«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
The leader of the BITF should report to CJCS with CINCUSACOM acting as the Executive Agent. The leader should be at least a Military (0-8) Field Commander with DISA (SES) Deputy. This leader should have sufficient command experience to be credible to the functioning CINCs as their "Surrogate." The term for the BITF should be limited to 24 months, followed by ongoing IPT process.
-54oruadcast satellite service for Warfighter (increase Action: BITF explore direct #2 capacity via broadcast downlink).
The Task Force sees great potential in greater exploitation of direct broadcast satellite service in providing a mechanism for offloading much of the communications traffic presently being transmitted via DSCS and other military-unique communications systems.
The direct broadcast of "published" information, under the control of CINC and JTF commander and their staffs has the potential to revolutionize information capabilities for
the battlefield. Direct broadcast satellite services include the following:
High frequency military or commercial band;
Large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small sil _nals;
User at any command level selecting information channels he/she needs;
Providing an integrated intelligence picture, air tasking order (ATO), weather, logistics, etc.;
-Delivery of wideband information independent of chain-of-command, organization, deployment;
Affordability - leverages commercial infrastructure and equipment; and
The potential to offload traffic from stressed military-unique assets. -
#3 Action: B1TF provide a vision for how to provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command below Division/Wing/CVBG.
The BlTF should also be tasked, as part of its early work, to provide a vision for how to provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command below Division/Wing/CVBG. This analysis should address critical multimedia information needed for collaborative planning, interactive database transfer, video teleconferencing, etc. Current systems are inadequate to meet needs of CINCs and component commanders during training and military operations. The BITF should reevaluate current DSCS system utilization by intelligence community, Space Command, etc. and offload to commercial fiber and SATCOM where it is feasible. The BITF should also explore commercial informatio;i services to allow real-time surge (CRAF-like concepts).
#4 Action: CJCS provide increased technical billets to give the CINCs better staff support.
There is a critical need to provide the CINCs with better staff support in the area of C41 for the battlefield. Modem information technology is moving very fast and the commanders need to strengthen the technical expertise of their staffs. Such an expanded
technical cadre must be able to:
- Assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements;
-Apply promising technologies to operational requirements definition;
- Support joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements; and
- Improve dialogue between user in field and developer.
-55In addition, the CINCs should each establish the position of Information Warfare Officer as major staff function. This position should be tasked to formulate the Information Warfare strategy (offensive and defensive) for each CINC and to provide dedicated information architecture management support to the CINC. This officer should support the CINC's tactical and strategic decision making and control and use of information recognized as a warfare discriminator.
Action: DDR&E (DMSO) with USACOM, JWFC and J-7, combine and expand U.S.
#5 capabilities for exercises, games, simulations and models in C4I, using the evolving GCCS
common operating environment, to enable operation "from the same seat" for:
- Readiness assessment;
- Requirements for acquisition;
- Verification of interoperability;
- Confidence building;
- Mission planning; and
- Battle damage assessment.
The DDR&E should provide the basis for "virtual" warfare to be conducted throughout the commands and JTFs on a daily basis, without the need to go to special modeling and simulation centers.
Action: SECDEF undertake a broad net assessment of Information Warfare.
#6 This assessment should include the involvement of the Battlefield Information Task Force to aid in DoD planning and policy development and should be designed as an input to national IW policy review and formulation. The Net Assessment should
- DoD and national systems and implications;
- Nature, extent and implications of vulnerabilities;
- Evolving U.S. and adversary capabilities; and
- Cost and effectiveness of strategy options.
Action: SECDEF support immediate increases in funding for defensive IW with a #7
on protection of critical services. In addition, SECDEF direct that:
focus BITF exercise and simulate IW and resultant degradations;
JCS design military operations to avoid catastrophic failure if information is degraded;
- DISA/NSA encourage the use of available multi-level security trusted technology everywhere. Trusted technology can remove the need for duplicate systems and reduce personnel support; and
- DISA/NSA support the recommendations made by the Joint Security Commission in Chapter 8 of their report dated February 28, 1994.
-56Action: SECDEF establish a Red Team to evaluate Information Warfare readiness and vulnerabilities.
The Red Team should be integrated with other assessment and exercise activities, audited by ASD (C31), and coordinated' with parallel Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) activity.
#9 Action: VCJCS create a joint DoD strategy cell for offensive and defensive Information Warfare integrated at Flag level and reportiiz, to the VCJCS.
This Joint strategy cell should be tasked to develop an IW strategy that:
- Integrates offensive and defensive IW;
- Integrates IW with Information in Warfare;
- Takes adversary actions, reactions, evolution into account; and
- Involves Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, DISA and Intelligence Agencies.
#10 Actions: SECDEF review draft PRD and related issues and expedite the net assessment to support development of the national policy. In addition, SECDEF should task ASD (C3M) to lead development of DoD policy on IW in acquisition and export.
#11 Action: DEPSECDEF should augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate integration of requirements and technical architectural frameworks for Warfighter information systems.
