«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
Figure ES-3 Underlying Technology Finally, the Task Force found that, since potential adversaries have access to the same modem information systems technologies, leveraging of commercial technology through unique military, value-added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield. There are three factors that should differentiate U.S. military information systems from those of a capable adversary: sensors, ability to reconfigure under stress, and ability to conduct information warfare. When coupled with advanced U.S. simulation capability, the warfighter can develop and tune the skills and techniques necessary to establish and preserve i competitive edge in dynamically managing information system.
Two special needs associated with military information systems were identified:
reconfigurability and information systems protection. Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations, with predictable communications and repeatable information needs. Military scenarios, which are too diverse to make a system designed under these assumptions acceptable, require the capability to be rapidly reconfigured.
Technologies supporting enhanced reconfigurability are joint battlespace modeling and simulation environments, information assimilation and information movement.
With the increasing dependence on information technologies and the explosion of interconnected networks and databases, the importance of information and information systems protection has grown significantly. While the commercial world has security concerns, most are focused on protecting access to information. The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption. In addition, the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems. For information and information systems protection, applicable technologies include enterprise security, network security and data security.
It is important for the DoD to recognize that it must accelerate its modernization and R&D efforts along a two-pronged course. First, it must continue its emphasis on supporting and infusing best commercial technologies. This will allow DoD to piggyback off of the tremendous R&D investments being made in the commercial marketplace.
Secondly, the DoD should continue its investments in military-unique information R&D.
Those technologies that are stressed by military applications should be given priority and, in particular those that support enhanced reconfiguration and information and information systems protection. Special attention should be given to information and information systems protection because of the increasing reliance on commercial products and systems and the increased threat of the use of information warfare as a weapon against C4I systems.
Accordingly, the Task Force formulated the recommendation shown in Figure ES-4.
The Task Force recommends that Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) continue to leverage commercial information systems technology to facilitate rapid technology infusion and reprioritize R&D investments to emphasize support of enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection.
RECOMMENDATION: UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY#12 DDR&E ensure that DoD's R&D strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses DoD investment in military-unique information technology.
Summary In summary, the Task Force believes that the timing is right for a major push to improve the effectiveness of information systems to support the Warfighters. There is a need for cultural change throughout DoD regarding the way information systems are developed and employed. In fact, such changes must be a part of a larger "re-engineering" ES-8 of DoD's warfighting approach. This Task Force underscores the importance of such a cultural change to achieving information dominance on the battlefield.
In addition, the Task Force sees significant vulnerabilities in today's information systems. The Department has not come to grips with the leverage of Information Warfare Unfortunately, the business practices of the as a tools for use by the Warfighter.
Department are hindering DoD's ability to exploit the best systems and technologies available in the commercial sector. Finally, it is not clear that DoD is investing its science and technology resources in the best way. The recommendations of this Task Force are intended to address these issues, for implementation of such recommendations will substantially improve CINC effectiveness and readiness. However, if real change is to of these occur, DoD leadership must aggressively pursue implementation recommendations.
ES-9 Report of the DSB Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Terms of Reference This Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that will enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for immediate assimilation to decrease decision cycle time. The Task Force was instructed to focus principally on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations. For purposes of this study, information architecture is considered to include concepts, networks, data bases, system security and necessary software.
In accomplishing its objectives, the Task Force was requested to:
Assess the current and future DoD and Service plans for battlefield warfare;
"* Develop concepts for information flow on the battlefield;
"* Develop an architectural approach to support these concepts;
"* Consider imposition of policy/security restrictions on information through explicit "* software and encryption rather than hardware to ease rapid changes when authorized;
Consider how joint exercises, gaming, and simulation can validate alternate "* concepts; and Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's "* recommendations.
The Terms of Reference for this study are provided in Appendix E. As shown in this report, the Task Force addressed all elements of this Terms of Reference except for the assessment of current and future DoD and Service programs. The Task Force did not have sufficient time nor access to all detailed plans to perform such an assessment.
Because of the relatively broad scope of this study, the Task Force membership consisted of a highly qualified and diversified group of individuals with expertise in technologies associated with information systems and information architectures, as well as the operational employment of such systems. The members of the Task Force dedicated a significant amount of personal time and energy in order to achieve the objectives set forth in the Terms of Reference.
In addition, the Task Force was supported by a strong cadre of skilled government advisors, representing organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and several agencies. The active and creative participation of these government advisors was a key factor in the success of the Task Force effort. Appendix F provides a complete listing of the many participants who contributed to this effort.
The initial efforts of the Task Force concentrated on a review of current DoD programs devoted to improving information system capabilities. A complete listing of briefings and speakers is provided in Appendix G.
