«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
This translates to the need for total situational awareness of the enemy disposition, capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities, as well as pertinent information on one's own forces. The ability to get that information to one's own forces responsively and in usable format tailored for assimilation at each level of command is crucial. At each level of the battlefield there are hundreds and potentially thousands of customers. Therefore tailored information means delivery of the "right piece" rather than the "whole piece" and in
The explosion in information and information system technology also creates an area of vulnerability. Enemy systems and vital data bases can be exploited as a new dimension of war-"Information Warfare." Taking advantage of the opportunity to degrade an adversary's capability can become a significant force multiplier, saving lives, reducing collateral damage, and speeding the end of conflict.
The existing methods for moving and distributing information in the fighting forces are largely hierarchical and sequential. Information flows in a very orderly pattern up and down the operational chain of command. While the new users of information are the regional CINC and JTF commanders, the old patterns of distribution are embedded in doctrine, force structure, and equipment. As a result, the top leadership is well serviced but lower levels are increasingly unable to meet their information needs. There isn't enough access or enough capacity at the lower levels, due to bandwidth limitations as well as equipment and frequency availability.
Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated both the need for moving large volumes of information and the enormous dependence on satellite communications. Military satellite communications formed the backbone of the U.S. command and control system, of which the DSCS and Fleet Satellite Communication (FLTSATCOM) systems were the primary players. This conflict and the U.S./UN operations in Somalia, a much smaller commitment of much different character, both pointed out significant command, control and information distribution problems.
Figure 3-2 defines the capabilities that are necessary for command and control, for integrated situation awareness to all appropriate levels, for effective support to the shooters, and for effective analysis and training. Information systems of appropriate capacity are required between and among all levels of command to facilitate access to and exchange of information vital to collaborative planning and the effective execution of combat operations. This connectivity is accomplished by highly interactive switched, wideband networks at the higher echelons of command providing interactive video and distributed database transfer capability. Effective command and control among deployed warfighting tactical voice and data networks requires more complex connectivity with narrower band information.
The warfighter should have dynamic control over the information form and flow.
He should be able to lay out his information needs tailored to the particular mission. As shown in the matrix provided in Figure 3-3, for each type of information (e.g., air surveillance, imagery, friendly force status, etc.), commanders should be able to specify what information he needs, to what level of detail, at what frequency of update, with which access controls, with which other information it should be fused, and in what form it should be displayed. One might imagine commanders conceptually filling out this chart.
Within the constraints of the current situation, the information officer would then "reprogram" the sensor, communications and computing assets to respond to these needs.
This capability to reconfigure is not available today. The systems are not capable of being
Figure 3-2 Today, point-to-point communications are dominant in the distribution of information for the battlefield. Voice circuits, message traffic circuits and remote computer connections and switching all play a part in achieving such information distribution. While this permits the greatest degree of information customization, it is very costly in terms of communications resource utilization.
This Task Force believes that the broadcasting (publishing) mode of operation could be used to off-loa%? -i notable fraction of the information distribution workload, without adverse effects on the quality of the information. For example, certain status of forces and logistics information, environmental information, and Global Positioning System (GPS) time are very well suited for broadcasting. Broadcasting is used today, but through custom data links such as Joint Tactical Information Distribution System JTIDS) and Tactical Relay and Processor (TRAP). Different approaches to broadcasting can extend the range of this kind of service.
In order to maximize effectiveness, an analysis of information distribution alternatives is necessary, utilizing a variety of communication media. New commercial
3.3 Empower the CINC to Fashion His Own Information Processing and Delivery System The CINC must be able to fashion his own information processing and delivery systems (Figure 3-4). The CINC should become the principal spokesman to the Services, the JROC, the ASD (C31) and DISA for his information needs. The CINC should also be the person who actually assembles and integrates his information systems in concert with other elements of his force structure.
The CINC must view information and information systems as critical resources to marshal as he plans his/her operation. To accomplish this, the CINC must tailor a system of systems to meet each mission and to support the specific forces that are to be involved.
The CINC must define: the information fusion points for a given operation; the limits of information access and dissemination; the nature of broadcast information to be provided and prioritization of such information for the forces; editing and filtering of information;
interconnection management; needed mission planning and weapon system support;
vulnerability management associated with information dissemination and declassification of tactical information; the information needs of offensive and defensive information warfare operations; and the information needs for battle damage assessment.
Much of the foregoing is controlled by the CINC now in varying degrees. However, this Task Force is recommending that the CINC become the responsible official, decision maker and orchestrator for information support to his theater. To do this, a warfighting architecture must be established that defines who needs what information and on what time scale. This Warfighting architecture demands are an input to the definition of an information architecture which defines the classes of information services and their
-9The information architecture then becomes an input to the characteristics.
communications architecture which establishes the interface, interoperability and timeliness requirements.
3.4 CINC's Warfighting Architecture-Enables Battlefield Dominance There are four general dasses of information services (see Figure 3-5).