This augmentation should add battlefield information systems to the charter as well as oversight and conflict resolution. The Council should employ the Battlefield Information Task Force for generating alternatives and task the JROC and JCS staff to develop, maintain and validate a warfighter information requirements architecture framework. DEPSECDEF should ratify the DISA role as technical architect for interfaces, standards, and interoperability. In addition, USD (A&T) should augment acquisition reform efforts to assure compatibility with the extremely short development and product lifetimes of commercial software and microelectronics.
#12 Action: DDR&E ensure that R&D strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses DoD investment in military-unique information technology. DoD should be investing in military-unique information technology R&D and giving special attention to information protection technology. In addition, DoD should be using the best commercial technology.
Summary In summary, the Task Force believes that the timing is right for a major push to improve the effectiveness of information systems to support the Warfighters. The Task Force sees significant opportunities for DoD in the use of information in warfare as well as vulnerabilities in today's information systems. The Departmefit has not come to grips with the leverage of information as a tool for use by the Warfighter. There is a need for change throughout the Department regarding the way information systems are developed and employed. This Task Force underscores the importance of such change to achieving information dominance on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the business practices of the
-57Department are hindering DoD's ability to exploit the best systems and technologies available in the commercial sector. Further, DoD needs to place high priority on militaryunique science and technology areas in its information technology investments.
The recommendations of this Task Force are intended to address these issues, for implementation of such recommendations will substantially improve CINC effectiveness and readiness. However, if real change is to occur, DoD leadership must aggressively pursue implementation of these recommendations.
3.0 CINC INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS: SUBSTANTIAL AND ROBUST....... A-6
3.1 The Warfighter's Requirements
3.2 The Warfighter's Information Architecture Vision Actionable Information
4.0. THE CINC NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE FORCEEMPLOYMENT
4.1. Command and Direction of Forces
4.2 Maintaining Situational Awareness
5.0. HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW
5.1. Just Cause Experience
5.2. Desert Shield/Storm Experience
5.3. Somalia Experience
6.0. REGIONAL INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENTAUSTERE AND SATELLITE DEPENDENT
.6.1 Inter-Theater/High Capacity
6.2 Tactical C2 Net
6.3. A Concept for the Future
7.0 BROADCAST FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION
8.0 BOTTOM LINE WHAT IS NEEDED IS CINC CONTROL
9.1 Recommendation # 1 Create An Awareness Explosion to Fuel Change.....A-16
9.2 Recommendation # 2 Explore Direct Broadcast Satellite
9.3. Recommendation # 3 Provide Robust Wideband Communications......... A-19
9.4 Recommendation # 4 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support
9.5. Recommendation # 5 Virtual Conflict Every Day
9.6 Recommendation # 6 Real Time Situational Awareness Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications
10.0 READINESS IMPACT
10.1 The CINC Information Architecture Posture is Much Improved
10.2 Measuring Effectiveness
LIST OF FIGURESFigure A-1 Military Operations Continuum
Figure A-2 CINC's Warfighting Architecture Enables Battlefield Dominance................ A-9 Figure A- 3 The Future
Figure A-4 Create Battlefield Information Task Force: An Instrument of Change......... A-17 Figure A-5 Explore Direct Broadcast System
Figure A-6 Provide Robust Wideband Communications
Figure A-7 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support
Figure A-8 Virtual Conflict Every Day
Figure A-9 Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications
Figure A-10 Information in Warfare - Impact on Readiness
INTRODUCTION1.0 Tasking Assignment 1.1 The 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield (the "Task Force") convened three times as a group during the early summer to receive briefings on relevant Government initiatives and programs, and to plan its approach to the Summer Study. The Task Force created four Panels as
"* Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare "* Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare "* Management Panel to address Business Practices "* Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This annex is the Final Report of the Warfighters Panel which was charged with addressing the needs of the warfighters for C4I capability. The panel addressed its tasks by
"* The Warfighters' task and the need for information in warfare "* How the world has charged "• Role and capabilities it the CINCs in defining their C4I architecture "* The C41 problems of today and conceptual approaches to address these problems "* Use of Virtual combat in joint C4I system definition and training "* Recommendations for change These themes formed the major focus of the Panel's assessments, and will be addressed in various ways in the report which follows.
The Warfighter's Information Architecture Vision: Achieve decisive advantage by moving actionable information reliably to decision makers and weapons operators with security appropriate to its sensitivity.
" The Warfighter's Task. The C.INC/Joint Task Force Commander's responsibility is to decisively apply force with minimum loss of life and consumption of resources.
Sun Tzu said "...if you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles..".
"* The World Has Changed. During the Cold War, there was potential for nuclear and conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale. The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the top-the National Command Authority (NCA).
" The Customer Has Changed. Today, it's different. The principal customer to be served is the CINC/JTF Commander and below, charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional conventional operations. The NCA continues to be the customer for information related to the nuclear threat.
" Actionable Information is Needed. The kind of information in question here is that necessary to fight forces and win-as compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans. The handling and use of this actionable information is the issue: getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner.