«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
Action: CICS provide increased technical billets to CINC staffs.
9.5. Recommendation #5: Virtual Conflict Every Day (Figure A-8) With the uncertainty of what U.S. and coalition forces will be called upon to do and which forces will be committed, there is a compelling need to jointly train, exercise and rehearse likely taskings.
The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and fight from the "same seat". The need is to combine, baseline, and then expand models, simulations, exercises and games. By modeling the "joint battlespace" to approach real world situations, CINCs/JTF commanders and components can conduct "virtual conflict every day".
Action: DDR&E MDMSO) with USACOM. MWFC and L-7.
9.6 Recommendation #6: Real Time Situational Awareness: Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications (Figure A-9) The Global Positioning System, if integrated with existing C3 systems, could provide a highly accurate spatial global time and position grid that could revolutionize warfare. It is possible now to provide the precise location of our own, friendly and enemy forces information at any given exact time. This would contribute greatly to surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, identification, electronic warfare, data processing and analysis and communications and fulfi many requirements for all-weather, day/night operations, identification friend or foe, ingress into new geographic locations, precision weapon delivery, reduction of collateral damage and positive control of forces.
A-22 Accurate Time and Positional RecO.mWation6
" GPS time and positional accuracy would contribute greatly to surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, identification, electronic warfare, data processing and analysis, and communication.
"Toimplement the integration of GPS into information systems, it is recommended that the JTIDS/ Tactical Data Information Link (TADIL) J, with its inherent precise position, location and identification (PPLI) features anchored to a GPS referenced position continue to be fielded and expanded to other link nets.
" Small inexpensive GPS receivers can modulate any communication transmission to provide the exact time of transmission and precise location of the unit communicating. If the hiatus between communications exceeds the periodical for positional updates, as determined by doctrine, an automatic burst transmission of time/ position can be made.
" All future information systems should have embedded the ability to transmit and receive GPS positional and time data. The result would be a highly accurate, global positioning, navigation and spatial situational awareness system with precise time, whereby targets, objects, own forces, data, etc. could be accurately fixed relative to all others at any time. The reduction in uncertainty and variance across the information systems would improve fidelity and quality of tactical operations.
Fielding this capability could be done relatively inexpensively and in an evolutionary manner.
A-2310.0 READINESS IMPACT
There is a significant readiness dimension once these recommendations are implemented. Regional situations develop very quickly, and at the onset, are of uncertain dimension. Accurate preplanning and exercising builds confidence, substantially shortens deployment/execution, materially increases initial effectiveness and should significantly shorten engagement time--more lethal, more decisive...with fewer losses and consumption of resources-today's test of success. But the CINC needs ways of measuring the effectiveness of his information systems. The following sections describe what the impact of the Task Force recommendations would be on the readiness of the CINC's information systems along with a discussion of ways for measuring their effectiveness.
10.1 The CINC Information Architecture Posture is Much Improved He Knows What He Needs to Succeed. When a CINC pulls together a concept of operations for an emerging situation, the experience of having a strong modeling system that allowed the CINC to simulate and later train and exercise a potential concept of operations is a significant confidence builder and readiness boost. The CINC would be training and fighting from the same seat.
He Will Have Tested His Concepts. A "Red Team" will have exercised logical counters to his "Blue Team" operations concepts, allowing development of new approaches to increase confidence of success.
He Will Determine What Information Support He'll Get. Transitioning from the known information architecture structure of Cold War operations to the unknown structure of regional operations, there is high uncertainty as to what kind of communications and intelligence support will be available. Implementation of these recommendations would materially alter that perception. Since most deploying forces would come from CINCUSACOM, the standardized modeling and simulation plus joint training and exercising concepts would be a well understood baseline for regional support of deployed operations.
The CINC Will Know What To Deploy. The combined impact of the recommendations would be widespread understanding of regional information architecture requirements and substantial experience in sizing, assembling, transporting, setting up and exercising the information system employment concepts.
The combination of these four features: 1) matching the information system need to the regional problem, 2) testing its viability via joint exercising and Red Teaming, 3) educating operating levels of what to expect and depend on, and 4) sizing/practicing what to take-constitutes a very robust capability that is ready when called.
10.2 Measuring Effectiveness
Since the importance of Information In Warfare has been identified -- a significant force multiplier, the CINC needs a means of measuring the state of this readiness. Figure A-10 displays a logical manner to accomplish this-a series of metrics applied to training, exercises and real world operations. The high end of the spectrum will show, in advance, the surge capability and capacity required for the information system infrastructure to A-24 support two MRCs near simultaneously. The Battlefield Information Task Force should be tasked to establish the information system readiness metrics and measurement process in consultation with each CINC.
