«Why discourse matters only sometimes: eﬀective arguing beyond the nation-state DIANA PANKE* Abstract. Pre- and post-agreement discourses are an ...»
How can we explain variation in the success of judicial discourses? Constructivist approaches content that states can be talked out of non-compliance interests in the course of judicial discourses, if arguing is eﬀective. In order to conceptualise endogenous interests, scholars recurred to the Habermasian theory of communicative action.13 Not the least because this approach generates either personally or institutionally ﬁx hypotheses on persuasion and cannot explain much variation in the success of discourses, the research focus shifted from whether arguing takes place to the conditions under which arguing is successful. ‘Second generation’ arguing approaches draw on the Habermasian discourse theory to identify conditions under which arguments make a diﬀerence.14 Public settings with broad access and transparency, high norm density and high institutionalisation foster eﬀective arguing, because these variables approximate ideal discourse conditions, with a common life world or public opinion as a substitute thereof.15 ECJ procedures are highly institutionalised and have hardly changed over time.16 Hence, judicial discourses should foster eﬀective arguing. By contrast, access and transparency are constantly low and do not further eﬀective arguing: only the advocates of the parties participate, oral exchanges are not generally public and the Court deliberates in closed settings (ECJ rules of procedure Art. 56, 27).
Another approach draws on social psychology.17 In this perspective arguing fosters ideational change, if actors are cognitively open to become persuaded. This 13 Although there is no empirical evidence for such informal bargaining in publicly accessible materials (protocols of European Advocate Generals, ECJ judgments), this alternative explanation is tested in part V.
14 In this mode of action, actors are consciously motivated to become persuaded by good arguments J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1 Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995); H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that’ p.
402ﬀ.; H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that’, p. 402ﬀ.
15 J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983);
Deitelhoﬀ and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise’ p 167ﬀ.
16 These approaches assume that contextual variables accelerate the quantity of argumentative speech acts, which automatically translates into persuasion so that arguing is eﬀective, once it takes place.
(T. Risse, ‘Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und die Theorie Internationaler Beziehungen – Warum empirisch nichts so heiß gegessen wird, wie es theoretisch gekocht wurde’, in G. Hellmann, K. D.
Wolf and M. Zürn (eds), Forschungsstand und Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland (2002), pp. 1–26).
17 There is one important exception: The ECJ can issue ﬁnancial penalties since 1993 (Art. 228 ECT) if states fail to comply with its ﬁrst judgment.
150 Diana Panke is more likely to be the case if they have few prior believes and attribute moral authority to other speakers, as well as if issues are new, environments are changing, the uncertainty is high due to policy failures, or if interactions are de-politicised and take place in an in camera setting.18 Again, institutional and contextual variables that induce eﬀective arguing in judicial discourses, such as the level of transparency or the moral authority of judges, are constant and cannot explain variation in the success of judicial discourses. By contrast, other variables indicate
that judicial discourses should hardly succeed in talking states into compliance:
States’ non-compliance interests are eminently strong since they did not opt for pre-judicial settlements, issues are not new and environments are unlikely to change rapidly during the discourse.
Under what conditions can consensual norm interpretations emerge from judicial discourses and when they are likely to end in dissent? State of the art approaches seem to have diﬃculties to explain why states are only sometimes talked into compliance. This section departs from these approaches regarding one essential element. The latter do not theorise that not every communicated argument is good, but can as well fail to be persuasive. The approach introduced here, by contrast, analyses the quality of arguments and claims that this is crucial for the varying eﬀectiveness of discourses.
Judicial discourses accelerate argumentative speech acts. Yet, exchanging arguments is not suﬃcient to induce ideational changes, since not every argument is persuasive per se. Only good arguments can be convincing and possibly end norm violations. What characterises a good argument? Which ideas might change actors’ compliance interests? Simply put, the answer is that good arguments have to be intersubjectively valid. This requires that arguments are exchanged and that actors share a yardstick which allows them to equally assess the quality of arguments in a discourse. Truth, righteousness and appropriateness are three standards to intersubjectively evaluate the goodness of communicated ideas.19 If actors share a common conception of how to assess the quality of truth, normative and value-based claims, they can commonly factor out good from less compelling factual, normative or value-based arguments, substitute old by better ideas, and incrementally arrive at a consensus. A truth paradigm encompasses ontological, epistemological and methodological elements. Exchanged causal or factual arguments are conducive to ideational change and consensus, if the actors adhere to the same scientiﬁc paradigm and share expertise on the subject matter.20 Similarly, norm generating discourses can end in consensus, if actors share a standard of righteousness on which they measure how certain aims, procedures or scopes of norms express or hamper the fulﬁllment of their common interest. However, sharing a standard of righteousness does not help to solve questions of truth or vice versa. Common evaluative standards have to ﬁt the type of arguments made.
Unlike these discourses, judicial discourses deal with contested norms rather than
truth claims or common interests.21 Once norms are contested, a dilemma emerges:
in order to argumentatively solve norm interpretation conﬂicts, it would be necessary that actors consent on which common interest is expressed by a norm’s 18 J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply?’, p. 553ﬀ.
19 Ibid., pp. 562–3.
20 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1’, p. 45.
21 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns.Band 1’, p. 26–7, 114ﬀ.
