«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
we exploit the unique and rapid evolution in commercial information technologies; and finally, that we ensure adequate protection against potential vulnerabilities in our evolving information systems.
C-174.0 NET ASSESSMENT AND RED TEAM CAPABILITY
The security of information systems and networks is considered by the Joint Security Commission to be the major security challenge of the decade and possibly the next century. In this era of information warfare, DoD needs the capability to detect, react, and recover from an information warfare attack. INFOSEC is an important element of our information security program, but protection of information content and local availability and data integrity are not enough. In addition, network control, automated data processing centers and information systems must be assessed for ease of repair and reconstitution of the overall information infrastr. - re.
Referring to Figure C-7 above, DoD information systems and the National Information Infrastructure are playing an increasingly important role in the effective conduct of military operations. U.S. offensive information warfare capabilities offer great promise in providing a critical advantage across the information warfare spectrum in all kinds of operations. At the same time, our adversaries' growing information warfare capabilities are increasing the vulnerability of both DoD and national systems and have the potential to degrade the effectiveness of military systems and operations. Because of the significant leverage and C-18
potential vulnerabilities associated with our Information Systems, we urgently need to evaluate:
Operational Performance Effectiveness of our evolving C4I Systems;
"* Robustness and Vulnerability of our systems to Information Warfare;
"* Potential Adversaries' C4I Capabilities;
"* Vulnerabilities of Adversaries' C41 to our Information Warfare capabilities; and "* Net Assessment of our Warfighter Information Systems.
"* Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the SECDEF direct that these assessments be accomplished promptly and actions to address shortfalls and needed improvements be identified.
In addition, the Panel recommends that the SECDEF direct the establishment of a "Red Team" capability to continually test our readiness and vuinerabilities. It should be integrated with our other assessment and exercise activities; be coordinated with parallel activities in the Intelligence Community; and be audited by the ASD (C3M).
Figure D-1 The Information System Must Adapt
Figure D-2 Flexible, Innovative Use of C4I Systems
Figure D-3 Dynamic Information Management for the CINC/JTF
Figure D-4 C41 For The Warrior (C4IEFW)
Figure D-5 Popular Definitions for "Architecture.
Figure D-6 Current DoD "Architecture" Initiatives
Figure D-7 Popular Definitions for Architecture - Information Architecture
Figure D-8 What the Architect Does
Figure D-9 Architectural Tradeoffs
Figure D-10 Technology for Multi-Level Security
Figure D-11 Refocus Investment Areas in Information & Information Systems Protection.D-18 Figure D-12 Align Processes with Life-Cycles
Figure D-13 Interoperability in the Information Architecture
Figure D-14 Specifications and Standards
Figure D-15 Technology Status and Trends
Figure D-16 Key Technology Drivers
Figure D-17 Forefront Technologies
Figure D-18 R&D for Information Dominance
Figure D-19 Enhanced Reconfigurability
Figure D-20 Information and Information Systems Protection
Figure D-21 Recommendation - Prioritize R&D Investment with Focus on Military-Unique Information Technology
INTRODUCTION1.0 Tasking Assignment 1.1 The Task Force convened three times as a group during the early summer to receive briefings on relevant Government initiatives and programs, and to plan its approach to the
Summer Study. The Task Force created four Panels as follows:
Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare "* Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare "• Management Panel to address Business Practices "* Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base "* This appendix is the Final Report of the Technology Panel which was charged with addressing architectural challenges and research and development investment thrusts. The
panel addressed its tasks by examining:
* Information system architectural and technical capabilities needed to respond to the Warfighter's needs;
e "Architectures" and their meaning, essential to understanding R&D investment contributions to meeting the warriors' functional architectural needs;
* The role of the architect and technical challenges to be faced;
* Technology trends in information systems that influence the options available to meet the Task Force goals; and o R&D investment thrusts to enable better management of information on the battlefield.
These themes formed the major focus of the Panel's assessments, and will be addressed in various ways in the report which follows.
Government Advisors who contributed to the Technology Panel's efforts were as follows:
"* Dr. Duane Adams [ARPA] "* Col. George W. (Bill) Criss, III USAF [BMDO] "* Mr. George Endicott [ASD (C31)] * Mr. Gene Famolari [Army] * Col. Thomas Hall, USA [Army] Ms. Beth Larson [CIO] * Mr. Harold McDonough [NSA] * Mr. Steven Schanzer [Intelligence] • D-1 * Dr. David Signori, Jr, [DISA] * Mr. Joseph Toma [Joint Staff] * MajGen Julio Torres, USAF [DISA] Excellent technical and administrative support to the Panel was provided by Dr. Nancy Chesser of Directed Technologies, Inc.
1.3 Background Recent history suggests future Tnilitary operating continua extend over a wide variety of activities. The potential for changing from one level of engagement to another is relatively high and the speed with which such changes can occur can be rapid. Management of information is an important ingredient, to both sides of a confrontation, for determining the outcome of an engagement. Modem information systems products are available to adversaries as well as U.S. forces; consequently innovative use of those systems is important for U.S.
information dominance of the battlefield. Innovation is particularly dependent on our ability to reconfigure both how systems are interconnected and how information is managed among C41 systems. Reconfigurability is not merely a mechanical or electrical connectivity question
- it is an information management issue. Consider the variety of information management schemes possible versus the limited number of options for information management in today's systems.
