«PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness URIAH KRIEGEL ABSTRACT Michael Tye has recently argued that ...»
Here and afterwards, I speak of a vehicle carrying a content. There is perhaps something odd in  thinking about the relation between vehicle and content as a carriage relation. But at least this usage of the term has the distinctive advantage of not being easily confused with more mundane uses.
 In talking about poised content, all we may defensibly mean is that a given content is poised in that it is carried by a state that plays the right functional role. I will return to this possibility towards the end of this section.
 It also makes sense for Tye to suggest that. Both types of states have non-conceptual representational content. And whether they have abstract and intentional content is irrelevant, since abstractness and intentionality cannot account for the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states. The only relevant difference is that V states lack a certain distinctive functional role which phenomenal experiences have.
 Tye writes: “It is worth noting that, given an appropriate elucidation of the ‘poised’ condition, blindsight poses no threat to the representationalist view … What is missing, on the PANIC theory, is the presence of appropriately poised, nonconceptual, representational states. There are nonconceptual states, no doubt representationally impoverished, that make a cognitive difference … But there is no complete, uni ed representation of the visual eld, the content of which is poised to make direct difference in beliefs” (Tye, 2000, pp. 62–63; italics original).
 Though one would expect the traditional problems of functionalism to bedevil disguised versions as well. In particular, I would predict a crisis for PANIC Theory in confronting the problem of absent qualia. Why should there be anything it is like to have a mental state which plays the right functional role D characteristic of poise? Conceivably, a functional duplicate of any human may have no phenomenal consciousness.
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