«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
In the absence of new buys, the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage of major defense satellite systems, primarily the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). Load will have to be moved/reduced, primarily to commercial alternatives-satellite, fiber and wire. This would open the opportunity for the CITNC's to have much more bandwidth in the short term for collaborative planning, video conferencing, joint training, exercising, etc. In the longer term the DoD must establish a publishing/broadcasting mode of service that would provide wideband data to small mobile terminals at all levels of command-CINC, component, tactical user/warfighter. In addition, the Task Force also sees new commercial space information systems and services that can be exploited when needed.
In addition, there is a parallel need to strengthen the CINC's expertise. The CINC and his staff need to understand how information systems might be better employed. The CINC also needs better technical support to be able to identify anc. articulate his operational requirements, apply promising technologies to operational needs, and improve the linkage between field user and developer. A new staff function, run by a combat arms officer, should build the CINC's strategic and tactical information warfare plan, both offensive and defensive.
In addition, the CINCs and JTF commanders need to exercise their information systems through virtual combat everyday. The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and to fight from the same seat and same system every day. The simulations of the battlespace must allow the CINC, his components and tactical formations to test employment concepts through Red Teaming. CINC and component practice and rehearsal of envisioned employment concepts will not only raise confidence of success but also improve force readiness and drive down costs.
These many tasks-putting the CINC in control, getting actionable information to mobile shooters, broadcasting information to users that can be accessed on demand, and improving the CINC's staff support to apply this technology and fight effective information warfare-require a major effort to change culture and educate users. To trigger such a change, the Task Force formulated the five recommendations shown in Figure ES-1.
RECOMMENDATIONS: INFORMAT7ON L/N WARFARE#1 Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) create a Battlefield Information Task Force (BlTF): to bring together warfighters and developers to establish the future vision, system needs, and evolutionary devefopment plans of the operational information system; to create and utilize "joint battlespace" Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate future growth (e.g. broadcast/request modes); to identify and track Command, Control, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) performance metrics; to provide recommendations to system developers and the Enterprise Integration Council; and to develop an Integrated Process Team (IMT) charter.
#2 BITF explore direct broadcast satellite service for Warfighter (increase capacity via broadcast downlink) #3 BITF develop future vision for providing more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command below Division/Wing/Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), and explore other space-based commercial information services to allow real time surge.
#4 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide increased technical billets to give the CINCs better staff support Strengthen CINC's technical expertise Establish Information Warfare Officer Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Defense Modeling and Simulation Office) (DDR&E (DMSO)) with U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), Joint Warfighter Center JWFC) and Joint Staff Element for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), combine and expand DoD capabilities for exercises, games, simulations and models in C41 to enable operation "from the same seat" for readiness assessment, requirements for acquisition, debugging, verification of interoperability, training, rehearsal, confidence building, mission planning and battle damage assessment.
Figure ES-1 Information Warfare An evolving strategy and capability to wage 'Information Warfare" (IW) may be the most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth. Unlike "hard" munitions of combat, IW assets have near-instantaneous global reach and can pervade throughout the spectrum of conflict. Given the dependence of modem commerce and the military on computer-controlled telecommunication networks, data bases, enabling software, and computers, the U.S. must protect these assets regarding their vulnerabilities.
In addition to the importance associated with the use of information in warfare, the Task Force found U.S. information systems highly vulnerable to IW. Based on inputs provided, the Task Force has concern over the integrity of the information systems that are a key enabler of military superiority. The Task Force found similar vulnerabilities in the information systems of potential adversaries. U.S. military forces and their commanders ES-4 need to be able to protect against their own vulnerabilities while exploiting those of the adversary, as an element of their force structure. This effort, protection and exploitation, must become an integral part of the joint training and exercise programs of the CINCs.
The Task Force sees three interlocked actions that must be addressed by DoD and the
"* Design and leverage of one's own information systems to provide decision makers with actionable information;
"* Protect those information systems from disruption, exploitation and damage; and "* Employ offensive IW techniques such as deception, electronic jamming, and advanced technologies to deceive, deny, exploit, damage and/or destroy adversary information systems.
The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy, military operations and intelligence community initiatives. A serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical 1W strategy is the current lack of a national policy on this matter. Further, there is no well defined "threat" to U.S. information systems. Protection of U.S. information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions put forth, for example, in the Computer Security Act of 1987.
Of concern to the Task Force is the fact that IW technologies and capabilities are largely being developed in an open commercial market and are outside of direct Government control. In contrast with the very secret development and control of most weapons technologies by the Government, a "third-world" nation could procure a formidable, modern IW capability virtually off-the-shelf. This fact portends a revolution in commercial and military-technological individual warfare.
The Task Force formulated the five recommendations shown in Figure ES-2 to address these issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS: INFORMATION WARFARE#6 SECDEF undertake a broad net assessment of IW including the involvement of the Battlefield Information Task Force as an aid in DoD planning and policy development and as an input to national IW policy review.