1.1 Tasking and Membership The 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information
Architecta, -e for the Battlefield created four panels as follows:
"* Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare "* Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare "* Management Panel to address Business Practices "* Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This appendix is the final report of the Information Warfare Panel which was charged with addressing the needs of the warfighters for offensive and defensive
Information Warfare. Members of the Information Warfare Panel were:
"* Dr. Donald C. Latham, Chairman "* Dr. Richard L. Wagner "* LtGen C. Norman Wood, USAF (Ret) "* Mr. Lawrence T. Wright Government Advisors who contributed to the Information Warfare Panel's efforts
were as follows:
"* BrigGen Billy J. Bingham "* LCDR Gary Burnette "* Mr. Dennis Chiari "• Maj Robert Evans "* LTC Greg Gorzelnik "* COL Thomas Hall "* CAPT William Henry "* COL Douglas Hotard * Mr. Harold McDonough * Mr. David Patterson * LtCol Wilhelm Percival
1.2 Backarund An evolving strategy and capability to wage Information Warfare (IW) may be the next most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth. Unlike the "hard" munitions of combat, Information Warfare could pervade throughout the spectrum of conflict to create unprecedented effects. Further, with the dependence of modern commerce and the military on computer controlled telecommunication networks, data bases, enabling software and computers, the U.S. must protect these assets relating to their vulnerabilities. There are three interlocked aspects of Information
1. The design and leveraging of one's own system to provide decision makers with actionable information;
2. The protection of those information systems from disruption, exploitation and damage; and B-1
3. The employment of offensive techniques such as deception, electronic jammers, munition and advanced technologies to deceive, deny, exploit, damage or destroy adversary information systems.
The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy, and for example, military operations and intelligence community initiatives. One serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical IW strategy is the current lack of any national policy on this matter. Further, there is no well defined nor understood "threat" to U.S. information systems. Protection of U.S.
information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions put forth, for example, in the Computer Security Act of 1987.
1.3 A Military-Technologcal Revolution As one ponders the significance of Information Warfare in relation to Nuclear Warfare, the comparison depicted in Figure B-1 illustrates some key differences and similarities. Of significance is the fact that Information Warfare technologies and resulting capabilities are largely being developed in the open commercial market without Government control. This contrasts sharply with the necessary, very secret development and control of nuclear weapons technology by the Government. This means a so called third-world nation could procure a formidable, modem IW capability virtually off-theshelf. This fact portends a revolution in commercial ana military-technological warfare.
Figure B-1 This nation is under IW attack today by a spectrum of adversaries ranging from the teenage hacker to sophisticated, wide-ranging illegal entries into telecommunications B-2 networks and computer systems. As we continue the use of a SIOP for strategic nuclear warfare, the DoD might want to consider an "Information Warfare SIOP" process. The IW SIOP could be used, in part, to "play" against an adversary IW strategy, examine offensive and defensive deconflictic.i and would deal with intelligence equity issues.
The Information Warfare panel attempted to address these and other related issues during the DSB Summer Study on Information Architecture for the Battlefield. This appendix expands on the 1W material in the main body of this report and focuses on several specific recommendations to address the issues as we saw them.
These recommendations are:
1. The SECDEF should direct that a broad Net Assessment of Information Warfare
be undertaken to examine:
" DoD Information Systems and supporting national and global commercial systems and the related implications for U.S. IW readiness and operations;
"* The nature, extent and implications of assessed vulnerabilities;
"• Evolving U.S. and adversary capabilities in IW; and "* Cost-effectiveness of IW strategy options.
2. The DoD should increase its emphasis on Defensive Information Warfare because of the perceived and known vulnerabilities. In particular, the SECDEF should support immediate increases in resources for Defensive IW. This recommendation parallels a similar recommendation in the Joint Security Commission Report.
3. A Red Team activity across the DoD should be institutionalized to help evaluate IW readiness and vulnerabilities. This Red Team activity should be integrated with other assessment and exercise activities. A parallel and coordinated activity with the DCI is also recommended. The ASD (C31) should provide oversight and audit these activities.
4. The Vice Chairman JCS should create an integrated, joint DoD IW strategy cell in the JCS. This flag-level cell would report to the VCJCS and consist of representatives of the J2, J3, J5, J6, J7, and J8 staff elements, SOCOM, Services, DISA and intelligence agencies. Its
missions would be to develop an 1W strategy which:
* Integrates offensive and defensive IW; and * Integrates IW with Information in Warfare.
This cell would support the JROC assessment process, provide the Joint Staff point of contact for all IW matters with the Services and agencies, review for correct IW integration, and be the advocate for technological advancement in IW. The cell would also act as a champion for resources and be the Joint Staff advocate for 1W in the POM process.
5. The SECDEF should review the existing PRD and actively promote the development of national policy to be embodied in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD).
Further, the SECDEF should direct the ASD (C31) to lead the development of DoD IW policy in acquisition of systems and in the export of U.S. technology abroad.
B-3 "These recommendations are critical to the future readiness of this nation as it evolves the Nil into the GIl. The NII is under active IW attack today by a diverse set of adversaries. This has blurred the concepts of peace, crisis and war as we traditionally have known them. Information superiority provides enormous political, economic, and military opportunities to the United States. Maintaining information superiority is as important today as nuclear deterrence and dominance were during the Cold War.
INFORMATION WARFARE2.0 Why Information Warfare?
2.1 Because it is there! The United States, perhaps more than any other nation on earth has adopted electronic information technology. The result is a policy which is fundamentally dependent upon the proper functioning of our national information infrastructure. Information storage and exchange has become characterized by computers linked to computers; many systems of systems connecting global information. Virtually every facet of our lives is affected by electronic media: television, radio, banking, communications and the entire panoply of electronics associated with our industrial, manufacturing and s, rice industries.