«A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of ...»
92 Ben Rosamond, „The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas‟, Journal of European Public Policy, 12: 2 (2005), pp. 237-254, p.
See for example, John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.) (New York:
Harper Collins, 1995) 39 “Entrepreneurs aim to induce authoritative political decisions that would not otherwise occur.”94 This comes about as a result of the policy entrepreneurs promoting policy proposals and ideas. Some of the important reasons outlined by Kingdon as to why entrepreneurs are willing to invest a wide range of resources (time, money, or reputation,) into this advocacy are personal interests and promotion of their values. 95 As we have seen above there are strong reasons to expect the European Commission to try to promote further integration. As a result, it will be promoting a particular type of policy proposals and values, which as far as the topic of this study is concerned means that it can be expected to argue in favour of creating a common area in the EU. This is why in Integration Studies the Commission is often referred to as supranational entrepreneur.96 In this study the Commission actions regarding the Blue Card initiative are the best example of it performing entrepreneurial activities that promote further integration. As the discussion in section 2.4.1. and the empirical findings in Chapters Three and Five show, functional spillover has also been an important tool used by the Commission in its attempts to promote further integration.
As the empirical chapters will demonstrate in detail, when this strategy is employed, at discursive level there are articulations that link the achievement of the goals of the internal market with the development of integration in other policy fields (such as border controls or social policy). 97 However, the ability of the Commission to successfully exercise independent entrepreneurial leadership is one of the major issues of disagreement between Neofunctionalism and its main theoretical rival Intergovernmentalism. On this matter, some
have argued against the position of Neo-functionalists and have maintained that:
“supranational organizations such as the European Commission exert little or no causal 94 Burns cited in Andrew Moravcsik, „A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation‟, International Organization, 53: 2 (1999), pp. 267-306, p. 271 95 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.) (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 122-123 96 Examples of such studies are Mark Pollack, „Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community‟, International Organization, 51: 1 (1997), pp. 99-134; Andrew Moravcsik, „A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation‟, International Organization, 53: 2 (1999), pp. 267-306; Neill Nugent, „The Leadership Capacity of the European Commission‟, Journal of European Public Policy, 2: 4 (1995), pp. 603-623 97 For a study that briefly reviews the traditional types of spillover and introduces a novel fourth type see Carsten Jensen, „Neofunctionalist Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38: 1 (2000), pp. 71- 92 40 influence.”98 Some of the most important contributions supporting this position have come from Moravcsik 99 and Pollack. 100 Ultimately, this is a debate that goes back to the ontological positions of what integration is.101 In my view, the focus of Intergovernmentalist accounts on grand Treaty bargains is too limited an understanding of integration. As such, this position is in danger of not paying attention to other important developments that are indispensable parts of integration. 102 One of the main weaknesses of Intergovernmentalism is that because it regards interests (national interests) as externally given, it cannot provide a satisfactory account of how agenda was set and the decision-making situations were framed. 103 Therefore, the Neofunctionalist understanding of integration as a process better captures such developments. This conception emphasises the importance of day-to-day inputs in 98 Mark Pollack, „International Relations Theory and European Integration‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 2 (2001), pp. 221-244, p. 225 99 Andrew Moravcsik, „A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation‟, International Organization, 53: 2 (1999), pp. 267-306 100 Mark Pollack, „Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community‟, International Organization, 51: 1 (1997), pp. 99-134; Mark Pollack, „The Commission as an Agent‟ in Neill Nugent (ed.), At the Heart of the Union – Studies of the European Commission (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-128; Mark Pollack, „The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union‟ in Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217- 249 101 A presentation of Intergovernmentalists‟ and Neo-functionalists‟ views of what integration is, goes beyond the scope of this research. The most recent Intergovernmentalist Theory in Integration Studies has been developed in a series of contributions by Andrew Moravcsik. See for example, Andrew Moravcsik, „Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community‟, International Organization, 45: 1 (1991), pp. 19-56; Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Andrew Moravcsik, „Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31: 4 (1993), pp. 473-524. Neofunctionalist thinking about integration is exemplified by the contributions in Ernst Haas, Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1996); Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963);
Philippe Schmitter, „Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration‟, International Organization, 23: 1 (1969), pp. 161-166 102 A good overview of the main criticisms to Intergovernmentalism is offered in Mark Pollack, „International Relations Theory and European Integration‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 2 (2001), pp. 221-244, pp. 226-227. This study‟s position on Intergovernmentalism is especially informed by the criticisms of the constructivist camp developed by Thomas Risse-Kappen, „Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 1 (1996), pp. 53-80; Jeffrey Lewis, „Is the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36: 4 (1998), pp. 479-504; Wayne Sandholtz, „Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht‟, International Organization, 47: 1 (1993), pp. 1-40; Wayne Sandholtz, „Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 3 (1996), pp. 403-429; Ben Tonra, Thomas Christiansen (eds), Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004) 103 Thomas Diez, „Riding the AM-Track through Europe; or, the Pitfalls of a Rationalist Journey through European Integration‟, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 28: 2 (1999), pp. 355-369, p. 363 41 integration, which: “stress that the enmeshment of member states in the larger framework of integration changes their identities, limits their institutional choices through path-dependencies, and accordingly strongly influences their interest formation”. 104 In such an understanding, the Commission does not only (as explained above) have a good reason to promote further integration but is also well placed to do so. In the next section, I elaborate on exactly how the Commission can promote its preferred option, thus contributing to the transformation of EU borders.
