«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
connectivity between mobile tactical command elements; links among collaborative regional/ tactical planning cells, to include coalition forces; interactive video; two way distributed data base transfer; and, direct support to leaders/weapons operators with time-sensitive, actionable combat information of all types-Command and Control (C2), SIGINT, Human Intelligence (HUMINT, etc.
" Messaging: This grouping of information communications describes the storage and forwarding of information, data and data bases. It is necessarily structured, both because of the function it performs and the way that it links - often by hard wiring.
It includes such tasks as routine message distribution, filing of reports, updating of data bases, etc.
This grouping of information communications, also "* Information Access:
structured, provides the capability to access stored information, from both central and distributed data bases; and to insert, access, update and/or extract information.
A-8 CINC's Warfighting Architecture - Enables Battlefield Dominance
4.2 Maintaining Situational Awareness The second important information function, also illustrated in Figure A-2, that of maintaining a common frame of reference (often referred to as situational awareness), is currently being accomplished through distribution using existing structured/switched nets. These are the only paths available.
Situational information is important to everyone. It is the basis of orchestrating/commanding/directing action. Since everyone needs it-the weather, for example-it could be distributed in a more universal distribution scheme - unstructured and unswitched - horizontal, so to speak - if it were available. This grouping of information distribution is labeled the publishing or broadcasting mode.
Publishing: This grouping of information distribution describes the centralized creation and distribution of high quality information broadly- horizontally-such as via broadcast similar to commercial radio and TV - a sort of CINC CNN concept.
This mode would be used to support CINC/JTF distribution of important information such as: weather synopses; summary reports; inventory listings;
personnel data; etc. It could also be used to distribute current situational information such as the JSTARS/AWACS "picture" and an integrated intelligence picture of the battlefield. Another use by the CINC/JTF would be to respond to inquiries that have applicability to a broad cross section of the command/coalition.
A-9 HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW5.0.
The existing methods for moving and distributing information to our fighting forces today are largely hierarchical and sequential (structured/switched). Information flows in an orderly pattern up and down the operational command chain. While the new focused customer in the net is the regional CINC/JTF Commander, the old patterns of distribution are embedded in our doctrine, force structure, and equipment. As a result, the top is well serviced but lower levels are increasingly unable to satisfy their perceived information needs. In short, for regional operations, there is neither enough access nor enough throughput at the lower echelons due to clogged pipes as well as limited equipment and frequency availability. There is enormous evidence, accumulated during recent regional operations, to support the latter statement.
5.1. just Cause Experience
In JUST CAUSE, one finding was that "...timely automated intelligence support (was not provided to) units/staff during the initial operation...(due to) faulty design, environmental problems, and shortage of automation personnel...". Again in JUST CAUSE, a report commenting on information flow noted that "...The volume of reports processed by J-2 operations, other staff sections, and units was at times overwhelming...due to the volume, most of these reports could not be followed up by J-2 personnel...".
5.2. Desert Shield/Storm Experience
DESERT SHIELD/STORM provides an abundance of views on communications support of the field commander. Because of the size of the deployed force as well as the length of the effort, there was a requirement to move large volumes of information. The austerity of deployable resources as well as limitations on the host nation's capabilities created enormous dependency on satellite links.
Senior command officials considered themselves well informed during DESERT SHIELDISTORM. In the words of General Colin Powell, CJCS, "No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander.
Intelligence support to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story."
General Norman Schwartzkopf's view was similar: "The great military victory we achieved in Desert Storm and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis." That view was less sanguine as one moved down the chain of command. Lt Gen William M.
Keys, USMC, Commanding General, 2D MARDIV, noted that "At the strategic level (intelligence) was fine. But we did not get enough tactical intelligence-frontline battle intelligence."
This information support-satisfie, t senior level, lacking at the operitional level-was, as noted earlier, heavily dependent ori,r.ie'. DESERT STORM after action reports contain statements such as:"...At the begiing of the offer.,ive, DSCS provided 75% of all inter-theater connectivity and was used extensively to support intra-theater requirements across long distances, not supportable by terrestrial comms"...".. Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) formed the C2 backbone and highlighted flexibility tailored to prioritized C2 needs...". And, "...Approximately 95% of the Navy's A-10 message traffic went over UHF satellite communications...In the end, less than 75% of the known UHF(satellite) requirements could be met...".
5.3. Somalia Experience The U.S./UN operation in Somalia, a much smaller commitment but of a much different character, pointed up significant information architecture problems caused by the regional operating mode. "...Command posts in Somalia were widely separated, well beyond normal doctrinal distances and beyond the normal range of FM voice radio...UHF Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) was...used to overcome the distance problem, but there were insufficient assets to cover all unit requirements...some units were simply forced to operate outside communications range, rendering them unable to call for MEDEVAC, fire support or emergency maintenance support...".
6.0. REGIONAL INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENT: AUSTERE
AND SATELLITE DEPENDENTThe actual nature of regional operations and information support are well described by these brief operational insights. The lack of existing host communications infrastructure, the need to haul in required terrestrial equipment to support operations, plus the inadequacy of the resulting structure gives perspective to why there is such a push to use satellite means to communicate, both out of theater and within. These important satellite linkages are of two main types, those used to primarily support high capacity information movements and those used to primarily support tactical information networks and requirements.