1.2 What We Heard As reflected in Figure 1-1, each of the Services and agencies has programs devoted to battlefield support that are attempting to adhere to an architecture defined for promoting interoperability. Although the programs are paying some attention to the need to migrate into a unified information structure by conforming to the Joint Staffs Global Command and Control System (GCCS) migration plan, corresponding directives are needed to ensure that individual programs have adequate cost and schedule provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve full interoperability and a common operating environment. Until a process is put in place to ensure that the joint warfighter's interoperability requirements are considered, these well intentioned but Service and agency-unique programs will tend to drift away from migration objectives.
Figure 1-1 Current acquisition practices exacerbate the tendency to drift. Since each program is independently supported by mostly independent agencies; a joint corporate perspective is not built into the acquisition process. The warfighting CINCs and JTF commanders have little influence on systems under development or being modified, but they have perhaps the most at stake when systems reach their ultimate application. The joint warfighters' concerns should be represented during the acquisition process to ensure the C4I systems that will support the warfighter, have maintained pace with commercially available technology, and will intermesh well with legacy systems.
Legacy systems must either be migrated into or interfaced with common systems.
The motivation to diverge from a common joint interoperation structure is aggravated by
-2the need to maintain compatibility with Service-unique, legacy systems that are not targeted for migration.
There is a need for establishing a process, in a manner akin to that used for the Internet, that identifies incremental improvements and ensures that each can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants. The part of the Internet process that establishes standards by consensus, and allows continuous integration of improvements, migration of standards, adaptation of commercial products, and distribution of valueadded products, has been shown successful. Some variant of that process is appropriate to institute for the DoD. Unlike the Internet, the DoD will need a method of measuring overall cost and benefit of modifications, and ensuring that appropriate benefits accommodate each incremental change. This requires refocused investment to develop and/or acquire tools to facilitate these efforts.
The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing their transition to modernization. This process should be recognized as a continuous process; there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems.
1.3 Task Force View
Figure 1-2 depicts how the Task Force approached its evaluation of DoD's information architecture for the baitlefield. The global security environment provided the
-3background for understanding the information needs of warfighting commanders in scenarios likely to occur in the coming decade. Because of their importance, the Task Force then assessed four aspects of information architectures for the battlefield: 1) the use of information in warfare; 2) information warfare, both offensive and defensive; 3) the business practices of the Department for acquiring and using such information systems, and 4) the underlying technology. Detailed information regarding each of these aspects is provided in Appendices A through D, respectively. To further assist the reader, Appendix H provides a list of acronyms used throughout this report.
There is a need for a cultural change regarding the way information systems are developed and employed. In fact, such changes must be a par, )-If larger "re-engineering" a of DoD's warfighting approach. This Task Force underscores 1.s need for cultural change.
The recommendations of this Task Force will help facilitate such change, by providing much closer linkage of the real users of information and information systems with the development and acquisition process.
Figure 2-1 The world is fraught with destabilizing factors that make the threat to U.S. interests ambiguous and hard to define. As shown in Figure 2-1, there is a continuum of potential military operations between peace and regional contingencies.
* The predominant types of military operations for the foreseeable future will be operations other than war (OOTW), including both combat and non-combat missions. These operations will be highly diverse in character and may be conducted amidst the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
* WMD and associated technology in the hands of outlaw groups pose the most complex and serious challenges that the United States is likely to face, short of war.
Accordingly, the battlefield architecture must be refocused from the Cold-War orientation to meet today's needs of warfighting units for this changing environment.
The extent to which suppliers of information are able to distribute necessary information to the warfighting commander and to manipulate control of that which is available to the enemy will become a decisive advantage. The diversity of missions requires CINCs and JTF commanders to have the ability to tailor their forces and information systems to meet the specific objectives of each different situation. The challenges associated with OOTWtype operations may be less demanding than major regional contingencies (MRCs), but the consequences of a perceived failure will have far-reaching effects.
Figure 3-1 As shown in Figure 3-1, the battlefield information architecture must recognize the CINC and the JTF Commander and below as the informed customer. This does not imply that national needs should not be met or recognized. It does argue that the Warfighter's current and future environment requires this priority in an unstable, non-threat specific world.
Besides the advantages afforded by trained and ready forces and the capability to project and employ them rapidly and efficiently, the tactical commander also requires critical information as it pertains to his mission, and the ability to use that information most effectively-if he/she is to achieve a decisive advantage on the battlefield. It is key that U.S. force decision making remain within the decision cycle time of their adversaries.
The battlefield information architecture must support such a decision cycle time.