«DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD DTlC OCTOBER 1994 S ELECTE APR I 0 1995' G i 95-01137 I ...»
Recommendation - PrioritizeR&D Investment with Focus on Military-Unique Information Technology "* Technology is not a major impediment to information dominance on the battlefield "* The commercial information industry leads in technology and research investment "* Information technology is available globally "* DoD should:
- Invest in military-urique information technology R&D
- Give special attention to information protection technology
- Use the best commercial technology Action: DDR&E ensure that R&D strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses DoD investment in military-unique information technology Figure 6-4
-48With respect to modem information systems, component technology is not the major impediment to information dominance on the battlefield. DoD must assume that both current, and increasingly, more capable commercial technologies will be available, acquired, and used by friend and foe alike. It will be important to stay abreast of current and emerging technology but our real discriminator will be our ability to continuously infuse these technologies and to configure and reconfigure the ensuing products to support joint warfare.
Key to technology insertion is the recognition that the commercial information technology industry leads in technology and research investment. DoD has seen advances in office automation systems, mapping systems, imagery processing and GPS. Those technologies and resultant products are available from the global marketplace.
With the increasing dependence on information technologies and the explosion of interconnected networks and databases, the importance of information and information systems protection has grown significantly.
In response to this dramatically changed environment, it is important for the DoD to recognize that it must accelerate its efforts along a two-pronged course. First, it must continue its emphasis on supporting and infusing best commercial technologies. This will allow DoD to piggyback off of the tremendous R&D investments being made in the commercial marketplace. Secondly, the DoD should continue its investments in militaryunique information technology R&D. Those technologies that are stressed by military applications should be given priority and, in particular those that support enhanced reconfiguration and information and information systems protection. Special attention should be given to information and information systems protection because of the increasing reliance on commercial products and systems and the increased threat of the use of information warfare as a weapon against C4I systems.
The Task Force recommends that DDR&E continue to leverage commercial information systems technology to facilitate rapid technology infusion and reprioritize R&D investment to differentiate military-unique information technology in support of enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection.
-49SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS7.0
7.1 Key Findings and Observations The charge to this Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for immediate assimilation to decrease decision cycle time. The Task Force saw a variety of good information system initiatives among the Services and agencies as well as DoD policies and procedures that, if enforced, should motivate interoperability of such information systems. The key observations of the Task Force are outlined in Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-1 Make the Warfighter an Informed Customer. There is a need to strengthen the CINC's expertise. While the CINC an.! staff need to better understand how information and information systems might be better employed, the CINC needs better technical support to be able to identify and articulate his requirements, apply promising technologies to operational needs, and improve the linkage between field user and developer. The ever increasing importance of information warfare requires focus on both its opportunities and its vulnerabilities. A new staff function, run by a combat arms officer, should build the CINC's strategic and tactical information warfare plan, both offensive and defensive.
-50In addition, the CINCs and JTF commanders also need to exercise their information systems through virtual combat every day. The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and to fight from the same seat and same sys~m, every day. The simulations of the battlespace must allow the CINC, his components and tactical formations to test employment concepts with Red Teaming. CINC and component practice and rehearsals of envisioned employment concepts will raise confidence of success and improve force readiness.
Warfighters Need to Change Information Systems to Accomplish Different Missions. During the Cold War, there was potential for nuclear and conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale. The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the top-the National Command Authority (NCA). Today, the principal customer to be served is the CINC/JTF Commander and below, charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional conventional operations. Actionable information is needed, the kind of information necessary to fight forces and win-as compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans. The handling and use of such information is the issue: getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner.
The CINC must control the process. In order for the CINC to carry out his mission, he must exercise control of his information support. Information must flow to the field leader/weapons operator who is on the move, under great stress and very busy. He needs
* In a timely manner, to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness, controlling the battle space and denying/disrupting his enemy's information flow;
9 At all levels of execution in common, but somewhat adaptable, format; and e In a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use.
U.S. Information Systems are Highly Vulnerable to Information Warfare; So Are Our Adversaries.' In addition to the importance associated with the use of information in warfare, the Task Force found U.S. information systems highly vulnerable to "Information Warfare" (IW). The Task Force was briefed on activities and capabilities that caused concern over the integrity of the information systems that are a key enabler of military superiority. The Task Force found similar vulnerabilities in the information systems of potential adversaries. U.S. military forces and their commanders need to be able to exploit these vulnerabilities as an integral capability, similar in character to traditional weapon systems. These systems should become an integral part of the joint training and exercise programs of the CINCs.