This Neo-functionalist argument provides a compelling case in favour of the expectation that the Commission will favour and is able to promote decreased salience of internal EU borders. Nevertheless, from the point of view of border configurations it has a serious flaw. Due to Neo-functionalism‟s concern with explaining integration, this theory is understandably focused on providing an account of the internal developments in the EU. Thus, the major findings of Neo-functionalism are related to elucidating transformations of internal EU borders. The theory, however, gives much less detail on the developments at the external EU borders. Indeed, it anticipates the emergence of dividing lines at the outer edges of the Union but does not contain more in-depth analysis on the issue. I elaborate on that matter in section 2.3.2.
Despite their disagreements on issues, such as the definition of integration and the ability of the Commission to exert independent influence, the studies referred to above share an important commonality. As I pointed out, they agree that the institutional structure of the EU prompts the Commission to try to increase its own powers. This will lead it to support further integration and decreased significance of internal borders. This, however, brings to the fore the issue of the study‟s understanding of borders.
2.3. Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Study In this section I aim to develop the theoretical framework that will enable me to demonstrate the inherent ambiguity in the way in which Commission discourse configures EU borders and as a result of that also transforms European borders. This will inform the empirical parts of the study. Achieving this requires me to advance my
104 Ibid., p. 360
42 positions on the academic debates reviewed above and my understandings of some terms and issues core to this study, such as borders, or discourse. Therefore, in this section, I spell out my stance on the core debates on borders and the European Commission presented above. I elaborate on how I perceive borders, analyse how the Commission influences border constructions and building on these, work out the different ways in which the Commission can configure various borders under integration.
2.3.1. What are borders?
This study sees borders not as an independent reality existing beyond people‟s knowledge of it but as socially constructed phenomenon. As the discussion in the Literature Review section has shown, one of the fundamental disagreements between the two major camps in Social Sciences is over the existence of an independent reality beyond our knowledge. On this issue, constructivists argue that reality as such is created through the social interaction of everyone involved. Berger and Luckman were among the first to explain this process. According to them, the interactions between agents and/ or structures lead to gradual habitualisation of human activity. The reason for this is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the different activities have to be performed more than once and in fact very often occur on a regular basis. Recurrent activities are habitualised because this allows their performance with making fewer efforts and with spending less time. However, a society will not be able to function effectively if each individual has a unique habitualisation of his/ her activity. Therefore, in order to enable the faster performance of routine actions, it is necessary for actors to reciprocally habitualise certain types of actions. This is what leads to the establishment of social practices. The latter are habitualised activities that have been accepted as the way for performing certain tasks in a particular group. Over time this acceptance of the social practices leads to their institutionalisation because this becomes the uniform and unchanging (or difficult to change) way for performing certain actions. 105 This acceptance can also be called “normalisation”. It is when a social practice has been successfully normalised that it starts to be taken as an objective reality. Thus, what positivists regard unquestioningly as a reality, has a very important history according to 105 Peter Berger, Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1967), pp. 71-72 43 constructivists. This history is related to the question of discursive struggles, which I look into below.
Importantly, as Berger and Luckman underline, the institutions created during the process of habitualisation, are objectively given to the individual in the sense that they exist over and beyond him/ her, they appear as given, difficult to change, and selfevident.106 The reason for that is the fact that institutions are results of social interaction.
Therefore, no single actor can be influential enough to be able to modify and transform institutions alone. The end result will always be an outcome derived from the activities of all the parties involved in the process and in that sense, it is not entirely subjective for anyone of them.
Following this reasoning, I regard borders as created in a process of social interaction107 that gives rise to specific social practices of inclusion and exclusion. Such social practices of inclusion and exclusion are also often referred to as “bordering practices”. As the review of the current research on EU borders has demonstrated, at the moment there is a very strong trend towards the construction of new types of borders as a result of the process of integration. Therefore, the bordering practices in the Union are also undergoing significant changes. They are characterised, for example, by a shift in the way, in which traditional inclusion/ exclusion along the lines of national-states is replaced by novel inclusion/ exclusion dynamics, such as between EU member states/ non-EU members. Importantly, this transformation also leads to a change in the meaning of borders. Today EU borders are often located in places different from their positions in the first half of the Twentieth century. Furthermore, there are modifications in the way inclusion and exclusion is implemented in practice.