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Satellite Evidence of Alteration to the Environment and Drying Out of River/Stream Bed............... 383 PART IV: FOREIGN CORPORATE COMPLICITY, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.............385 TALISMAN AND CANADA, 1998-2000
Talisman’s Decision to Invest
Talisman Failure to Investigate Allegations
What Riek Machar Said He Told Talisman, 1998-99
What Gov. Taban Deng Said He Told Talisman, 1999
The Campaign Against Talisman
Canadian Government Promises Action on Talisman, March-April 1999
Talisman Annual Meeting May 1999
U.N. Expert Criticizes Oilfield Human Rights Abuses, October 1999
Canadian Government Issues Policy Statement on Sudan, October 1999; Talisman Signs Code of Conduct, December 1999
Southern Politicians in Khartoum Denounce Oil Companies, November 1999
Talisman Takes Oil Analysts on Company Tour of Sudan, November 1999
The Harker Report
Canadian Government Announces Toothless Sudan Program, February 2000
U.S. Criticizes Canada
Canadian Initiative at U.N. Security Council Blocked, April 2000
TALISMAN “HUMAN RIGHTS” AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, 2000-2002
Talisman Annual Meeting, May 2000
Talisman Meets the Sudan Government; GNPOC Signs Code of Ethics, December 2000................ 418 Talisman Human Rights Monitoring
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, Sudan (April 2001)
Compensation Payments (Pipeline Only)
Development Initiatives and Relief Donations
Talisman Condemned at Annual Meeting 2001
Canadian Government Response
Cynical Satellite Images, 2001
Talisman Annual Meeting, May 2002
Talisman Pulls Out, October 2002
LUNDIN: WILLFULLY BLIND TO DEVASTATION IN BLOCK 5A
Lundin Hides the Situation of Armed Conflict in Block 5A
Lundin Denies Revelations about Forced Displacement in Block 5A, 2001
Lundin’s “Oil Policy on Sudan” Substitutes for a Human Rights Policy
Talisman Buys Lundin’s Non-Sudan Assets, June 2001
Lundin Suspends Operations Due To “Insecurity,” January 2002-April 2003
Lundin Community Development Program
CHINA’S INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN: ARMS AND OIL
Arms Trade between China and Sudan
China’s Need to Acquire Foreign Oil Reserves
China’s First Initial Public Offering on the N.Y. Stock Exchange Backfires
CNPC Erects a “Firewall” to Satisfy Activists
Opposition Undercuts PetroChina Initial Public Offering, March 2000
CNPC Participation in Government Refinery
OTHER OIL COMPANIES
Petronas: Partner in GNPOC, Lundin, and Block 5B Concessions
OMV (Sudan): Excited about Thar Jath Discoveries
TotalFinaElf: Courted by Khartoum Government
THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMACY REVIVED
Clinton Administration Policy on Sudan
U.S. Bombs Khartoum, August 1998
U.S at the U.N.
U.S. Congress Gets in on the Act
Campaign Against Oil Investment
Pressure to Sell Off Talisman Shares
The Campaign for Capital Market Sanctions
Talisman Sued by Displaced under the Alien Tort Claims Act in New York
U.S. Aid to Sudanese Rebel Groups
U.S. Special Envoy for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan: May 2001
U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan: September 2001
U.S. Policy in Sudan, 2002
E.U.-Sudan Political Dialogue
E.U. Leadership at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Minimum Benchmarks
II. Failure to meet benchmarks
To the European Union and its member states (notably Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and the governments of Canada, China, and Malaysia, and any other state where oil companies operating in Sudan are headquartered:
III. Additional Recommendations
To the companies:
To the Government of Sudan:
To the United States:
To the Canadian Government:
To the governments of Canada, China, and Malaysia:
To the European Union and its member states, notably Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom:
To the members of the United Nations Security Council:
To the World Bank:
To the rebel forces: the SPLM/A and other anti-government armed groups:
APPENDIX A: CHART OF BOMBING CONDUCTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN, 2000APPENDIX B: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ONFISCAL TRANSPARENCY
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY: OIL, DISPLACEMENT, & POLITICS IN SUDAN
Human Rights Watch
The Concession Holders:
Blocks 1, 2, and 4: Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) owns the concession to explore and develop these blocks, the 1,540 kilometer pipeline to the Red Sea, and the port at Masra El Bashair, the last two built and completed by GNPOC in 1999. Its owners are Talisman Energy Inc. of Canada (25 percent, from 1998 until 2002, when it sold its interest to ONGC Videsh Ltd.); China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) (40 percent since 1996), Petronas Nasional Berhad of Malaysia (Petronas) (30 percent since 1996), and Sudan’s state-owned Sudapet Limited (5 percent since 1996).