Many architecture initiatives are underway - but OSD technology investment refocus is needed for data, access, and vulnerability management. Focused research and development (R&D) investment, coupled with a responsive information architecture derivation process, is needed to shake-out the functional flexibilities needed, to develop the tools for managing information architecture options, and to derive the most useful forms of information management flexibility. It will begin with concentration on the information to be exchanged around the battlefield, and conclude witf 1 selection of appropriate information management schemes and selection of communicatit._1s devices and circuits which allow conformance with chosen information management strategies.
Prior to instituting battlefield plans for reconfigurable systems, provisions for reconfigurability must be developed. The acquisition processes must encourage the inclusion of reconfiguration properties into new or modernized systems. Migration incentives should be incorporated in the acquisition process, together with provisions for maintaining responsiveness with respect to the life-cycles of the technology involved - it does little good to establish sound information management systems if they are three generations behind those of adversaries.
R&D initiatives can be overlaid on the Information in Warfare/Information Warfare battlefield to reveal appropriate investment candidates. Investment is needed to foster improved reconfigurability options; and investment is needed to manage the new possibilities of information warfare.
INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE TO MEET BATTLEFIELD NEEDS2.0 2.1 Adaptable Information Systems As shown in Figure D-1, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there have been many contingency operations confronting the U.S., marked with substantial uncertainty, delicate international relationships, and operational conditions which challenge our ability to manage infor
Figure D-1 There is a great uncertainty concerning where, when, why, and with whom U.S.
military forces may be engaged in the future. For each situation the particular geography, local infrastructure, rules of engagement, threat sophistication, arrangements with coalitions and allies, and the CINC and JTF commanders' desired command structure will all drive the C41 needs.
There is a need for an information architecture which will allow flexible but responsive support for the warfighter intent on not only protecting the prime national security interests of the United States, but also conducting a variety of important contingency operations. The information architecture must support flexible assembly of capability, flexible application of capability, and rapid responsiveness to changes in the complexion of operations. As a result, a
refocus in R&D investment is necessary to do two things:
" Provide the ability to more flexibly configure interoperation among C4M systems and develop tools and techniques for dynamically managing the flow of information around the battlefield among the newly reconfigurable C41 systems; and " Improve our ability to execute information warfare. This involves both technology to enhance protection of our own systems, as well as technology to conduct offensive operations against an adversary's information management system.
2.2 Keys to Information Dominance in the Battlefield As the information systems market matures, there are more and more technically capable resources on the open market that are capable of supporting military operations. Only a D-3 few years ago, most of that technology was of the class used for office automation. Commercial management information systems were also becoming more and more attractive in their off the shelf form rather than custom development. But, for the most part, it was seldom reasonable to expect commercial products to produce the robust, technically advanced capabilities that would give a warfighter an advantage in the field. Sophisticated information systems continued to be custom developments, and sophisticated electronic devices were only available after expensive development and integration processes made them suitable for operation in the rugged environment of a battlefield. As indicated in Figure D-2, the U.S. ability to underwrite the required investment kept our forces at the forefront of technical capability.
Figure D-2 More recently, not only have office automation capabilities expanded, but there are also complementing advances in sophisticated technology from the commercial market. GPS, mapping systems, night vision devices, satellite imagery, etc. are all available to one degree or another from the open market. It is unlikely to presume improvements in price and capability won't continue. While U.S. advanced sensor technology is likely to continue to provide our forces with a substantial data gathering advantage, much of the effectiveness of that advantage could be dissipated if the information garnered by the sensors is not managed more effectively than adversaries manage their information.
Key to continuing dominance on the battlefield will be our ability to maintain pace with the commercial market, and, perhaps more important, our ability to apply the technology with coordination and innovation among our forces. Such coordination requires development and fielding of tools to aid that process, practice and training in how to coordinate information management among diverse C41 systems, and, based on such practice and experience, evolution of an information architecture which provides U.S. warfighters with the most flexible and responsive C41 systems on the "battlefield."
The wide availability of battlefield-capable information systems technology suggests that there are increasing opportunities for information warfare. New vulnerabilities must be managed by the U.S. as it depends more on sophisticated information systems, and new vulnerabilities may be exploited by the U.S. when adversaries use similar products.
In addition to the obvious management and process demands on the DoD, there are key R&D investments that will contribute to improved innovation with respect to the warfighters' C41 assets. This panel attempted to identify relevant areas for technology investment.
D4 To address the research and development investments key to this approach, one must no start in the traditional manner by selecting the communications hardware and then deciding what data may be overlaid on the physical assets of the communications forces. Instead, it is important to begin with consideration of the information to be sent throughout the system.
After the information is identified, then appropriate approaches can be designed for how hiformation access will be managed, how vulnerabilities of the irfornmation will be managed, and lastly over what physical resources the information will be exchanged. Only after defining the information schemes, can mechanisms for managing access, vulnerability, and connections be established. The technology, systems and commercial communications are available at a reasonable cost to support overcoming these challenges.
2.3 Enhanced Reconfigurability As is discussed in Section 3.3 of the main report, one key aspect of innovation is the ability to reconfigure forces and systems. Joint Task Forces tend to be assembled from a variety of assets trained and equipped by the Services. Further, the compositions of forces will likely vary in both the size of components integrated into a joint force, and the sources providing assets.