«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
Interoperability in the Information Architecture " Interoperability is not possible without Use of Common Standards for the waveform and physical layers of information systems
- Use of Common Data Definitions Use of common interpretation
C41FIW will not come true until:
Base-level information infrastructures of the Services use interchangeable components and standard data elements Command and control systems are built to the same common operating environment and use standard data elements FigureD-13 We recommend that on a regular and "no notice" basis the Joint Chiefs of Staff should call, through Atlantic Command, "live" equipment configuration tests with "Joint" referees where the Services demonstrate that forces can talk to each other in command and control and in all the supporting 'ilities." This is the only way to ensure we have forces that are adaptable and can be rapidly configured into a Joint Task Force to answer short notice national security challenges.
We wholeheartedly support the policy outlined in the Secretary of Defense memorandum "Specifications & Standards - A New Way of Doing Business," dated June 29, 1994.
This reform of the acquisition process will yield significant economic benefit.
owever. we have painfully learned that the easy flow of information within and between the various weapons, intelligence, and support activities of the Department is hindered when private and proprietary data elements, style guides, mapping symbols, and other information artifacts are allowed into the Defense information infrastructure. This propagates the modern Tower of Babel and operating inefficiencies to include fratricide - adding a note of caution (see Figure D-14).
It is important to ensure the policies outlined in the 29 June memorandum are not interpreted to undercut the policies contained in DoD Directives 8000.1, Information Management;
8320.1, DoD Data Administration; and 4630.5, Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligemce (C31) Systems.
Sndfications and Stanards " Policy: Greater use of performance and commercial specifications and standards
- Secrecary of Defense memorandum June 29,1994 "* Caution: To ensure interoperability, data element standardization, Federal Information Processing Standards, and the DoD Technical Architectural Framework for Information Management must be retained and followed.
We should use commercial information technology But we must retain our own language
Technolony Status and Trends "* Current Status of Information Systems:
- Rapid growth in capabilities including processors, displays, man-machine interfaces, COTS software, databases, communications, and networks High cost of maintaining legacy systems Continuing pressure for decreasing DoD budgets
- Procurement constraints make acquisition and development difficult "* Technology Trends:
- Distributed systems will continue to drive market and availability
- Open software will provide system portability
- Systems will be faster, more efficient; parallel processor workstations will improve throughput
- Software solutions will focus on ameliorating network & I/0 bottlenecks
- Greatly expanded capabilities will become available for capturing, processing, displaying, storing, and retrieving huge volumes of information
- Greatly enhanced multi-media user interface capability will become available with faster processors and improved algorithms
- Rapid development will replace rapid prototyping * System Development Trends:
- Software development cycles will continue to be under two years
- Current, established technology and fielded systems will continue to provide a base to promote quick buildup and integration will build on current distributed architecture systems which continue to
Technology Thrusts 5.2 It is clear from the status and trends above that DoD needs to aggressively refocus
" Unique military-value-added offensive and defensive technologies to assure we exploit commercial systems better than our adversaries for data certainty and for information warfare, both offensive and defensive;
"* Rapid test tools development;
"* Architecture case tool development; and "* First principles technology for C41 architectures.
Some of the more relevant key technology drivers are listed in Figure D-16.
5.3 Forefront Technologies Applicable forefront technologies include computing hardware, telecommunications hardware, and software. Among the technologies listed in Figure D-17, a few key technologies can be identified that are sufficiently mature to be integrated in the near term and which will play an important role in making C4I For The Warrior faster, cheaper, better.
Forefront Technoloi'es "* Broadband, high gain, light weight and electronically steerable antenna that can access multiple satellites simultaneously "* Personal computing (emphasis on wireless - Laptops to Newtons, Dick Tracy radios) * Gigabyte/terabyte networks * Databases with large heterogeneous data items (e.g., mixing data, text, images, etc.) * Wireless telecommunications * Software testing (+ performance evaluation) Distributed simulation systems M * Distributed computing - maintaining information consistency * Parallel and distributed algorithms * Data compression * Human factors/human interfaces/visualization * Language translation * Optical storage devices (particularly tape) * etc.
FigureD-17 The U.S. is world leader in forefront technology for C4I. However, these technologies have not been exploited for battlefield use. The problem in many cases is not technology development; it is adopting the technology that has been developed. Several factors have
inhibited integration of these forefront technologies into the DoD infrastructure:
"* Risk-averse procurement process;
"* Large capital investment in legacy stovepipe systems, need for backward compatibility;
"* Need for defense specific systems - inhibits off-the-shelf purchasing (DoD suppliers are typically not at the forefront); and " Large size and widespread distribution of the software and hardware systems.