This concession in Western Upper Nile includes the Unity and Heglig oilfields, the oldest producing oilfields in southern Sudan. It also includes El Toor, Toma South, El Nar, Talih, and Munga oil fields, and the more recently explored Timsa and Bamboo oilfields in Block 4. Civilian displacement started in the mid-1980s.
Block 5A: Lundin Oil AB, a Swedish company, was lead partner in the consortium that owned Block 5A, immediately to the south of Blocks 4 and 1 in Western Upper Nile, until 2003. Lundin (through its subsidiary International Petroleum Corp.) owned 40.375 percent, which it sold to Petronas of Malaysia.
Petronas owned 28.5 percent, which it purchased in 1997, and with the purchase of Lundin’s interest owns 68.875 percent of Block 5A. OMV of Austria owned 26.125 percent, which it purchased in 1997, and sold this interest out to ONGC Videsh Ltd. in 2003. Sudapet owns 5 percent of Block 5A, also purchased in 1997. The Block 5A concession is still in the exploratory phase, with very good results from
drilling tests. Civilian displacement began in 1998.
Because of a rebel attack at their drilling facility in May 1999, the consortium withdrew, citing “the rainy season” and “logistics” as the reasons for not continuing tests. After major displacement, continuing in 2000, the all-weather road to the drilling site was completed in 2001 and the exploratory tests resumed, were suspended for more than a year in 2002, and resumed again in 2003 shortly before Lundin sold off its interest.
Block 5B: Petronas (41 percent) and Sudapet (10 percent) are the lead partners on this concession, with Lundin Oil (24.5 percent) and OMV (24.5 percent), as announced on May 3, 2001. The concession, on the southeast border of Block 5A, includes Nyal and Ganyliel in Western Upper Nile.
The White Nile cuts through it. It appears that OMV agreed to sell its interest in this block to ONGC Videsh Ltd. in 2003.
Blocks 3 & 7 in Eastern Upper Nile are not the subject of this report, but are being developed by the Qatari Gulf Petroleum Company (GPC) with CNPC, Al Hath (private Sudanese company), and Sudapet (5 percent). Fighting in this area has expanded in 2000-2001 between SPDF, SPLA, rebels and government militia and troops.
Block 5: also not covered in this report, the concession, by far the largest in the south at 120,000 square kilometers, is owned by the oil multinational TotalFinaElf, and encompasses Central Upper Nile and beyond. It is not currently being developed.
Block 6: the concession northwest of block 4 in western Sudan is owned by CNPC, but oil explorations
have not yet taken place and the block is not covered in this report.
Chevron Oil Co., a U.S.-based multinational oil company that bought and explored concessions in Sudan starting in 1974; it pulled out of the south in 1984 after rebels killed three employees and sold off its Sudan interests in 1992.
Arakis Energy Co., a small Canadian exploration company traded on the Vancouver Stock Exchange, that in 1992 purchased State Oil Co. and its interest in Sudan in blocks 1, 2, and 4, and brought in Chinese, Malaysian, and Sudan government partners in December 1996, forming the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Talisman Energy purchased Arakis in October 1998.
Main Rebel and Militia Forces in Southern Sudan Named in this Report Anyanya: guerrilla army of southern separatists, 1955-72.
Anyanya II: guerrilla army of southern separatists, 1975-91.
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A): dominant rebel army in Sudan, 1983present, composed of southerners and other marginalized peoples such as the Nuba, headed by Col.
John Garang de Mabior (Dinka). Program: united, secular Sudan. Headquartered in Rumbek, Bahr El Ghazal, southern Sudan.
South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM): a pro-independence southern political movement based in Akobo, Eastern Upper Nile, headed and formed by Michael Wal Duany in late 1999; it signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government in 2002.