An evolving strategy and capability to wage IW may be the most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth. Unlike the "hard" munitions of combat, IW assets have near-instantaneous global reach and can pervade throughout the spectrum of conflict to create unprecedented effects. Further, with the dependence of modem commerce and the military on computer-controlled telecommunication networks, data bases, enabling software, and computers, the U.S. must protect these assets regarding their vulnerabilities.
The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy, military operations and intelligence community initiatives. A serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical IW strategy is the
-51current lack of any national policy on this matter. Further, there is no well defined "threat" to U.S. information systems. Protection of U.S. information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions put forth, for zxample, in the Computer Security Act of 1987.
Of concern to the Task Force is the fact that IW technologies and capabilities are iargely being developed in an open commercial market and are outside of direct Government control. In contrast with the very secret development and control of most weapons technologies by the Government, a "third-world" nation could procure a formidable, modern IW capability virtually off-the-shelf. This fact portends a revolution in commercial and military-technological warfare.
As viewed by this Task Force, the nation is under IW attack today by a spectrum of adversaries ranging from the teenage hacker to sophisticated, wide-ranging illegal entries into telecommunications networks and computer systems. As DoD continues the use of a single, integrated operations plan (SIOP) for strategic nuclear warfare, the DoD might want to consider an "Information Warfare SLOP" process. The IW SIOP could be used, in part, to "play" against an adversary IW strategy, examine offensive and defensive deconfliction and would deal with intelligence equity issues.
Buy Commercial Products, Buy Commercial Services, "Buy Into" Commercial Practices. Today, the information system is saturated. Even with control of his information systems, the CINC must cope with the system as it exists today. Much of what is being moved now is of a routine nature, time relevant but not critically time sensitive-weather, logistics status, personnel/admin/finance data, etc.-and much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to pipe constriction/data rate limitations. More throughput is critically needed. Not only routine, but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space. A substantial new buy of information systems is not likely. New concepts for information distribution are needed.
The s ution may be in exploiting another information system mode than is currently being emphasized: publishing/broadcasting-the Warfighter's CNN. There is great promise in such an approach in order to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels through the creation of a multi-band broadcast that blankets the battle space.
In the absence of new buys, the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage tions of major defense satellite systems, primarily the Defense Satellite Comm!_..
System. The information load would then have to be moved to commercial alter:..,vessatellite, fiber and wire. In the longer term DoD must exploit the broad array of commercial space information systems and services much more.
The Task Force sees a critical need for the Department's acquisition system to facilitate the buying of commercial information products and services, and to '"buy into" commercial business practices. Information system superiority is dependent on an ability The obsolescence cycle for to incorporate the latest in commercial technologies.
commercial information systems is dramatically shorter than DoD's weapon system cycle.
If information is to remain a key discriminator in capability, DoD must link its acquisition cycle to that of the commercial sector.
The Task Force also found a need for DoD to establish a process, in a manner akin to that used for the Internet, that identifies incremental improvements and ensures each of these,nprovements can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants. The process used in establishing Internet has been shown successful in establishing standards by consensus and in allowing continuous integration of improvements, migration of
-52standards, adaptation of commercial products, and distribution of value ad,.,3 products.
Some variant of that process is appropriate for institution within the DoD. The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing This should be recognized and supported as a their transition to modernization.
continuous process, as there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems and technologies.
Finally, while the Task Force found no significant breakthrough R&D areas, it is clear that since potential adversaries have access to the same modern information systems technologies, leveraging of commercial technology through unique military value-added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield. Two special needs associated with military information systems are reconfigurability and information systems protection.
Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations, with predictable communications and repeatable information needs. Military scenarios, which are too tions acceptable, require the diverse to make a system designed under these ass capability to be rapidly reconfigured. While the comnufercial world has security concerns, most are focused on protecting access to information. The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption. In addition, the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems.
* Leverage commercial world
- Direct broadcast system
- Buy bandwidth in commercial market
- "Civil reserve" communications and commercial information services capability
- Acquisition cycle for software
- Exploit commercial R&D
#1 Action: SECDEF create a Battlefield Information Task Force.
There is a need to bring together warfighters and developers to establish the future vision, system needs, and evolutionary development plans. The proposed BITF could act
as an agent of change. Its specific functions should include the following:
- Create and utilize "joint battlespace" modeling and simulation for requirement.trades, training and exercises;
- Develop ACTDs to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate future growth (e.g. broadcast/request modes);
- Exploit current science & technology base programs Demonstrate combat potential of C4I improvements to CINCs via relevant exercises in theater;
- Identify and track C41 performance metrics;
- Provide recommendations to system developers and Enterprise Integration Council;
- Develop ongoing Integrated Process Team charter.