«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
Today, DoD users of high capacity satellites justify time/throughput based on priority; the cost to the user is free since DoD centrally funds the capability. If a user is required to find alternate movement means - presumably commercial, they lack the dollars to fund the service. This is a major impediment to implementation in this resource-tight environment.
One possible way to work this problem is to convert use of DoD satellites to user funding-distribute the centralized cost of running the system to the user in the form of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding and then charge a fee for service. This is a common practice in defense/service supply and transportation systems, referred to as revolving funds or, more recently, the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF). This would open up some capacity, perhaps substantial capacity, to serve not only CINC/theater needs (the broadcast net, for example), but also other users who are willing to pay but cannot get time/space on the net.
The expected result would be more rational bulk data movement based on market rates-the real cost of doing business-as well as opening up capacity for operational priority use. Capacity would be created to practice in peacetime; conduct collaborative planning between NCA/JCS/CINCs/components and potential coalition partners; to train and exercise in CONUS as well as overseas as the CINC intends to operate in crisis/contingency/conflict; exercising large data transfers; and using interactive video, to name a few.
The proposal, however, also involves downside risk that must be thought out. It is both the need to substitute new resources to buy the capacity that is diverted to commercial markets as well as the potential risk, not now quantifiable, that diversion from the DoD satellite net might result in significant underutilization - a foolish and unintended resource consequence. And given that the cost of satellite operations is of a magnitude in hundreds of millions per year, the offload/DBOF proposal requires careful study before considering implementation.
Another major hurdle to implementation is the lack of understanding of just what new technology (such as the broadcast mode of information delivery) can do to help meet the CINC/JTF Commander's information architecture requirements. The military is not driving information technology. The commercial sector is in the lead and likely to remain so. And they have advanced faster thark most senior leaders/commanders understand in their ability to provide arrays of information services-and it is growing every day.
A-14 Some device needs to be found to educate users on capabilities, now and envisioned, and to communicate a sense of the rate of development of improvements.
Unless and until this happens, the process to identify information architecture requirements will not be driven by commanders/leader but rather by specialist/functional providers. This is an unsatisfactory situation that demands reform if the military requirement is going to be articulated by the end user, the CINC/JTF Commander, rather than the functional provider.
BOTTOM LINE: WHAT IS NEEDED IS CINC CONTROL8.0
Control. This one word describes the major change being proposed: putting the CINC in control of his information needs. The CINC should be the principal spokesman to the Services, the JROC, the ASD (C3Y) and DISA for his information needs. The CINC should also be the person who actually assembles and integrates his information systems in concert with other elements of his force structure. The CINC or his JTF commanders
"* Determine the arrangement and linking of the operations and intelligence information systems. The CINC would become the judge of when to fuse intelligence information as well as how to fuse it.
" Establish the rules for access and dissemination to command echelors. In the case of coalition operations, national-level guidance would play a role. When forces are engaged, however, the CINC would have the latitude to make access and distribution determinations.
"* Direct and support the means of information assembly and distribution, to include filtering, editing, and the mode of distribution (e.g., publishing).
"* Determine the information support needed for combat operations, from mission planning through battle damage assessment. This function would include control of theater intelligence gathering assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The CINC would also have a dominant voice in the tasking and use of national technical means, as they apply to his area of responsibility.
Much of the foregoing is controlled by the CINC now in varying degrees. However, this Task Force is recommending that the CINC become the responsible official, decision maker and orchestrator for information support to his theater.
To do so requires an attack on a broad front, from education to informed articulation. An igniter needs to be found to fire the effort, to force alteration of the status quo. Since this is a military warfighting effectiveness issue, it should be led by a field experience senior flag officer. And since change is best implemented when there is ownership at the top, the undertaking should be constituted at the CJCS/JCS level. The recommendations which follow are intended to support the implementation of CINC Control.
Recommendation # 1: Create An Awareness Explosion to Fuel Change:
9.1 The Battlefield Information Task Force (Figure A-4) The user must regain control of the information architecture requirements process.
The commander/leader must appreciate what "can be" rather than what "is". A means
must be found to attack the culture of comfort that exists. The commander/leader must:
"* Be in control of his needs and requirements;
"* Be the focus for articulating the requirement; and "* Build his knowledge and awareness of information technology to match his familiarity with weapons and weapons systems.
To trigger change, the creation of a "Battlefield Information Task Force" is strongly recommended. This Task Force, sponsored by SECDEF, constituted by SECDEF/ASD (C31), reporting to CJCS/JCS with CINCUSACOM as the executing CINC, would be tasked to explore innovative means to move information to/around/from the battlefield. It would be led by a combat joint experienced commander at the MGEN/RADM level (0-8), reporting to the job from field command. This insures hands-on field experience and a representative knowledge base at his level of seniority. The BlTF deputy would be a subject matter expert, a DoD civilian of SES grade, probably drawn from DISA.
Information technology is advancing at an explosive rate. System developers well versed in the technology changes, however, often do not understand the warfighter's needs/environment. On the other hand, the warfighters do not know what capabilities and technologies are available to solve their problems. The Battlefield Information Task Force is intended to bring together warfighters and developers in the warfighters' environment as an instrument of change and to break down knowledge barriers and resistance to change.