Rebel forces headed (directly or indirectly) by Cmdr. Riek Machar, 1991-2002:
SPLM/A-Nasir faction: 1991-93, breakaway SPLA faction headed by SPLA Cmdrs. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon (Dok Nuer), Gordon Kong Chuol (Eastern Jikany Nuer), and Lam Akol(Shilluk);
although its program called for an independent south, it received government aid. Headquartered in Nasir until 1995 and thereafter in Waat and Ayod, Upper Nile.
SPLM/A-United: 1993-94: the above faction (mostly Nuer) joined by forces from other ethnic groups in southern Sudan, headed by Cmdr. Riek Machar, based in Nasir. Later this name was used by Lam Akol for his mostly Shilluk faction (see below).
South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A): 1994-97: the above faction, reformed and
renamed after the Nuer reconciliation meeting at Akobo in 1994, based variously in Waat and Ayod, Upper Nile.
South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF): 1997-2000, the army formed under the Khartoum Peace Agreement from ex-rebel forces including SSIM/A, based in Khartoum, Juba, and Malakal, and aligned with the political party United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). Both were headed by Cmdr. Riek Machar until January 2000, when he left the government. On April 27, 2001 all southern forces allied with the government were unified under this name, SSDF, including the progovernment militia forces listed below.
Sudan People’s Defense Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF): January 2000-January 2002 or when the merger with the SPLM/A was complete, the rebel group formed from most SSDF forces, based in Upper Nile.
Some pro-government militia forces (later known as “armed groups”):
South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A): formed in early 1998 by Maj Gen. Paulino Matiep of the Sudan army, incorporating his formerly Anyanya II and SSDF Bul Nuer forces, supported by the Sudan government, based in Mayom, Western Upper Nile. (Bul Nuer) Cmdr. Gabriel Tanginya, pro-government Nuer militia based in Fangak, later Poum, Central Upper Nile. (Lak Nuer) Cmdr. Gordon Kong Chuol, pro-government Nuer militia based in Nasir, Eastern Upper Nile. (eastern Jikany Nuer) Cmdr. Simon Gatwich Dual, pro-government Nuer militia based in Waat, Central Upper Nile. (Lou Nuer) SPLM/A-United: Cmdr. Lam Akol’s Shilluk forces formed in 1994, which signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997. Lam Akol claimed the name after the Riek Machar forces in 1994 took the name South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). Lam Akol had been part of the original SPLM/A-United. Based in Tonga, the Shilluk capital, in Upper Nile of southern Sudan.
For further details, consult the Glossary, Lists of Key Individuals, and the text. There are several other southern ethnic militias armed by the government, including the Murle, the Mandari, the Toposa, the Didinga, and the Fertit and other ethnic groups not named here.
Most southerners’ names include their “proper” name first, their father’s name second, and their
grandfather’s name last. For example, to refer to Cmdr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon as “Machar” is to refer to that commander’s father. Therefore the first and second names are used in this report.
Key Southern Individuals Named in This Report Note: The names are listed alphabetically by second name (underlined), unless the person is known by another name.
Abel Alier Kwai Respected southern politician living in Khartoum, former vice president of Sudan and head of the Southern Region during part of the autonomy period. Author of Southern Sudan: Too Many Promises Dishonored (1990). (Bor Dinka) Tito Biel Chuol Western Upper Nile zonal commander in SSDF in May 1999 in charge of the attack on the oil company rig at Ryer/Thar Jath, Western Upper Nile. Instrumental in securing field alliance with Cmdr.
Salva Kiir Mayandit of the SPLA. Originally in the SPLA, joined the Riek Machar breakaway faction in 1991 and followed him into the government in 1997, becoming part of the SSDF, and then in 2000 part of Machar’s SPDF. In late 2002 he realigned himself with the SSDF (pro-government). (Dok Nuer) Kuong Danhier Gatluak Head of security of the SPDF in 1999. Joined the SPLA and defected with Riek Machar in 1991. When Riek Machar was in the government, Kuong Danhier was chief security officer for the SSDF, based in Nairobi. Joined Riek Machar when Machar defected from the government in early 2000.