«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
" The CINC Must Control the Process. In order for the CINC to carry out his mission, he must exercise control of his information support. The first step is improved understanding by the CINC/JTF Commander of what "can be" - as compared to what "is" since he, not the functional specialist, must become the spokesman for his needs and requirements.
" The Mobile Tactician Has Special Needs. Information must flow to the field leader/weapons operator who is on the move, under great stress and very busy. He
needs the information:
- In a timely manner, to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness, controlling the battle space and denying/disrupting his enemy's information flow;
- At all levels of execution in common, but somewhat adaptable, format; and
- In a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use.
" The Problem: The Information Systems Are Saturated Today. Even with control of his information and information systems, the CINC must cope with the system as it exists today - clogged. Much of what is being moved now is of a routine nature, time relevant but not critically time sensitive--weather, logistics status, A-2 personnel/admin/finance data, etc. - and much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to pipe constriction/data rate limitations.
" More Throughput Is Critically 'Needed. Not only routine, but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space. A substantial new buy of information systems is not likely. New concepts for information distribution are needed.
" The Solution: Publishing/Broadcasting-The Warfighter's CNN. One recommended approach to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels is to create a multi-band broadcast that blankets the battle space. Akin to a multiband TV network, it allows the CINC to tailor the information products to meet tactical demands as well as allowing the operator/user to access on demand - select the channels to meet his needs.
" Finding New Pipe--Reallocate. In the absence of new buys, the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage of major defense satellite systems, primarily the DSCS. Load will have to be moved/reduced, primarily to commercial alternatives - satellite, fiber and wire. This would open the opportunity for the CINC's to have much more bandwidth in the short term for collaborative planning, video conferencing, joint training, exercising, etc. In the longer term we must establish a publishing/broadcasting mode of service that would provide wideband data to small mobile terminals at all levels of command-CINC, component, tactical user/warfighter.
"* Strengthen the CINC's Expertise. While the CINC and staff need to better understand how information assets might be better employed, the CINC needs better technical support to be able to identify an-A articulate his requirements, apply promising technologies to operational needs, and improve the linkage between field user and developer "* Focus the CINC's Information Warfare. The ever increasing importance of information warfare requires focus on both its opportunities and its vulnerabilities.
A new staff function, run by a combat arms officer, should build the CINC's strategic and tactical information warfare plan, both offensive and defensive.
" Conduct Virtual Combat E. oryday. The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and to fight from the same seat and same system, every day. Models for simulation of the battlespace are needed to allow the CINC, his components and tactical formations to prepare for commitment under uncertainty. Testing his employment concepts with Red Teaming, CINC and component practice and rehearsals of envisioned employment concepts will raise confidence of success and improve force readiness.
" Implementing Change-A Major Cultural Hurdle. These many tasks-putting the CINC in control, getting actionable information to mobile shooters, broadcasting information to users which is accessed on demand, and improving the CINC's staff support to apply this technology and fight effective information warfare--requires a major effort to change culture and educate users.
"• The Igniter-The Battlefield Information Task Force. To trigger change, the task force approach must be used, led by a field experienced operator-an unsatisfied customer, A-3 with specific output taskings-charged with altering the landscape in a defined period of time: two years. Working for the CJCS, this task force would survey the field, demonstrate new concepts to the CINCs, apply them in relevant exercises, improve the requirements development process, and put together a CINC oriented action program. After the two year start up period an IPT would be charged with maintaining the ongoing program.
The Output: Decisive Regional Conventional Operations. Implementation of these recommendations will substantially improve CINC effectiveness and readiness. He will have a much better understanding of what he needs, will have tested his concepts and his troops, will know what to expect, having practiced from his fighting seat, and will know what it takes to be lethal and effective with minimum loss-today's standard of success.
2.0. WARFIGHTING FOCUS: PAST AND PRESENT
2.1. The Cold War Perspective: Global Nuclear Operations During the Cold War, not only was there potential for global conflict, but also for use of both conventional and nuclear operations against the same adversary. The envisioned concept was: deter; if that failed, engage conventionally while maintaining the capability to respond with nuclear force; if unable to prevail or if preempted, be able to conduct and prevail in sustained nuclear operations.
* The Cold War Customer, The National Command Authority. The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the top-the NCA-bec•ase of the responsibility for making the solemn nuclear decision.
Control and direction flowed from the top down a defined pipe, narrowing in throughput as it descended. This tight knit system minimized the risk of an inappropriate action triggering the nuclear decision on either side of the conflict.
* The Cold War Outcome: A Success. This worked. There was no nuclear exchange during the Cold War-a ringing endorsement of not only the concept but also the leadership and command that dealt with events and controlled the use of force, as well as the communications and intelligence that informed and shaped the views of those leaders and commanders.
2.2 The World Has Changed: Today's Focus Is Regi.onal Conventional Operations
Today, it is different. Nuclear capability is still a necessary part of our deterrence posture, but now it is not only a smaller feature of our arsenal-smaller target base, much reduced force levels, etc.-but it is also largely disconnected from where we are likely to use force. We still possess nuclear weapons in order to deter use by any party-but there is reduced likelihood that any of the other current major nuclear parties are also potential near term adversaries in a conventional engagement involving U.S. forces.