"Interpersonal Communications" are dynamic connections for real-time information exchange such as voice, video conferencing, etc., 1.a-tween a number of networked users.
This is a switched service with very tight requirements on set-up time, delay and jitter within the information network supplying these services. "Information Access" represents the ability to access and transfer stored information. This is an interactive, tw(,way switching capability that has similar but slightly less stringent requirements on network characteristics. The other two classes, "MessagLg" and "Publishing," do not require network switching operations and have much simpler end user equipment requirements. "Messaging" refers to the storing and forwarding of messages via point-topoint connectivity while "Publishing" represents the broad distribution of information created and generated from a centralized node.
The question for DoD is: "Has technology enabled us to redistribute our message traffic among the four classes in a manner that enables us to do much more for the Warfighter?"
Figure 3-5 The expanded information services required to meet the future needs of the warfighter generally fall into these four classes. The expansion of the use of interactive video teleconferencing between the CINCs and component commands down to the Brigade/Wing/Carrier Battle Group level for collaborative planning, and the demands of distributed data base management between these, levels of command, will require expanded interpersonal communications and information access services with wider bandwidth and more connectivity.
The need for significantly improved situation awareness implies a major expansion in the ability to broadcast essential and timely background information that can be used at all levels of command. Background information can include the location of all forces (friendly, foe, and neutral), an integrated intelligence picture of the battlespace (imagery/Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)/Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), weather, maps and logistics/support information. This information can be disseminated using the unswitched publishing mode via direct broadcast concepts to small receive only terminals deployed at all levels of command.
The increase in the ability to move relevant information rapidly to all levels of the battlefield and establish complete situational awareness provides the commander with greater control over his destiny. The commander can now determine what happens and how, and can better select the most effective and efficient use of combat forces and resources, fusion points, information access, management and vulnerability to optimize the Warfighter's advantage in the field. In essence, the CINC can directly reconfigure the
-11information system serving his needs to ensure that it is actionable and supportive to the situation he faces.
3.5 The Future Figure 3-6 breaks the future information services required by the tactical forces into three categories. The first is the connectivity among the distributed ground, sea and air mobile tactical networks used for low data rate information exchange and voice connectivity at levels of command below Brigade/Wing and CVBG. These tactical networks include Single Channel Ground Radio Systems (SINCGARS), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System JTIDS), Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). The tactical networks may connect force structures which are highly mobile and require connectivity via satellite communications.
Connectivity will be provided at UHF via the fleet (SATCOM (FLTSAT)) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) follow-on (UFO) systems. The UHF band does not offer any protection from jamming and can be easily interfered with by even an unsophisticated enemy. For these reasons Extremely High Frequency (EHF) connectivity among tactical networks is being deployed within Military Strategic Relay (MILSTAR) and parts of the UFO systems.
The jamming protection at EHF is excellent and will allow for assured connectivity among tactical mobile force networks.
-12The second category recognizes the need for high capacity, two-way, point-to-point connectivity between the CINC and echelons of command above Brigade, Wing and CVBG, as well as connectivity to support activities in the Continental United States (CONUS). This connectivity involves high data rate command and control, collaborative planning and distributed data base transfer. These functions are currently implemented via SATCOM using the DSCS satellite system operating at Super High Frequency (SHF) and commercial SATCOM and fiber optic systems. The DSCS system provides relative insensitivity to jamming interference if spot beams and large antennas are used at the higher echelons of command, since jammers are unlikely to be deployed within the beams servicing the upper echelons of command. Commercial systems can provide the connectivity and bandwidth required, but DoD cannot guarantee that commercial services will be available in the locations where a CINC must deploy his forces unless formal arrangements are made with commercial communications and information services companies ahead of time.
The last category of service is provided by direct broadcast of integrated situation awareness and critical support information to tactical users at all levels of command. This category of service provides subscribers with quick, efficient, and simultaneous access to broad band information via small, mobile and inexpensive, receive-only terminals. The user can employ filters to select broadcast information. A satellite broadcast system can be made inherently invulnerable to the ground mobile jamming threats expected in the future in that these threats cannot attack the downlink broadcast information. Only an airborne or space-based jamming threat can attack the downlink and this level of sophistication is not expected in many future operations. A broadcast satellite system could transmit the joint battlespace picture, vital intelligence data, weather, maps, logistics, etc. The ability of operational commanders to shift a high percentage of the information dissemination needs to the direct broadcast mode is a key enabler of the information systems flexibility needed for today's diverse mix of missions.
A Logical Time-Phased Approach to Provide Real Time Information to the 3.6 Warfighter Within the last several years, numerous demonstrations, such as ULCHI Focus Lens and Talon Sword, have illustrated the benefits of providing real time information directly to the warfighters. In addition, recent joint exercises, such as Tandem Thrust and Ocean Venture, have demonstrated the value of interactive video conferencing between the CINC and the JTF and component commanders. As illustrated in Figure 3-7, this has spawned a vision of the future wherein all warfighters have the ability to directly access information that can provide decisive warfighting advantage. The question is, how does DoD evolve from the current system to the vision of the future?