The Task Force would have limited life, 24 months recommended, to accomplish the taskings noted. This term was selected recognizing that sufficient time was needed to accomplish the task but short enough to insure a high quality officer could be made available without career prejudice. The Task Force Commander would report not less than quarterly to CJCS/JCS. This links the Services into every aspect of the effort and, when findings are endorsed, ties into the programming/resource entities (the Services) to fix the problem.
Prioritized tasks for the Battlefield Information Task Force " Bring together the warfighters/user and developer in the warfighters' environment;
- Establish baseline information architecture tailored for each CINC at all command levels;
- Identify theater unique and common elements among CINCs; and
- Identify current interoperability and integration issues between legacy systems.
"* Establish the future vision, joint interoperability requirements and evolutionary development/improvement roadmap.
"* In conjunction with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), design a series of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to be conducted for CINCs in theater;
- Educate the warfighter to what "can be"; and
- Include demonstrations of the direct satellite broadcast wideband down link.
"* Create baseline for a "common battlespace" modeling and simulation environment to support joint training and exercising in the field "from the same seat";
- Apply to requirements evaluation and acquisition cost and operational analysis.
A-17 "* Provide metrics and processes to measure readiness of information systems, using training, exercises and real world operations from the same seat.
"* Provide recommendations to CJCS/CINCS/ASD (C31) on short and mid term improvements to the battlefield information architecture, based on field exercises and user/developer dialogue;
- Establish required interface with DoD Enterprise Integration Council.
"* Provide metrics for the JCS/Joint Staff/ASD (C31) to evaluate implementation/ progress in achieving Battlefield Information Architecture road map.
"* Provide recommendations to CJCS/CINCS concerning:
- Best utilization of increased technical expertise assigned to CINCs; and
- Information in Warfare and Information Warfare staff functions.
"* Provide recommendations to CJCS/ASD (C3M) for transition of Task Force efforts to standing Integrated Process/Product Improvement Team to support CJCS/CINCs/ ASD (C31) Battlefield Information Architecture road map.
Action: SECDEF. Reports to CICS. Executive Agent is CINCUSACOM.
Cost: Estimated at $20-50 million dollars. Well within the funding authority of the CJCS's and CINCs' Initiative Funds. This does not include the cost of exercises since such activities are already funded and would be reoriented as part of the exercise cycle.
9.2 Recommendation # 2:. Explore Direct Broadcast Satellite (Figure A-5) To enhance the information services available to the CINC, component commanders and deployed warfighting forces, we recommend that the Battlefield Information Task Force investigate the utility of a direct broadcast satellite service. That concept would set up a direct broadcast service from space that blankets the regional operating area and could be received by small satellite dishes down to the tactical level.
This service would provide much greater capacity for integrated situational awareness across the command, transmitting a full range of data and information from the routine such as weather, reports, etc., to major activity directives such as the Air Tasking Order and significant situation summaries.
This direct broadcast service would:
"• Allow delivery of ;nformation across the regional operations area independent of the chain of chain of command/organization/deployment unit;
"* Provide broad pictures of intelligence, operations, logistics environment (weather), etc.;
"* Be implemented in the high frequency military or commercial band;
"* Offer large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small simple terminals; and "* Allow the user at any level to select the stream of information that he needs.
9.3. Recommendation #3: Provide Robust Wideband Communications (Figure A-6) The primary thrust of the DSB study effort has been to move control for information architecture needs to the CINC/JTF Commander and expand the capacity available to him in peace/crisis/ conflict. There is a need to provide more robust wideband
communications network capacity to the CINC and subordinate echelons to be used for:
"* collaborative planning, interactive data base transfer, and video teleconferencing;
and "* significantly expanded use during CINC and component commander directed joint training, joint exercising and conduct of military operations.
Su4ch capabilities should be available at CINC and JTF command centers.
" Provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command above Division/Wing/CVBG.
-Critical multimedia information needed for collaborative planning, Interactive database transfer, video teleconferencing, etc.
-Current systems are inadequate to meet needs of CINCs and component commanders during training and military operations
Action: Battlefield Information Task Force.
9.4 Recommendation # 4: Give the CINCs Better Staff Support (Figure A-7)
The recommendation is in two parts:
Strengthen CINC's Technical Expertise. The intent is to provide additional support to CINC's operational, training and simulation environment. Currently, CINCs are authorized a single scientific advisor. Given the pace of development in improved information handling and distribution as well as its increased importance to effective warfighting, this level of support is adjudged to be marginal, at best.
Additional staff expertise is required to:
- assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements;
- apply promising technologies to operational requirements definition efforts;
- support joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements; and
- improve dialogue between field user and the developer in order to better define/refine C41 architecture at all levels.
Establish Information Warfare Officer. The ever increasing importance of information warfare requires focus on its potential as well as its risks and vulnerabilities. Today, information warfare responsibilities are diffused across military staffs. There is a need to assign a combat arms officer to lead a CINC staff section responsible for formulating Information Warfare strategy (offensive and defensive) -- providing dedication information architecture management -supporting the CINC's strategic and tactical decision making -controlling and using information recognized as a warfare discriminator.