Conventional operations are now postulated to be regionally oriented-the two MRC strategy. The experience of the past several years in Bosnia, Somalia, Panama, A-1 illustrates the Rwanda, etc... lends strength and credence to this strategy. Figure continuum of potential future military operations that we face today. Not only are they A-4 diverse from the standpoint of probability and risk, but they also demand substantially different information system capabilities.
While nuclear operations are necessarily very structured, strongly centralized and consist of a series of discrete actions, conventional operations are less structured, much more diverse, and consist of thousands of individual acts/actions, all requiring coordination.
In the context of Battlefield Information Architecture, what's different today is the principal customer. In conventional regional operations this is the CINC/JTF Commander. The CINC controls and directs events, carrying out the NCA mandate, with the implied understanding that no nuclear operations are envisioned and these remain the purview of the NCA. The information system capabilities necessary to conduct regional operations must be provided in what could well be a very austere environment.
Whereas conflict in Europe against the Warsaw pact would have been on known terrain using a high quality communications network, composed of both military and host nation capabilities, honed and refined over decades, such is not the case in regional operations.
Not only must the military communications be deployed, but also the host nation capability may range from modest to essentially zero, e.g. Rwanda and Somalia.
The Warffhter's Requirements 3.1 Not only has the principal customer focus shifted to the CINC/JTF Commander, but also the very nature of how he is provided information support must change. On the
regional battlefield, the tactical commander requires:
"* Timely Information: To achieve decisive advantage.
" Situational Awareness: From deployment of the first forces to the engaged battle, the commander needs situational awareness. Where are his forces? Where are coalition forces? Where are adversary/enemy forces? What is going on now? What activity is underway (Joint Surveillance Targeting and Reconnaissance (JSTARS)/Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) "God's eye" views)?
Continuous weather, ELINT, SIGINT, etc.
Once the commander has the basic grasp of the " Control of the Battle Space:
situation, the task is to exert control over it. The challenge is to be the initiator of what happens - proactive - rather than the victim, reactive - and in a catch up recovery mode, damage limiting until the initiative can be regained. The desired level of control of the battle space is dominance - all levels, theater, battlefield, tactical engagement - such that the commander determines what happens and how it happens - the most effective and efficient use of combat forces and resources.
" Denial/Disruption of the Enemy's Information Flow: The corollary to friendly domination of the battle space is to insure the same advantage is denied to the enemy, not only to distort or destroy his picture of the battlefield but also to impede or prevent his capacity to act-to command and direct the effective use of his forces.
" Rapid Movement of Actionable Combat Information/Information Necessary to Fight Forces: There is no shortage of information, nor of data. The information architecture challenge on the battlefield is to provide actionable information germane, tailored and in usable format - to the leader/operator who must fight forces. This is a very demanding requirement - movement of information to operating units that are very mobile, have limited communications, and are very busy.
" Information Provided Reliably and in Real Time: The warfighter must have confidence that information will reach him reliably. He must trust the system, since he is risking forces and resources. Just as importantly, information must reach him when he needs it, as close to real time as possible, so that he can apply it to the situation he faces. He must also be able to acknowledge receipt and report back important information needed by others.
" Information Tailored to the Warrior at Each Level: On the conventional battlefield, there are at least hundreds, potentially thousands, of customers. In meeting this need, considerable effort needs to be expended to insure that not only is the user's need understood, but also that it is tailored to his needs. An important "piece" rather than the entire "whole" may often meet the need...and in limited pipe environments, such tailoring could prove crucial to success.
" Information In Usable Format: The purpose of information on the battlefield is to implement the defeat of adversary/enemy forces. It must be presented to the user in actionable format and be usable for the purpose intended.
" Effective, but not Restrictive, Security:
The Warfiahter's Information Architecture Vision: Actionable Information 3.2 Summing up what the tactical commander requires in one succinct statement: the
Warfighters' Information Architecture Vision, is the intent to:
The challenge, then, is to transition the existing information system structure, concepts, doctrine and equipment-with enhancements as required- to meet the needs of regional warfare. In considering how to better meet the CINC's regional warfighting needs, it is useful to consider how the CINC/JTF Commander might group-categorizehis information needs as well as considering how it is done now. From that examination, a new information architecture support concept will be proposed.
A military force commander and subordinate organizations need information to accomplish two major purposes: 1) to command/direct actions; and 2) to maintain a common frame of reference - situational awareness - keeping everyone on the same sheet of music.
The command/direction function is fundamental to effectiveness - maintaining control in order to act coherently and decisively, with minimum loss of personnel and consumption of resources. Command /direction communications are necessarily structured - up and down the chain of command - with support link-ins (each level of command is responsible for coordinating its own support requirements-logistics, personnel, etc.).
Structured/switched command/direction communications necessary to orchestrate
and control the actions of forces (as illustrated in Figure A-2) are generally of three types:
" Discrete Point-to-Point Communications: These are the dynamic, real time exchanges of information, linked in the form indicated in Figure A-2. Their purpose is to carry out such tasks as: exercise of command and control between NCA/CINC/JTF/Component Commanders and field command elements;