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2000. He formed a rival Islamist party, the Popular National Congress (PNC) party, and was held in prolonged arbitrary detention by the government in 2001 (after the PNC signed a compact with the SPLA) although the courts ordered him released. As of late 2003, he remains in detention.
BCSC British Columbia Securities Commission, responsible for regulating the Vancouver Stock Exchange.
Beja Congress A political party of eastern Sudanese Beja people, which took up arms in the 1990s and joined the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA). It claimed responsibility for January and May 2000 oil pipeline attacks. The Beja Congress backed candidates for parliamentary office in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s.
monitors; willingness to cooperate with an internationally-sponsored commission to investigate the ongoing practice of slavery in Sudan;
establishment of "zones of tranquility" to allow for emergency humanitarian interventions; and not to target civilians or civilian objects in the war in the south, with international monitoring.
DUP Democratic Unionist Party, based in the Khatmiyya Muslim religious sect in eastern Sudan, traditionally headed by the El Mirghani family, also head of the Khatmiyya sect. It is a political party in exile and part of the NDA; its leader, Moulana Mohammed Osman El Mirghani, also heads the NDA.
Dinka An African people living in the Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces of Sudan; probably the largest ethnic group in Sudan comprising approximately 12 percent of the population in 1983. They speak Dinka, a western Nilotic language, and believe in a Dinka religion but many have converted to Christianity.
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the joint venture among Talisman (its interest acquired by ONGC Videsh Ltd. in 2003), CNPC, Petronas, and Sudapet to own and develop Blocks 1, 2, and 4 of Sudan’s Muglad Basin oil fields. It also owns the pipeline connecting the GNPOC oil fields to the Red Sea and the port built on the Red Sea for oil supertankers.
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development (formerly the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification, IGADD),
KAIROS Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives/ Initiatives canadiennes oecumeniques pour la justice (formerly the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa/ICCAF)
Médecins Sans An international humanitarian aid organization that provides Frontières (MSF) emergency medical assistance in conflict zones around the world; winner of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize.
muraheleen(murahiliin) The Misseriya word for “travelers,” now referring to Baggara tribal militias of southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed by successive Sudanese governments starting with Pres. Numeiri, and incorporated in 1989 into government militias under army jurisdiction.
National Congress The Islamist political party formed from the National Islamic Front under the 1999 Sudan constitution.
OEPA Organization of Exploration and Production Authority: a Sudanese government entity.
OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan, the result of humanitarian access agreements to war-affected areas of Sudan negotiated from 1989 onwards between the government of Sudan, the SPLM/A, and the United Nations. The humanitarian operation comes under the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan based in Khartoum. He is assisted by two deputy humanitarian coordinators; one in Khartoum, for operations in government-held territory;
and one in Nairobi, for operations in rebel-controlled territory. OLS in the south is a consortium of six operational U.N. agencies and forty-five international and Sudanese nongovernmental organizations. It is headquartered in Khartoum and the southern sector is headquartered in Nairobi. The only official entry point by air is from Lokichokkio, Kenya.
OMV OMV (Sudan) Exploration GmbH, owned by the largest company in Austria, OMV Aktiengesellschaft, which is traded in Vienna, Munich, and Frankfurt. It held 26.125 percent of the Block 5A consortium (1997-2003) and 24.5 percent of the Block 5B consortium.
PDF Popular Defence Force, an Islamist government-sponsored militia under the jurisdiction of the Sudanese army, which trains, arms, and supervises these
Proved/ probable reserves Proved reserves: Estimated quantities of energy sources that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with reasonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions. The location, quantity, and grade of the energy source are usually considered to be well established in such reserves. http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_p.htm, “Energy Glossary.” RASS Relief Association of South Sudan, the relief arm of the forces led by Riek
SRRC Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, formed of the merger of RASS and SRRA; the relief wing of the SPLM/A in 2003 SSCC Southern States Coordinating Council, created by the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement to govern southern Sudan prior to a self-determination referendum to be held (after certain conditions were met) in four years, pursuant to that agreement.
SSDF South Sudan Defense Force, a government umbrella group for former rebel factions headed by Riek Machar until 2000, formed as a result of the 1997 Khartoum Peace agreement between the government and the forces of Riek Machar and other commanders who signed the agreement. After 2000, it was headed by Brig. Gen. Gatluak Deng (removed in late 2002) and then by Maj.
Gen. Paulino Matiep.
SSIM/A South Sudan Independence Movement/Army; breakaway faction of the SPLA from 1994 to 1997. Led by Cmdr. Riek Machar, Cmdr. Gordon Kong and Cmdr. Lam Akol, it broke away from the SPLM/A and John Garang’s leadership in August 1991. It was based in Nasir, Upper Nile, and for a time was referred to as SPLA-Nasir. It was dependent on clandestine military supplies and cooperation from the Khartoum government. On March 27, 1993, others joined and it was renamed SPLA-United. In November 1994, it was renamed South Sudan Independence Movement/Army to emphasize its
Sudd The name for the large blocks of aquatic vegetation obstructing the channels of the swamps of the White Nile in southern Sudan (and impeding European and Arab penetration) prior to the twentieth century. Sudd was derived from the Arabic word sadd meaning barrier or obstacle. Today it is used to describe the permanent swamp of the Nile or, more loosely, the whole Nile flood-plain, including the seasonal wetlands as well as the permanent swamp.
Talisman Talisman Energy Inc, the largest independent Canadian oil and gas producer.
Headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, it was the operational partner and owned 25 percent of GNPOC from October 1998 until early 2003. Talisman was spun off from British Petroleum and is now one of Canada’s largest corporations.
Toic Seasonally river-flooded grasslands in the White Nile basin of southern Sudan.
They are exposed late in the dry season as the floodwaters recede and provide excellent pastureland.
TotalFinaElf One of the world’s largest integrated oil companies. It operates in more than 100 countries. In 1980 Total of France gained the concession for Block 5 (158,113 square kilometers in the Bor, Pibor and Kapoeta districts of southern Sudan). In 1999 Total allied with PetroFina to be the fifth largest oil company in the world, called TotalFina. In 2000 it merged with Elf-Acquitaine to become the fourth largest oil company in the world, TotalFinaElf. Its Block 5
SUMMARY The first export of crude oil from Sudan in August 1999 marked a turning point in the country’s complex civil war, now in its twentieth year: oil became the main objective and a principal cause of the war. Oil now figures as an important remaining obstacle to a lasting peace and oil revenues have been used by the government to obtain weapons and ammunition that have enabled it to intensify the war and expand oil development. Expansion of oil development has continued to be accompanied by the violent displacement of the agro-pastoral southern Nuer and Dinka people from their traditional lands atop the oilfields. Members of such communities continue to be killed or maimed, their homes and crops burned, and their grains and cattle looted.
The large-scale exploitation of oil by foreign companies operating in the theatre of war in southern Sudan has increased human rights abuses there and has exacerbated the long-running conflict in Sudan, a conflict marked already by gross human rights abuses—two million dead, four million displaced since 1983—and recurring famine and epidemics.
Forced displacement of the civilian population, and the death and destruction that have accompanied it, are the central human rights issues relating to oil development in Sudan. The government is directly responsible for this forced displacement, which it has undertaken to provide security to the operations of its partners, the international and mostly foreign state-owned oil companies. In the government’s eyes, the centuries-long residents of the oilfields, the Nuer, Dinka, and other southern Sudanese, pose a security threat to the oilfields because control and ownership of the south’s natural resources are contested by southern rebels and government officials perceive the pastoral peoples as sympathetic to the rebels. But the Sudanese government itself has helped to create the threat by forging ahead with oil development in southern territory under circumstances in which its residents have no right to participate in their own governance nor share the benefits of oil development. Brute force has been a key
component of the government’s oil development strategy.
The oil in the ground and flowing through the pipeline to the Red Sea supertanker port has driven expulsions from Western Upper Nile/Unity State, the area of the main oil production today. In earlier campaigns in the 1980s government troops and horsebacked militia of the Baggara, Arabized cattle nomads of Darfur and Kordofan, invaded from the northwest, destroying communities and expelling much of the population from the initial exploration areas, in Blocks 1, 2, and 4, dangerously situated on the north-south border of Sudan. (Map B) In the 1990s the government embarked upon a more sophisticated displacement campaign, through the use of divide-and-conquer tactics: it bought off rebel factions and exacerbated south-south ethnic differences with arms supplies. Mostly Nuer factions with political and other grievances against the Dinka-officered rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A, referred to as SPLA when discussing the military wing), emerged and a bloody south-south war ensued, concentrated in the oilfield areas. Campaigns of killing, pillage, and burning, enabled by government troops and air support for their southern allies who served as front troops, cleared the way for Western and Asian oil corporations to develop the basic infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation: rigs, roads, pumping stations, and pipelines.
The relationship of the war and displacement campaign to oil development is evident: the oil areas targeted for population clearance are those where a concession has been granted and a pipeline is imminent and/or nearby. The availability of the means of transport of oil to the market makes the nearest undeveloped block economically viable. The agro-pastoralists living there then become the target of forced displacement. Since 1999, when the pipeline was nearing completion and Blocks 1, 2, and 4 came on line with 150,000, then 230,000 barrels of crude oil produced daily, the main military theatre has been in the adjacent Block 5A. Oil revenues enable the government to increase its military hardware: it tripled its fleet of attack helicopters in 2001 with the purchase abroad of twelve new helicopters—used to deadly effect in the killing of twenty-four civilians at a relief food distribution site in early 2002, to cite only one example.
37Human Rights Watch
In a number of cases, international oil companies in Sudan have denied that any abuses were taking place in connection with oil exploration and production. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, oil company executives have claimed that they were unaware of any uncompensated forced displacement as a result of oil operations. They have also claimed to have undertaken investigations establishing that abuses are minimal or nonexistent. As noted below, such efforts do not stand up to scrutiny.
Increasingly, under pressure from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some concerned governments, oil company representatives have claimed instead that they are playing a positive role in difficult circumstances to monitor and rein in abuses. As detailed below, such claims have consistently been self-serving. Human Rights Watch believes that oil companies in Sudan, seeking to make a profit in areas of the country wracked by civil war and often brutally cleared of indigenous peoples, have an obligation to see that rights abuses connected with oil production cease.
This report is about the human cost of the oil—and corporate complicity in the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses, including its policy of sponsored ethnic conflict and forced displacement to clear tens of thousands of southern Sudanese from their homes atop the oilfields.
The first part of this report describes early developments in the oil sector in Sudan, summarizing the experience of Chevron beginning in 1974 and Arakis beginning in 1992 in Blocks 1, 2, and 4. Part one also details the historical evidence that, contrary to oil company and Sudanese government assertions, southern Sudanese had long lived in the oilfields, and were displaced as a result of the oil operations.