#7 SECDEF support a focus on protection of critical services by supporting immediate increases in funding for and emphasis on defensive IW.
#8 SECDEF establish a Red Team to evaluate IW readiness and vulnerabilities.
#9 Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) create a Joint strategy cell for offensive and defensive Information Warfare integrated at a Flag level and reporting to the VCJCS. This strategy cell should be tasked to develop a DoD-wide IW strategy.
#10 SECDEF review draft Presidential Review Document (PRD) and related issues and expedite the net assessment to support development of the national IW policy. In addition, SECDEF should task the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control and Communications) (ASD (C31)) to lead development of DoD policy on IW in acquisition and export.
Figure ES-2 ES-5 Business Practices The commercial sector is subjected to very strong forces for standardization and interoperability, particularly in the information system sector. An inability to interface can be fatal to a product. In DoD, however, budget independence and separate operating processes do not create similar levels of pressure. Although each of the Services and Agencies has programs devoted to battlefield information systems that are attempting to adhere to an architecture defined for promoting interoperability, results have been suboptimal. Although the programs are paying some attention to the need to migrate into a unified information architectural structure by conforming to the Joint Staff migration plan, the Task Force found that corresponding directives and processes are needed to ensure that individual programs have adequate cost and schedule provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve full interoperability and a common operating environment.
Until policies and processes are put -, place to ensure that the joint warfighter interoperability requirements are strongly considered, these well intentioned but unique Service and Agency programs will tend to drift away from migration objectives.
In addition to new systems, there are legacy systems that nmust be either migrated into or interfaced with common systems. The motivation to diverge from a common joint interoperability structure is aggravated by a need to maintain compatibility with service-unique legacy systems that are not targeted for the migration. Although the Task Force found a high level of attention on the issue of legacy systems, no new innovative approaches had been proposed for use by the Department.
"The Task Force found a need for DoD to establish a process, in a manner akin to that used for the Internet, that identifies incremental improvements and ensures each can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants. The process used in establishing Internet has been shown successful in establishing standards by consensus and in allowing continuous integration of improvements, migration of standards, adaptation of commercial products, and distribution of value-added products. Some variant of that process is appropriate for institution within the DoD. The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing their transition to modernization. This should be recognized and supported as a continuous process, as there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems and technologies.
In seeking constructive and viable management structural changes to improve warfighter information processes, the Task Force reviewed the existing authorities and responsibilities of the major entities that oversee warfighter information systems in DoD, including statutory responsibilities. The Enterprise Integration Board (EIB) and Enterprise Integration Council (EIC) have recently been established to achieve the goals of Corporate Information Management (CIM) and to undertake an enterprise integration approach to the accelerated implementation of migration of legacy information systems, and establishment of data standards and process improvements. This structure provides a forum for interoperability anr cross-functional issues. Although currently the charters of the Board and Council do not include warfighter information systems, membership on the Board and Council are appropriate for dealing with these systems. The Task Force sees the need to change the existing EIB/EIC management structure to allow implementation of a dynamic process -hat will result in much improved interoperability of DoD warfighter ES-6 information systems, and better exploitation of the leverage that those systems can potentially provide to the combat forces.
Also within DoD, there is an ongoing initiative to establish a technical architectural framework of interoperability guidelines, interface specifications, and standards - such as data element definitions - under the general auspices of a Technicdl.•rehitectural Framework for Information Management (TAFIM). Current systems are designed based on requirements from the appropriate functional community, Service, or agency.
Jointness is not a major driver, and developers are not now required to comply with crossfunctional and interoperability requirements. The Task Force sees a need to review the TAFIM initiatives currently underway and ensure that they are brought to a satisfactory state of maturity to serve as part of an iterative process to evolve better interface standards and interoperability requirements. In addition, there is a need for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to include the infusion of its validated joint warfighting requirements into the DoD-wide information architecture process.
The Task Force sees a critical need for the Department's acquisition system to facilitate the buying and leasing of commercial information products and services, and to "buy into" commercial business practices. Information system superiority is dependent on an ability to incorporate the latest in commercial technologies. The obsolescence cycle for commercial information systems is dramatically shorter than DoD's weapon system cycle.
If information is to remain a key discriminator in capability, DoD should adopt acquisition practices similar to the commercial sector.
To address the above issues, the Task Force formulated the recommendation shown in Figure ES-3.
RECOMMENDATIONS: BUSINESS PRACTICES#11 Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) should augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate integration of warfighter requirements and technical architectural frameworks for Warfighter information systems.
DEPSECDEF should ratify the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) role as technical architect for interfaces, standards, and interoperability. Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) should augment acquisition reform efforts to assure compatibility with the extremely short development and product lifetimes of commercial software and microelectronics.