening the CINCs' technical expertise and establishing an Information Warfare Officer;
and ES-1 augmenting the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate the integration of functional requirements with technical architectural frameworks for warfighter information systems.
" Gear up for Information Warfare.'both offensive and defensive by:
- conducting an overall net assessment to determine the impact of information warfare on the DoD;
- investing more in information warfare defense;
- providing Red Teams to evaluate information warfare readiness and vulnerabilities;
- creating a joint DoD strategy cell for offensive and defensive information warfare; and
- providing strong DoD inputs to the formulation of a coordinated national policy on information warfare.
" Leverage the commercial world by:
- using commercial direct broadcast systems;
- buying and/or leasing communications bandwidth and other information services from the commercial market;
- providing a "civil reserve" commercial information service capability;
- adopting commercial practices in hardware and software acquisition; and
- exploiting commercial research and development (R&D).
Information in Warfare During the Cold War, there was potential for nuclear and conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale. The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer for information at the top-the National Command Authority. Today, the principal customers for information are the CINCs and their JTF Commanders, who are charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional operations. Actionable information is needed, the kind of information necessary to fight forces and win-as compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans. The handling and use of such information is the issue: getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner.
The CINC must control the process and the output. In order for the CINC to carry out his mission, he must exercise greater control over his information system support.
The first step is improved understanding by the CINC/Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander of what "can be"-as compared to what "is" since he, not the functional specialist, must become the spokesman for his needs and requirements. Information must flow to the field leader/weapons operator who is on the move, under great stress and very busy. He
needs the information:
in a timely manner, to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness, controlling the battle space and denying/disrupting his enemy's information flow;
- at all levels of execution in a common, but somewhat adaptable, format; and
- in a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use.
ES-2 Even with control -"fhis information systems, the CINC must cope with the system as it exists. A major pro*Lem is that the information systems are saturated today. Much of what is being moved now is of a routine nature, time relevant but not critically time sensitive-weather, logistics status, personnel/admin/finance data, etc.-and much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to data rate limitations. More throughput is critically needed. Not only routine, but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space.
In today's budget environment, a substantial new buy of information systems is not likely. New concepts for information distribution are needed. The solution may be in
exploiting another mode more than is currently being emphasized:
publishing/broadcasting-the Warfighter's CNN. There is great promise in such an approach in order to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels through the creation of a multi-band broadcast that blankets the battle space. Akin to a multiband TV network, such an approach could allow the CINC to tailor the information products to meet tactical demands as well as allowing the operator/user to access on demand-select the channels to meet his needs.