Why discourse only matters sometimes 151 aim, procedure or scope, while the very fact that a case has been carried to Court indicates that there is dissent. Nevertheless, the parties of norm interpretation disputes are not trapped in talking at cross-purposes. Judicial discourses oﬀer an expedient: diﬀerent judicial methods of interpretation allow specifying what norms are about and to which situations they should be applied. In this sense, judicial methods of reasoning serve as additional yardsticks to commonly measure the quality of arguments. They diﬀer in their interpretational scope. The broadest scope has the historical method of judicial interpretation, which speciﬁes scope and content of legal norms through references to the initial will of the norm-creators.22 The teleological method is only slightly more speciﬁc, since it speciﬁes the purpose and content of a norm though analysing the general aim of the broader legal context: What is the purpose of the treaties and how does it relate to the norm in question?23 The directive-immanent teleological interpretational device is more speciﬁc than the general teleological means, since it speciﬁes content and scope of a disputed issue (for example, is exception X acceptable?) by analysing the general aim of the norm at hand. The general systematic method is a bit more speciﬁc than the general teleological one. It inquires into the broader legal context in order to solve interpretational questions of a norm embedded in the context: Is there another legal norm that delimits or speciﬁes the meaning of the norm in question?
The directive-immanent systematic method of legal interpretation is suited to solve more detailed interpretational issues by analysing the paragraph or article in question in the context of the whole legal norm: Are new concepts introduced in other paragraphs that deﬁne or delimit the issue in question? Are there exceptions in other parts of the norm that impact scope and content of the interpretational issue at hand? The wording method aims at solving interpretational diﬀerences of great detail by analysing the exact phrasing of the paragraph in question: Are new concepts introduced? How are they deﬁned? Are exceptions speciﬁed?
A shared standard of truth is not helpful in eﬀectively solving conﬂicts over values or vice versa.24 Similarly, not every judicial method of interpretation is suited to solve every interpretational problem. The interpretational scope of problems and judicial methods has to match; otherwise actors simply talk at cross-purposes. Some disputed issues are complex and characterised by imprecise, ill-deﬁned concepts concerning aims, procedures and applicatory scopes, many cross-references, several relevant paragraphs or articles, and complex exceptional
clauses. Other interpretational problems have narrow interpretational scopes:
Contested issues are highly speciﬁc and characterised by relatively precise concepts, few and accurate cross-references and clear-cut exceptional rules. Judicial interpretational techniques also vary in their scope. Some are broad, capture norms comprehensively and are suited to solve complex issues (for example, historical or teleological methods), others are narrow, focus on detailed interpretational diﬃculties and are suited to solve issues of detail (systematic method) or of great detail (wording method). Successful judicial discourses that produce intersubjectively valid consensual outcomes require ﬁrstly that the parties exchange arguments, secondly that they share a judicial method and thirdly that the latter 22 J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992).
23 H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice.
24 R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 33–50.
152 Diana Panke matches the interpretational scope of problem at stake.25 If these conditions are met, the parties do not talk at cross-purposes but can relate to their arguments in a meaningful manner, can commonly sort good judicial arguments from less convincing ones, and can incrementally develop consensual norm deﬁnitions.
National advocates are in close contacts with the responsible ministries and disseminate judicial arguments.26 If European and national advocates establish consensual norm deﬁnitions in the course of the one to two years of a written and oral judicial discourse, national advocates diﬀuse them together with the supporting arguments back into the ministries.27 This fosters domestic persuasion processes. If ministries at a minimum accept the legal expertise of their own advocate, they learn that judicial experts consider a particular interpretation as superior and that their initial norm interpretation cannot be justiﬁed any longer by valid good arguments. Actors who accept that non-compliance cannot be argumentatively justiﬁed lack means to coherently and plausibly excuse norm violations vis-à-vis European enforcement authorities.28 Argumentative entrapment changes the parameters for action: Continued non-compliance would either be irrational (violating new believes on which interpretations enforcement authorities might accept) or inappropriate (violating integrity, consistency or credibility norms) for aﬀected states. Hence, successful judicial discourses facilitate swift
policy changes that end norm violations. The hypothesis states:
Consensual norm interpretations leading to quick shifts into compliance are likely to be achieved in judicial discourses, if the parties do not argue at cross-purposes but share a judicial method ﬁtting to the interpretational scope of the contested issue.
IV. Case study
This section analyses the incorrect transposition of the European Drinking Water Directive (DWD, 80/778) in Germany, which had been referred to the ECJ in 1990 (case 237/90). This single case study has in-case variation on the independent variable and, therefore, reﬂects a most similar systems design. At the same time, it keeps country-speciﬁc variables (for example, political or legal culture, political and administrative capacities) and policy-ﬁeld characteristics (for example, domestic structure of interest organisation) constant.
Drinking water is one of the most highly regulated aliments. Hence it comes at no surprise that the DWD deﬁnes more than 60 quality standards for drinking water.
25 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1, pp. 412–39.
26 An example for a mismatch would be a narrow interpretational method applied to a complex problem. Interpreting diﬀerent articles or paragraphs with the wording method can lead to completely diﬀerent interpretations of the whole norm. Yet, the wording technique of interpretation cannot solve the problem of which article or paragraph (and their associated interpretations) should be given priority.
27 Interview ministry of ﬁnance, October 2004.