D-22 As a specific example, the advent of commercial space systems, with reductions in the cost to use commercial space services, is bringing about a potential revolution in commercial communications, navigation, imagery and environmental services. The day of the Dick Tracy wrist radio is not that far in the future. Whether there are ROCS, SONS or MENS will not matter if and when the GLOBALSTARS, IRIDIUMS, DBSs, WORLDVIEWs and EYEGLASSES (projected commercial imagery systems) are on orbit for ad hoc JTF commanders and CINCs to use to provide connectivity and information for the battlefield in a crisis or contingency - if the need is there they will buy and use the service. The proliferation of commercial GPS receivers by caring and concerned mothers and fathers to their sons in battle in Desert Storm is a graphic example of just that. The challenge again is that in the age of offensive and defensive Information Warfare, as well as use of Information in Warfare to attain and maintain information dominance of the battlefield, dependence on this kind of commercial capability might well result in its denial to those who will try to depend on these services in time of stress. As is well known from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, over 80% of our communications satellite use was through commercial capability and well over 3/4 of our airlift was from the commercial reserve airlift fleet and commercial systems. Just as the DoD determined many years ago that our needs for airlift in contingency and crisis would far exceed our military capacity, and established contracts with the airlines to provide unique military value added capability through commercial aircraft and systems for such contingencies, it would seem wise for the DoD to make prioritized choices for unique military value added investments in space-based commercial and federal government civil imagery, navigation, environmental, and communications systems. We need to do this to both enhance their utility to our warriors in time of need, as well as to potentially deny those capabilities to our adversaries during those times.
It is strongly recommended that the Battlefield Information Task Force initiate examination of dramatically expanded defense-prioritized requirements and investments leading to more reliable and robust dependency on use of imagery, navigation, environmental and communications information services from commercial and federal civil space-based capabilities, and to allow real time surge in time of need.
5.4 Software Technologies. Software, with a small amount of hardware, can substitute for complete interoperability in many cases (e.g., Internet). Connecti, ty mechanisms include gateways, marriage boxes, common nodes such as satellites, bridging software, standards and protocols. In some cases interfaces of existing elements can be modified to achieve connectivity (as in Desert Shield/Storm). Software can be the intermediary between different security systems. It can seek sources and routes and provide buffering, memory, redialing, etc. Most important, software is the key to what the user sees and hears. With a simple key stroke it can completely
reconfigure a display, fan out whole distributions, reconfigure a network, etc. Software offers:
"* Modularity and reusability (issue is selecting module size; i.e., resolving the twin problems of functional aggregation and partitioning);
"* External simplicity and internal complexity of modules (e.g. object-oriented hidden routines and external control shells);
"* Shared resources used to set up "phantom" or "virtual" capabilities and networks;
"* Interoperability between and among modules (but not necessarily internal to each);
"* Recognition of different architectures for different purposes; and "* Open architectures for C41; i.e., extendibility, expandability, alternate applications.
R&D FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE6.0
While the Task Force found no breakthrough R&D efforts, it is clear that since our adversaries have access to the same modem information systems technologies as we, our levo eral or hasmecial technology through unique military value added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield. In that light, as is indicated in Figure D-18, two special needs of military information systems relate to enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection. Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations, with predictable communications and repeatable information needs. Military scenarios are too divers ae ade a system designet under these assumptions acceptable. While the commercial world has security concerns, most advancedccess to information.
The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption. In addition, the mobiliation of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems.
There are three factors that should differentiate U.S. military information systems from those of a capable adversary: sensors, ability to reconfigure under stress, and ability to conduct information warfare. When coupled with advanced U.S. simulation capability, the warfighter can develop and tune the skills and techniques necessary to establish and preserve a competitive edge in dynamically managing information system reconfiguration.
Enhanced Reconfigurability and Information and Information Systems Protection are improved by leveraging commercial and/or DoD technologies. Supporting technologies for Enhanced Reconfigurability are categorized as Joint Battlespace Modeling & Simulation Environment, Information Assimilation and Information Movement. For Information and Information Systems Protection, applicable technologies are categorized as Enterprise Security, NetD-24 work Security and Data Security. Figures D-19 and D-20 provide the specifics on each of these technologies. Note from these figures that the Panel considers it important to leverage current commercial and ongoing DoD efforts in many refocus areas, as well as to initiate more DoD investment where the commercial marketplace does not lead.
6.1 Enhanced Reconfigurability
Figure D-19 The necessity to deal with a wide range of unanticipated crises that involve joint and coalition operations places new requirements on the C4I information systems. These systems must be designed with architectures that facilitate reconfiguration at two levels. First, the systems should be designed to permit new technologies and functionality to be rapidly added to the system. Second, they should permit the warrior to adapt the system to meet unique needs.
Meeting these dual requirements necessitates refocused R&D investment in the three areas described below.
Joint Battlespace Environments. Today's simulation based training systems, planning and collaboration tools, and operational systems have been separately developed and do not interoperate. Additionally, separate communications systems are used to support these applications. Having these separate systems results in a very inefficient use of our resources. More importantly, it deprives the warfighter from using the simulation environment to evaluate new C4I tools and to plan for and rehearse operations using real data and the same information systems that will be used in exercises and combat operations. Technologies needed to support
joint battlespace environments are:
Tools for developing, fielding, and evaluating component syýPms: A great deal of flexibility is needed in the joint battlespace environment to accomr the testing and evaluation of new C4I systemn and software. Tools and methodolob are needed to support the development and fielding systems by assembling components and rapidly tailoring the sf D-25 system to meet specific mission needs. These tools should incorporate performance metrics, help evaluate interoperability, and provide measures of relative operational utility.