6.1 Inter-Theater/High Capacity
Today, movement of large amounts of information-the inter-theater bulk traffic effort-is done by land line when it is available but also by high capacity satellite connectivity. Recall the statement that some 75% of DESERT STORM intra-theater comms moved by DSCS alone in the early days of combat operations. This mode of support requires medium to large terminals (Figure A-3 - High Capacity example) - transportable but not mobile - that provide large volume point-to-point wideband connectivity. It can also provide interactive video, recognizing however, that large bandwidth is the price.
This mode moves the majority of intra-theater intel, C2, and other support required from out of theater. Figure A-3 illustrates how this mode, primarily designed to service CINC and JTF needs, can also directly serve tactical/warfighter users, either by downlink or by two way use. Low density/low bulk users drive down the efficiency of the satellite mode but can provide critical capability when needed.
6.2 Tactical C2 Net
The second grouping of satellite capability is the tactical C2 net. This net is characterized by small, mobile terminals aimed at supporting mobile tactical units.
Throughput is limited - low data rates-making it unsuited for moving large amounts of information or high data demand products-such as digitized imagery - except under emergency circumstances.
A-11 Both the USN and the USAF are major users of this capability, the USN with its UHF Fleet Satellige (FLTSAT) constellation and the USAF with its UHF Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) network. Not as well understood is the importance of this net to the Special Operations Forces of the United States. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) units are often deployed to distant/remote locations on short notice.
They are either precluded from communicating by existing host means for security reasons or have no other recourse other than owned comms to accomplish all required C2 functions, both in theater and inter-theater. This capability is especially significant since the sensitivity of such operations often involves national interests that reach to the NCA level. Tight linking for positive command and control is an essential requirement in such force applications.
The critical UHF satellite connectivity among tactical terrestrial command and control networks are quite vulnerable to ground mobile jammers and cannot be protected.
For this reason, the USN's UHF Follow-On S -,tem (UFO) and the MILSTAR-Il system, scheduled for launch in 1998, include relatively narrow band to medium band highly protected data links at EHF frequencies (44GHz uplink/20GHz downlink).
Figure A-3 describes the tactical C2 net concept. Note that it looks the same as the high capacity net except that the size of the "lightening bolts" are thinner, indicative of low data rate, and service reaches out to the tactical user-really the primary user-- of this unique capability.
A-12 As noted earlier, the key difficulty in meeting CINC/JTF C2 needs is the lack of capacity. Since host national capabilities cannot be depended upon, the CONUS/Theater forces must deploy terrestrially-linkable and satellite terminals. That has proven insufficient to meet the need. And, given that large buys of new equipment are not likely, the principal path to meeting the CINC/JTF requirement lies in better utilization of what now exists - using new concepts and new approaches.
A Concept for the Future6.3.
It is generally accepted that much of the information distributed from outside the theater, as well as that circulated within it, is of a routine nature-time relevant but not critically time sensitive. This includes information activity such as: establishing databases upon initial deployment; updating databases, particularly if of a distributed nature; and, providing routine summaries--intel, logistics, personnel, finance, weather, mapping.
These and other needs are distributed frequently to a broad array of receivers/users-a horizontal distribution scheme.
Direct Broadcast. The logical question is: why not make this time relevant information available to all users simultaneously by means other than hard wire or other limited capacity, structured means?
"Therecommended solution is to employ a "direct broadcast" mode of service. This would be a wideband link to small, mobile terminals, servicing all levels of recipientsCINC, component, tactical user/warfighter. Moreover, since the transmission is broadcast style, it could provide everything from low density simple listings to high bandwidth demand digital imagery. It would reach all potential users simultaneously, but allow receivers to exercise selective reception - "pull" as desired. Future use of this system would augment the current capabilities discussed above.
The broadcast concept is quite robust with respect to vulnerability to ground mobile jamming threats expected in the future. These threats cannot attack the downlink broadcast information. Only an enemy controlling space-based or airborne jamming equipment can impact the downlink. These are evaluated as less likely threats. The high power uplink can be made invulnerable to jamming by insuring that it is placed in a sanctuary location or satellite relays are considered to protect this critical injection mode.
Direct broadcast systems are therefore much less vulnerable to jamming than other twoway communications systems used for command and control.
Figure A-3 also illustrates the direct broadcast concept. Note the characterization of large pipe and blanket coverage across the engagement region. This concept is conceived as one way: inputs edited based on CINC/JTF/Component/Tactical-stated requirements and then delivered - pumped - by broadcast means. In addition to having this broadcast fed from outside the theater (as illustrated), the CINC, through his Information Warfare Officer, would also have the capacity to input to the broadcast net from within theater.
The CINC would therefore exercise control of the net and, based on user need, configure it to deliver information appropriately. Depending on the frequency band used and the degree to which current systems can be downloade'i, it is possible to make on the order of hundreds of channels available for broadcast material.
A-137.0 BROADCAST: FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION
Two approaches could make this concept a reality. The first is to reallocate existing use of our large, high capacity satellites. The difficulty is deciding how to move displaced information/data. No doubt, some of the use could probably be eliminated but the estimate is that the percentage is minor. The second possibility is to move significant segments of the information stream by other means - either commercial satellite or by linked means-wire, fiber, etc.
While means exist to move the information by another mode, resources are lacking.